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Abstract 
The ability to perceive social information from another person is an important skill for 
successful everyday functioning. Given that deficits in this ability can be detrimental for 
wellbeing and relationships, it has unsurprisingly been the focus of much research. This has 
revealed notable individual differences in the general population; but relatively little work 
exists seeking to understand this variation. Moreover, sex and age differences have largely been 
studied with small samples and problematic stimuli. In this thesis, I addressed a number of 
major issues in the field of person perception through the lens of individual differences.  
In Chapter 3, I examined the individual differences architecture of emotion recognition 
across three modalities (face, body, voice), and observed that this ability is related to, yet 
distinct from, the recognition of facial identity, the construct of alexithymia (a trait reflecting 
difficulty in identifying and describing feelings), and general intelligence. In Chapter 4, I 
observed a moderate association between emotional expression and identity recognition even 
after adjusting for general intelligence. In Chapter 5, I observed a negative relationship between 
alexithymia and intelligence, independent of emotion recognition ability.  
In Chapter 6, I examined sex differences in facial and bodily emotion recognition, and 
observed a small but consistent female advantage for recognising facial disgust. Finally, in 
Chapter 7, I examined the effect of age on facial expression and facial identity recognition, and 
report significant age-related declines in both abilities that were independent of each other and 
of general intelligence.  
This thesis expands our understanding of key components of person perception. I have 
outlined a proposed structure of emotion recognition ability, and how this is related to identity 
recognition, cognitive ability, and demographic variables. I suggest that individual differences 
are highly important to consider at both the general (cognition) and specific (face-processing) 
levels of this ability.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Person perception involves attending to social information from another individual, and 
being able to comprehend and integrate this information to give the most appropriate response. 
This ability is highly important for forming and maintaining successful relationships with 
conspecifics, and deficits in person perception can result in psychiatric difficulties and social 
isolation. In this thesis, I will focus on two main aspects of person perception: recognition of 
emotional expressions, and recognition of facial identity. Both of these abilities are necessary 
for everyday functioning, and as such, have been the focus of substantial research. However, 
as I will outline further, there exist several limitations in the way that these abilities have been 
assessed, and this thesis seeks to address some of the major concerns.  
The first aspect of person perception, emotional expression recognition, is fundamental 
for nonverbal communication. It enables individuals to understand other people’s actions and 
infer their intentions, which then allows them to respond most appropriately (Bal et al., 2010). 
Emotional expressions can signal a source of threat in the environment, and as such, fast and 
accurate perception is highly adaptive for human survival. Furthermore, successful emotion 
recognition is associated with better social functioning (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & 
Salovey, 2006) and greater relationship well-being (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999). 
Conversely, an impairment in emotion recognition is associated with psychopathological 
disorders including (but not limited to) depression (Surguladze et al., 2004), social anxiety 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2006), and borderline personality disorder (Fenske et al., 2015).  
The second aspect of person perception I will focus on, face identity recognition, is 
also necessary for everyday interactions. Being able to instantly recognise a familiar person’s 
identity from their facial features allows one to adjust one’s response based on prior 
experiences with and knowledge of the other person. A deficit in this ability can be socially 
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debilitating and impact negatively on one’s quality of life, social interactions, and mental 
health (Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008).  
For emotional expression recognition and particularly identity recognition, much of 
the past research has tended to assume that the neurotypical population are similarly 
competent in their recognition ability (Rozin, Taylor, Ross, Bennett, & Hejmadi, 2005). The 
early literature also suggests that it is mostly individuals with specific neurological or 
psychiatric conditions whom exhibit difficulties with these everyday abilities, and traditional 
models have supported this dichotomous view. Some of the main theories are outlined below.  
 
1.1 Insights from Cognitive Models of Face Processing 
There have been two key cognitive models proposed that outline how the brain may 
process diverse information from the face. In their functional model of face recognition, 
Bruce and Young (1986) argued for a clear distinction between the processes underlying 
emotional expression and identity recognition. The model initially posited separate pathways 
for emotional expression and identity recognition that diverged after an early stage in face 
perception in part because of clinical studies of individuals with brain lesions, in which 
double dissociations between expression and identity were observed. Studies of brain lesion 
patients showed selective deficits on recognition facial expressions and facial identity 
(Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993). Some separation between these 
processes makes sense given we do not need to be familiar with an individual in order to 
decode their facial expressions, and we can easily recognise a familiar face regardless of the 
expression they are making.  
In line with Bruce and Young’s model of functional separation for these two abilities, 
Haxby and colleagues’ cognitive neuroscience model (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000) 
posited distinct brain regions for processing of variant and invariant facial cues. Whilst 
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invariant, stable characteristics (identity, age, sex) are processed in ventral occipitotemporal 
regions such as the lateral fusiform gyrus, variant facial cues (eye gaze or facial expression) 
involve the superior temporal sulcus (STS). These findings from neuroimaging studies of 
separate routes for expression and identity processing neatly reflect the functional distinction 
in Bruce and Young’s model, and therefore the framework was bolstered by converging 
evidence from different research areas.  
More recent work, however, has suggested a more nuanced association between these 
two core processes of face perception. Neuroimaging studies using fMRI have examined 
brain areas that were previously considered to be specialised to either facial expression 
(posterior STS) or facial identity (fusiform face area), and demonstrated that these regions 
can be activated in response to changes in either type of facial signal (Fox, Moon, Iaria, & 
Barton, 2009). Additionally, an asymmetric relationship has been reported in which 
variations in facial identity influenced the perception of facial expression, but variation in 
expression did not affect perception of identity (Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). This 
suggests a greater level of dependence between expression and identity recognition that was 
not predicted by the Bruce and Young or Haxby et al. models.  
It also suggests that the structure of face perception may reflect the demands of daily 
reality, insofar as it being necessary to recognise different facial expressions on the same 
person without perceiving a change in identity. Moreover, it seems reasonable that changes 
in identity can affect judgements of expression. Several studies have reported that changes 
in invariant facial signals, for example, face shape or sexually dimorphic facial features, can 
influence how variant facial signals (expressions) are perceived. As an example, Sacco and 
Hugenberg (2009) demonstrated that making faces appear more baby-like, i.e. by making 
them rounder with larger eyes, facilitated the perception of a fearful facial expression, whilst 
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
13 
 
making the faces appear older (smaller eyes and narrow face shape) facilitated the perception 
of anger.  
Other studies have noted that the judgements on sex and facial expression of a face 
are not entirely independent of each other. Rather, they show an interaction effect in that 
participants are quicker and more accurate at detecting an angry male face and a happy female 
face (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007). From this, it seems possible that 
there is some natural overlap in the features that denote masculinity and anger, e.g., heavy 
brow, inset eyes, large jaw, and also some overlap in features denoting femininity and 
happiness, e.g., rounded cheeks (Becker et al., 2007). What is clear from these studies is that 
processing of variant and invariant facial features is not as functionally distinct as classic 
theory would suggest.  
 
1.1.1 Individual Differences in Face Identity Recognition 
Whilst more recent work has indicated that processing of variant and invariant facial 
signals is not as functionally distinct as posited by traditional cognitive models, it still 
remains unclear as to the specific degree of overlap between these processes. Regarding facial 
expression and identity recognition, recent perspectives suggest that the evidence for overlap 
might arise from the early common perceptual stage that both abilities share, and that the 
evidence for functional separation comes from after the pathways diverge later in the face 
processing system. There exists some evidence for this, although more work is needed to 
clarify the extent of the overlap.  
Importantly, the widely accepted traditional view has been that the majority of the 
typical population perform similarly well on measures of face processing, and only 
individuals with neurological impairment will show relative difficulties. Recent work, 
however, has identified a greater variation in ability across the entire population than was 
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typically assumed (e.g. Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010). An individual differences 
perspective, then, is a highly worthwhile avenue to offer further insight on this issue, and the 
work of this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate.  
 
1.2 Insights from Evolutionary Models of Emotion Recognition 
Following on from classic cognitive models of face processing, a plausible 
explanation for the ability to recognise the variant signals of emotional expressions in others 
is that such ability evolved in order to serve an adaptive function. This evolutionary 
perspective was first outlined in Darwin’s seminal work on facial expressions of emotion 
(1872/1965) and inspired a great deal of academic debate in the field as to whether certain 
facial expressions are innate and universal, as posited by Darwin, or the degree to which they 
are culturally dependent, as proposed by others. Many researchers since Darwin’s work have 
argued in favour of a small subset of emotions that are termed ‘basic’, meaning fundamental 
and distinguishable emotional categories that may combine to form more complex emotions 
(Ekman, 1999). Nativist theories of emotion posit discrete emotional categories that are 
innate, adaptive, and initiated automatically and unconsciously by a natural, evolutionarily-
driven stressor in the environment (Izard, 2007). However, much discussion still centres on 
which emotional categories should be included in this ‘special’ status, as well as the 
biological or evolutionary mechanisms for why they are considered basic.   
Arguably the most common reason to posit the existence of basic emotions is to 
explain the empirical findings that some emotions seem to exist across all cultures. In a series 
of studies, Ekman and colleagues examined various developed Western and Eastern cultures 
(e.g. Brazil, United States of America, Argentina, Chile, and Japan), and found comparable 
identification of emotional expressions across all samples. Importantly, this finding extended 
to two pre-literate cultures from Borneo and New Guinea (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 
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1969), thus giving support to Ekman’s proposal that certain facial movements are universally 
associated with certain emotional categories. Ekman argued that these findings argue against 
the idea that culture-specific norms solely underpin the expression and recognition of basic 
facial emotions. Rather, cultural differences may instead emerge in the display norms 
associated with culture-specific social settings. Being able to adapt our human biological 
propensity to unique cultural environments is an adaptive and flexible faculty that has likely 
arisen from evolution (Nesse, 1990).  
If, as Darwin, Ekman, and others argue, the basic emotional expressions are intrinsic 
and universal, then an interesting question follows as to how these expressions have come 
about. Some emotion researchers have suggested that the basic emotions are biologically 
primitive and ‘hard-wired’ into our biological make-up. That is, there are features in the basic 
emotion categories that make them adaptive in an evolutionary sense, both in a non-
communicative, physiological way, but also as a means to quickly and effectively 
communicate important information to conspecifics. Successful expression and recognition 
of these emotions, then, is required for future survival and reproduction. Expressing disgust, 
for example, consists of wrinkling one’s nose, narrowing the eyes, and expelling the tongue, 
all actions which minimise the inhalation or congestion of potential contaminants in the 
environment (Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994). Being able to rapidly and accurately recognise 
these signals of disgust in a conspecific may alert the individual to harmful odours or a putrid 
foodstuff, and lead them (or their offspring) to avoid ingesting these potential toxins. This 
argument also holds for recognition of fear. The facial (and subsequent vocal) expressions of 
fear are automatic, high-contrast signals of immediate threat in the environment. Being able 
to recognise these signals at distance serves as a warning of danger that enables the individual 
and other members of the group to flee and reach safety or prepare for attack.  
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Finally, whilst outbursts of anger can often be viewed as irrational, the basic emotion 
still may have an adaptive basis. Angry expressions are associated with a narrowing of the 
eyes and lowering of the brow, features that are thought to be in preparation for an attack, as 
well as to signal the individual’s physical strength. These features of an angry facial 
expression may have in part evolved in order to signal physical dominance (lower brow, large 
jaw) and maturity (small eyes) to deter any would-be attackers in the group (Sacco & 
Hugenberg, 2009). Being able to recognise when someone (with greater physical strength) is 
angered and considering an attack would be hugely important for preparing for or attempting 
to avert the attack.  
 
1.2.1 Individual Differences in Emotional Expression Recognition 
As already outlined in the context of face identity recognition, traditional cognitive 
models have suggested that the majority of the population have similar recognition ability, 
but it is clear that individual differences have largely been overlooked. To a lesser extent, the 
same could be said for emotional expression recognition. Evolutionary theories of how 
emotions have evolved to serve an adaptive purpose suggest that neurologically healthy 
people are similarly skilful in their emotion recognition, but notable individual differences 
have been reported in this domain, for example, Lewis, Lefevre, and Young (2016). Studies 
such as Lewis et al. with sensitive measures have demonstrated that there is substantial 
variation in what is considered ‘typical’ recognition, with some individuals performing very 
accurately and others performing poorly.  
Many earlier emotion recognition studies used posed prototypical stimuli in which 
the target emotion was easy to identify and thus often resulted in ceiling effects. In addition, 
some emotional expression stimulus sets were developed to distinguish between the 
neurotypical population and people with neurological deficits. These stimulus sets are 
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therefore not suitable for examining the natural variation in the neurotypical population. This 
thesis seeks to overcome some of these limitations and use stimuli that have been morphed 
to different intensities and carefully piloted. This ensures their suitability for detecting subtle 
individual differences in performance, and extends our understanding of this ability in the 
general population. 
 
1.3 Individual Differences in Intelligence 
A further variable to consider when examining individual differences in person 
perception is that of intelligence, given the known large variation that exists in the general 
population. To the extent that facial expression and facial identity recognition do share 
common perceptual processes, an interesting question is if this common stage of overlap is 
reflective of broader cognitive processes. There have been mixed findings concerning the 
association of general cognition to face perception abilities. In the domain of facial 
expression recognition, several studies have noted a moderate positive correlation with 
general intelligence (Borod et al., 2000; Lewis et al., 2016; Schlegel & Scherer, 2016), 
although a significant association has not been noted unanimously (e.g. Palermo, O’Connor, 
Davis, Irons, & McKone, 2013).  
In the domain of facial identity recognition, an absence of a significant relationship 
with intelligence has often been reported (e.g. Palermo et al., 2013, Wilmer, Germine, & 
Nakayama, 2014), and identity recognition has been considered a ‘special ability’ distinct 
from broader cognitive abilities (Wilmer et al., 2010). However, other studies do report a 
modest association with general intelligence (e.g. Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015), and as with 
many other areas of research, the discrepancy may have arisen from differences in 
methodology, samples, and measures. This thesis seeks to disentangle the individual 
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differences that exist in both emotion and identity recognition from the independent 
differences present in general intelligence. 
  
1.4 Individual Differences in Emotional Expression Recognition: Factor Structure 
As outlined above, person perception abilities have been a topic of enduring interest. 
Regarding the individual differences structure of this ability, however, there exists far fewer 
studies. Of those, there is debate as to whether all facial expressions are processed by a single, 
general facial affect recognition system or whether specific neural networks underlie 
recognition of discrete categories of individual emotions. This section will first consider 
evidence from both behavioural and neuroimaging studies in order to examine the main 
theoretical perspectives in the field. Secondly, it will consider individual differences work that 
has used a factor analytic approach, to give an outline of the proposed structure of emotion 
recognition.  
1.4.1 Emotion specificity: brain injury and neuroimaging studies 
To date, arguments for functional specialisation of emotion recognition have in part 
arisen through neuropsychological work involving participants with brain injury. These studies 
have suggested that specialised neural networks are implicated in the recognition of individual 
emotions, and that damage to these areas results in a deficit in recognising a particular emotion. 
For example, previous work has observed that patients with amygdala lesions often fail to 
recognise fearful facial expressions (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994).  
In contrast, other researchers have argued that amygdala-damaged individuals can 
exhibit difficulties with other emotions as well, for example, disgust (Rapcsak et al., 2000). 
Moreover, Rapcsak and colleagues reported no significant difference in the recognition of fear 
between subjects with or without amygdala damage, evidence against a selective fear 
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
19 
 
impairment in the amygdala-damaged population. Thus whilst damage to various brain 
structures can disrupt typical emotion recognition, this disruption may not necessarily affect 
specific emotions, even if specialised neural networks are damaged (Rapcsak et al., 2000). 
Further empirical support for the emotion-specific networks hypothesis has been argued 
in the domains of other emotions. Firstly, damage to the basal ganglia, for example in 
Huntington’s disease or Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, has been associated with impaired 
recognition of disgust (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997). Furthermore, healthy participants given a 
dose of anti-anxiety drug Diazepam showed a selective impairment in recognition of anger 
whilst the other emotions were unaffected (Blair & Curran, 1999). 
1.4.2 Valence specificity 
Whilst a number of studies have argued for specialisation of recognition of individual 
emotions, other work has argued instead for differential recognition of positive and negative 
emotions. Adolphs and colleagues (1999) argue that although amygdala damage has been 
shown to impair fear recognition in particular, it also impairs recognition of the other negative 
emotions, whereas happiness recognition remains preserved. In contrast, meta-analytic work 
by Ruffman and colleagues (2008) reported that age-related decline largely affects recognition 
of the negative emotions, but that it did have some impact on happiness recognition. They also 
reported that older groups showed relative preservation of disgust recognition, which 
neurological perspectives have argued may be due to structures within the basal ganglia 
showing a slower age-related decline than areas associated with other emotions, for example, 
the amygdala (Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008).  
The inconsistency in the reported valence effect findings may have arisen, at least in 
part, due to inequalities in the tested emotions themselves. Many studies test four negative 
emotions (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) and two positive emotions (happiness and 
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surprise), the last of which is debated as to its inherent valence (Rosenberg, Dethier, Kessels, 
Westbrook, & McDonald, 2015). Additionally, research indicates that these six emotions are 
not equally difficult to recognise, for example, average accuracy scores are reported as highest 
for happiness (94%), and lowest for fear (70%), and that putative valence effects may be 
confounded by ceiling effects in the positive emotions.  
1.4.3 Emotion generality: evidence from behavioural studies 
In the behavioural domain, studies suggest a general ability in recognising emotions 
across categories, and also extend this to recognition of emotions across different sensory 
modalities. In a study of 166 individuals, Rozin and colleagues (2005) tested the four negative 
emotions (anger, disgust, fear and sadness) in four modalities (face, body, dance and hand 
gestures), and noted significant positive correlations between the individual emotions (.42-
.62), and also between the modality subtests (.29-.54). Whilst there was considerable 
variation in overall accuracy scores within the sample, there was no evidence of participants 
showing a selective difficulty with any particular emotion (Rozin et al., 2005).  
Behavioural evidence also suggests a substantial overlap in recognition of emotions 
between the visual and auditory modalities, at least when presented simultaneously. de 
Gelder and Vroomen (2000) asked participants (N=44) to interpret the emotional state of 
either a static face or a spoken sentence. Even when instructed to ignore one of the sensory 
sources, participants were still affected by this concurrent information when making the 
emotion judgement, suggesting that the audio-visual integration of emotional information is 
somewhat automatic and involuntary. It also appears to be advantageous: a robust 
behavioural finding in the literature is that unimodal (i.e. face only) emotion displays are 
recognised at a slower and less accurate level than the congruent bimodal (i.e. face and voice) 
condition (Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 2001). 
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1.4.4 Emotion generality: evidence from neuroimaging studies 
 Neuroimaging studies also offer compelling evidence of emotion recognition across 
modalities. A range of brain regions show greater activation to multimodal than to unimodal 
emotion expressions. Specifically, the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) meets 
Calvert, Campbell, and Brammer’s (2000) criteria of a multimodal region, by demonstrating 
a supra-additive response to audio-visual stimuli (Hagan et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies have shown that disruption to left pSTS 
activity results in reduction or loss of the McGurk effect (Beauchamp, Nath, & Pasalar, 
2010). Calder and Young (2005) also posit parts of the pSTS as having cells that receive 
input from multi-sensory brain regions, and are involved in dealing with changeable aspects 
of faces, for example, lip movement and eye-gaze. It is thought that this region is crucial in 
integrating signals from different sensory channels in order to determine the emotional state 
and attention of conspecifics (Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992), as well as detecting 
incongruity in an individual’s expressions that may suggest deception (Schirmer & Adolphs, 
2017).   
1.4.5 Emotion generality: evidence from structural equation modeling (SEM) 
Suzuki, Hoshino, and Shigemasu (2010) (Ntotal=805) tested participants on the five 
basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness) and found support for a general 
recognition ability across emotions. Their SEM analysis indicated that the best fitting model 
was a single factor that loaded substantially onto the four negative emotions (coefficients of 
.64) with a weaker loading onto happiness (.18), although all loadings were statistically 
significant. The authors suggested a minimal overlap between positive and negative emotions 
but noted that the valences were not completely independent from each other.  
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Schlegel, Grandjean, and Scherer (2012) (N1=305; N2=295) also reported that a 
general factor model fitted their data best with added minor factors for confused emotions, 
e.g. anger and irritation. Furthermore, a model positing a single factor underlying emotion 
recognition across the both audio and video presentation showed an excellent fit to the data, 
thereby supporting earlier behavioural and neuroimaging work that emotion recognition 
reflects a multimodal ability.  
Schlegel and colleagues’ (2012) second study also supported a general factor model 
(with additional latent factors for positive and negative emotions in which surprise correlated 
with both valence factors) showing the best fit to the data. Moreover, the high correlation 
(.77) between the two valence factors suggests a substantial overlap between positive and 
negative emotion recognition ability. The authors proposed that these two valence factors are 
sub-dimensions of a broad general emotion recognition ability, with valence factors being 
highly correlated, not distinct.  
 In the visual domain, Lewis et al. (2016) carried out three studies of face and body 
emotion recognition, and reported the best fitting model to be a higher-order structure in 
which there was an emotion-general multimodal factor acting indirectly on the face and body 
manifest variables, as well as direct face-specific and emotion-specific modality-general 
factors. These findings suggest that emotion recognition ability operates at broader emotion-
general and modality-general levels, with more specific factors for individual emotions or 
modalities being subsumed under this single dimension.  
In sum, across a range of behavioural (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000), neuroimaging 
(Calder & Young, 2005), and structural modeling (Lewis et al., 2016) studies, the majority of 
evidence appears to suggest that a single underlying dimension best reflects the structure of 
emotion recognition, regardless of the sensory modality or emotion category. This thesis 
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(Chapter 3) seeks to contribute to the debate in this area by examining the individual differences 
structure of emotion recognition ability across visual (face, body) and auditory (voice) 
modalities. Importantly, I will assess this ability using stimuli that are sufficiently sensitive to 
detecting subtle individual variation in this domain. The association of this ability to clinical 
and demographic traits will also be examined. This will contribute to our understanding of the 
nature of emotion recognition ability, and place it in the context of wider person perception.  
 
1.5 Outcomes of Individual Differences in Emotional Expression Recognition: 
Psychopathology 
 Investigating individual differences in person perception is of particular importance 
given its real-life implications. For example, there are a number of outcomes that are related 
to the ability to recognise emotional expressions. One of the most salient outcomes is the 
positive association between emotion recognition deficits and risk of psychopathology,  
particularly those disorders characterised by impairments in interpersonal functioning. A 
general impairment in processing emotional expressions has been noted for several disorders, 
including psychopathy, autism spectrum disorder, schizophrenia, depression, and social 
anxiety disorder.  
Importantly for the focus of this thesis, individual differences exist in many of these 
dimensional disorders, both above and below clinical thresholds, but this has not been well 
examined. In the following section, I review the work to date and consider how an individual 
differences approach is necessary for furthering our knowledge of emotion recognition deficits 
in these heterogeneous populations.   
  
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
24 
 
1.5.1 Autism  
Autism, or autism spectrum disorder (hereafter autism), is the collective term for the 
pervasive developmental disorders that are characterised largely by repetitive and rigid 
behaviours, difficulties with reciprocal social interaction, and impaired verbal and non-verbal 
communicative skills. These social difficulties can be apparent from late infancy onwards 
(Ozonoff, Heung, Byrd, Hansen, & Hertz-Picciotto, 2008), and include, although not limited 
to, lack of orientation to faces, impairment in the social use of eye gaze, difficulty initiating 
communicative interactions, and impaired social cognition (Weiss & Harris, 2001; Rao, Beidel, 
& Murray, 2008).  
In particular, difficulty in the recognition of emotional expressions is often suggested 
as a core feature of the social impairment associated with these disorders. Many studies report 
generalised deficits across a range of emotions (Bal et al., 2010), whilst others report selective 
impairments for specific emotions such as fear (Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard, & Behrmann, 
2007).  
One important account recently proposed for the large discrepancy in emotion 
recognition in autism is that of co-occurring alexithymia (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013). 
Alexithymia, outlined in more depth in the following section, consists of difficulties identifying 
and verbalising emotions, impaired interoceptive abilities, and a concrete style of thinking. The 
condition has a prevalence of 10% in the general population, but some degree of alexithymia 
exists in approximately 50% of individuals with autism (Cook et al., 2013), with some 
estimates as high as 65% (Bird & Cook, 2013). However, despite the high levels of 
comorbidity, these are independent constructs: not all autistic individuals are alexithymic and 
equally, some individuals experience severe alexithymia without evidence of autism.  
This recent perspective suggested is that it is the comorbid alexithymic component in 
autism that is associated with their emotional impairments, rather than a deficit caused by 
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autism itself (Cook et al., 2013). The authors observed that there were no group differences in 
expression recognition between the autistic sample and alexithymia-matched healthy controls. 
Alexithymia correlated with accuracy of facial expression recognition, and importantly, it 
remained a significant predictor of recognition accuracy even when adjusting for intelligence, 
age, sex, or autism. In contrast, autism did not account for a significant proportion of variance 
in expression recognition. These results may help to disentangle the highly mixed findings of 
emotional deficits in autism, given that the majority of studies have not adjusted for this 
commonly co-occurring construct. It is plausible that the studies that observed emotional 
deficits in autism had a greater proportion of highly alexithymic individuals, particularly in 
view of the different prevalences of the construct in autistic and neurotypical populations. 
Future studies, then, should measure alexithymia in order to distinguish if any emotional 
difficulties appear to be explained by autism or comorbid alexithymia.  
1.5.2 Alexithymia 
As outlined above, alexithymia is a subclinical personality construct associated with 
difficulty identifying and describing one's own emotions, impairment in differentiating 
emotional arousal from bodily sensations, and an externally-oriented cognitive style. 
Alexithymia frequently co-occurs with many developmental and psychological disorders, 
including autism, eating disorders, anxiety, depression, and somatoform disorders (e.g. limb 
pain, stomach disturbance).  
With regards to emotion recognition ability, behavioural studies have consistently 
reported that higher levels of alexithymia are associated with decreased emotion recognition 
accuracy (Lane, Sechrest, Reidel, Shapiro, & Kaszniak, 2000). Montebarocci, Surcinelli, 
Rossi, & Baldaro (2011) proposed that lower verbal ability was associated with alexithymia, 
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and observed that the difference in emotion recognition performance between people with low 
and high alexithymia disappeared when adjusting for verbal intelligence.  
The perspective of verbal difficulties as a potential mechanism for alexithymia has been 
proposed in a recent paper by Hobson and colleagues (2019). In their alexithymia-language 
hypothesis, they argue that early language abilities contribute to typical emotional 
understanding and development, and therefore infant or childhood language difficulties may 
give rise to emotional difficulties in later life (Hobson, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2019). They 
support this perspective with studies of children with speech and language impairments, 
hearing impairment or deafness, and autism spectrum disorder, all of whom show early deficits 
in typical language development, and which is associated with later difficulties in regulating 
and recognising emotions, empathy, and broader social interactions.  
Converse to Montebarocci et al’s and Hobson et al.’s verbal difficulties perspectives, 
Lane et al. (1995) proposed that the negative correlation between alexithymia and emotion 
recognition accuracy is a result of both verbal and nonverbal difficulties. They tested 380 
participants on the Perception of Affect Task (PAT) which comprises four verbal or nonverbal 
emotional tasks. Individuals higher in alexithymia showed reduced accuracy across the total 
PAT, regardless of the verbal or nonverbal nature of the task. The authors argued that 
alexithymia has been long defined as being a difficulty with putting emotions into words, but 
that the condition may be better conceptualised as a more general deficit in emotion processing. 
In rebuttal, Hobson et al. (2019) argue that a nonverbal emotion recognition task fails to 
acknowledge the role of language in early emotional development, thus why alexithymic 
individuals will struggle on emotional tasks even in the absence of linguistic demands. In sum, 
it remains difficult to tease apart the verbal and nonverbal abilities that are important in 
alexithymia, and this thesis aims to offer an additional perspective on this ongoing debate.  
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1.5.3 Social Anxiety Disorder 
Social anxiety is a type of anxiety that is marked by avoidance of situations with 
potential negative evaluation, a tendency which may result in damage to their educational, 
occupational, and social lives. In terms of emotion recognition, some studies report evidence 
of enhanced accuracy for negatively valenced faces (Winton et al., 1995; Mogg, Philippot and 
Bradley, 2004), whilst others report avoidance to angry faces, which the authors suggest as a 
mechanism for not wanting to engage with the facial expression at all (Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, 
& Chen, 1999).  
In contrast, Button and colleagues (2013) reported that socially anxious individuals may 
not have a problem accurately decoding a facial expression such as anger per se but show 
differences relative to healthy controls in their interpretation of how threatening they perceive 
this expression to be. They also highlighted that misinterpretations were most likely to occur 
when the individual was uncertain (i.e., for more subtle expressions), and that this effect is not 
specific to negative emotions but is instead reflective of a general response bias in expression 
decoding (Button, Lewis, Penton-Voak, & Munafò, 2013).  
The nature of emotional difficulties in social anxiety is particularly relevant for the 
current thesis in light of recent work highlighting how aspects of this disorder can resemble 
core social deficits of autism (White, Bray, & Ollendick, 2012). Through factor analytic work, 
these authors highlighted a substantial overlap in the constructs of social difficulties in both of 
these disorders. Specifically, both autism and social anxiety measures captured a lack of 
enjoyment and avoidance of social situations, and a preference for aloneness. Whilst these two 
latent factors were statistically distinct, they show considerable overlap and a high prevalence 
of comorbidity (up to 57%: Kuusikko et al., 2008), and therefore White and colleagues (2012) 
suggested that both disorders should be measured when examining either one of these 
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populations. This may be particularly appropriate for high-functioning individuals, in which 
self-reported social difficulties could reflect either socially anxious or autism-like traits.  
Given the considerable prevalence of emotional difficulties in autism, alexithymia, and 
social anxiety, then, as well as the highlighted comorbidities between them, the current thesis 
(Chapter 3: Study 1) will assess individuals on all three of these traits. In this way, any emotion 
recognition deficits observed will not be misattributed to a co-occurring disorder.  
 
1.6 Individual Differences in Person Perception  
A further salient factor in person perception is how individual differences are 
influenced by demographic variables. In this section, I will firstly review the literature on how 
a person’s sex interacts with emotion expression recognition ability, given the widely held view 
of female superiority in this domain. Secondly, I will review how both facial emotion and facial 
identity recognition are reported to change across the adult lifespan. In both, I will consider in 
particular how individual differences have been somewhat overlooked, and that using more 
suitable tests is crucial to detecting any subtle differences that may exist.   
1.6.1 Sex Differences 
Sex differences in emotional expression recognition have been examined extensively, 
but findings in this area have been mixed. A small but significant advantage for females is 
reported in the four meta-analyses that have been carried out (Hall, 1978, 1984; McClure, 2000; 
Thompson & Voyer, 2014). However, other studies report more mixed or null findings (e.g. 
Rahman, Wilson, & Abrahams, 2004; Lyusin & Ovsyannikova, 2016). This is due, at least in 
part, to the wide variety of stimuli and design that have been employed across the numerous 
studies. Many use a forced-choice paradigm (Rotter & Rotter, 1988; Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, 
Rukavina, & Traue, 2010) with a variety of tested basic emotions. Others have used a visual 
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search task (Williams & Mattingley, 2006; Sawada et al., 2014). The stimuli chosen have 
typically been prototypical expressions of posed emotion, such as the Ekman set of faces 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976), and the relative ease of recognition of these expressions often 
generates maximum accuracy scores and ceiling effects that obscure any group differences. 
Moreover, the sample sizes in many of these studies are very small (i.e. N<100) and therefore 
they lack the statistical power to detect any potential, and likely modest, effects. In addition, 
the most recent meta-analysis (Thompson & Voyer, 2014) indicated the presence of publication 
bias in the field, so the small general advantage for females in emotion recognition should be 
interpreted with some caution.  
This thesis (Chapter 6) will address some of the challenges faced by previous work in 
this area, and attempt to offer more conclusive findings. Sex differences in both facial and 
bodily emotional expression recognition will be assessed using stimulus sets that have been 
morphed to different intensities to increase task difficulty and avoid ceiling effects. Any 
significant findings from the first sample of this chapter will be tested in two further 
independent samples so that results are more robust and replicable than have typically been 
reported in earlier studies.  
1.6.2 Age Differences 
Adult age is another important demographic variable that can contribute to the 
individual differences observed in person perception abilities. Much emotional development 
reaches peak performance by early adulthood, but an interesting question is how this changes 
with advancing adult age. That is, for how long does optimal performance last, and when and 
how does age start to impact on this ability? Studies examining age effects on emotion 
recognition have consistently reported declines across the basic emotions which is evident from 
middle adulthood onwards (Calder et al., 2003). These authors implicated the specific 
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emotional categories of anger, fear and sadness, with disgust recognition showing evidence of 
a relative improvement or preservation with age.   
A meta-analysis of 28 datasets (total N=1667) supported the general consensus of age-
related difficulties in emotion recognition, which is evident across sensory modalities (voices, 
bodies, and face-voice matching) and basic emotional categories. In line with much of the 
previous research, particular difficulties were noted for anger and sadness and to a lesser extent, 
fear recognition, in older adults (average age: 71) relative to younger adults (average age: 24) 
(Ruffman et al., 2008). The authors also noted the preservation of disgust recognition that is 
observed in other studies.  
A key question concerning age effects of emotion recognition is the mechanism 
responsible for the observed decline. As outlined above, one posited account is the known age-
related declines in general intelligence (Deary, 2001; Salthouse, 2010) and/or in sensory 
abilities (Lima, Alves, Scott, & Castro, 2014). Emotion recognition performance may not be 
restricted by understanding and perception of emotional expressions specifically, but by 
broader task demands. A decline in fluid abilities such as processing speed, working memory, 
spatial reasoning, or impairment to vision and/or hearing may substantially contribute to the 
observed decline across emotion recognition tests.  
Some studies have sought to include control variables of cognition, but have frequently 
used rough proxies, for example, level of education (e.g. Mill, Allik, Realo, & Valk, 2009; 
Sasson et al., 2010) or a single test of matrix reasoning or processing speed (e.g. Horning, 
Cornwell, & Davis., 2012; West et al., 2012). Accuracy did not change when adjusting for 
these various proxies of cognition, suggesting an independent effect of age on emotion 
recognition. However, a broader battery of cognitive tests is required to fully capture the 
variance associated with intelligence. The question of age effects on facial emotion recognition 
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will be examined in this thesis (Chapter 7) using a well-established battery of general 
intelligence.  
1.7 The Current Thesis 
 As outlined in the sections above, accurate perception of emotional expressions and 
facial identities is crucial for successfully navigating the social world and for being made 
rapidly aware of imminent threats in the physical environment. This thesis will examine a 
cluster of these person perception abilities, and use an individual differences approach to 
overcome some limitations of earlier work in the field.  
 Firstly, we know that emotions can be expressed through a variety of sensory channels, 
most commonly the face, body, and voice. Whilst we can recognise expressions from across 
these channels, little is known regarding the individual differences structure of emotional 
expression recognition ability. That is, if you are particularly good at recognising facial 
expressions of emotion, does this mean you are equally good at decoding bodily and vocal 
expressions as well? This research question comprises the first main aim of this thesis. In 
Chapter 3 (Study 1), I will use structural equation modeling to examine whether a general factor 
underpins recognition of expressions across these three sensory modalities.  
If such a general factor appears to exist, the second main aim of the thesis is to 
determine how this general ability relates to broader non-emotional cognitive and affective 
traits (Chapter 3: Studies 2 and 3). This will help to clarify the specificity of the ability factor. 
In other words, is this putative factor associated only with expression recognition or does it 
encompass other face perception abilities or general intelligence? In Chapter 4, I will further 
investigate this question. Specifically, I aim to explore the degree of separation between facial 
expression and facial identity recognition, as posited by classic cognitive models of face 
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perception (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000), and also whether any shared variance 
is reflective of broader cognitive or perceptual functioning.  
Further to the question of broader links to expression recognition, the third main thesis 
aim is to investigate the relation of the emotion factor to general cognitive ability and to 
clinically-relevant traits involving emotional difficulties. In Chapter 5, I will examine whether 
the alexithymia construct shows an association with intelligence when adjusting for deficits in 
facial and supramodal (face, body, voice) emotion recognition ability.   
The fourth main research aim examines how emotional expression recognition is 
affected by a person’s sex. It has often been reported in earlier literature that females show 
superior performance in this regard, but empirical samples have typically been small and 
ceiling effects are common. Using robust samples of data, Chapter 6 will examine sex 
differences in facial and bodily expression recognition across three large, healthy samples, with 
a view to offering a more reliable conclusion than has previously been available.  
Finally, the fifth research aim of the thesis concerns how person perception changes 
across the adult lifespan. In Chapter 7, I will leverage data from a large, age-diverse, healthy 
sample to examine how facial expression recognition and facial identity recognition change 
across adult age, and whether any change in these abilities is independent from the widely 
established age-related decline in general intelligence.   
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
 For the novel data collected in this thesis, the behavioural tests were chosen based on 
their ability to detect subtle individual differences (for example, using stimuli morphed to show 
facial expressions at different intensities). These stimuli had also been piloted prior to the main 
testing to select those that reduced the possibility of floor or ceiling effects.  
For secondary data, the tests were already chosen by researchers on a separate project. 
This is why there are differences between papers in this thesis with regards to the tests of 
expression recognition, identity recognition, and intelligence.  
Examples of each of the visual tasks’ stimuli are shown in the respective subsections 
below. An outline of the independence or overlap of the studies in this thesis is included at the 
end of this methods chapter.    
2.1 Emotion Recognition 
2.1.1 Face Emotion Expression Recognition 
The vast majority of emotion recognition studies have used static faces as emotion 
recognition stimuli. Many databases and stimulus sets have been developed over the past few 
decades of research, and one of the most extensively used stimulus 
sets is the standardised black and white prototypical facial 
expressions set developed by Ekman and colleagues (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976). This set consists of 10 Caucasian individuals (six 
female and four male) portraying posed expressions of the six 
discrete ‘basic’ emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
and surprise. These are considered basic emotions in the sense that 
they are innate, recognised and expressed universally across 
Fig 1. Exemplar image of 
an Ekman face (Young et 
al., 2002).  
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different cultures, and are thought to have evolved as an adaptive function to urgent and 
potentially life-threatening obstacles in the environment (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992). Given 
that the standardisation of this stimulus set, and its speed and ease of administering to 
participants, it has been widely used across emotion research since its development.  
However, because these stimuli display full blown emotional expressions, ceiling 
effects are often observed in samples of neurotypical individuals with no emotion perception 
impairments. Because of this, then, some studies have morphed the facial expressions to 
differing intensities to increase task difficulty and individual variation (Young, Perrett, Calder, 
Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). Another task using the Ekman faces, the Emotion Hexagon, 
comprises stimuli made from two discrete facial expression categories that have been morphed 
together to create a blended expression on a continuum between the two emotions, e.g. 90% 
anger, 10% disgust. The emotional categories that were blended together were always two 
emotions that were most easily confused with each other, and were as follows: anger-disgust, 
disgust-sadness, sadness-fear, fear-surprise, surprise-happiness, and happiness-anger.  
The ecological validity of these stimuli have been questioned by several researchers, 
who argue that prototypical, static expressions are rarely encountered in ecological contexts 
(Isaacowitz & Stanley, 2011). They have also been criticised as being contextually 
impoverished, and it is plausible that this may contribute to the deficits observed in clinical 
populations. In real life situations, individuals who are older or who exhibit emotional 
difficulties may be able to compensate by using abnormal processing strategies (Adolphs, 
Sears, & Piven, 2001) or by using cues from other sources, such as gesture or voice (Isaacowitz 
& Stanley, 2011). In the context of older individuals, Ruffman (2011) argues that static 
emotional images could be improved upon in the future, but are still useful for research 
purposes. It may be informative that older adults show age-related deficits on these stimuli 
relative to younger adults, given that their prototypical nature and longer presentation duration 
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may make the emotion easier to accurately recognise than the often more subtle and rapid 
expressions displayed in everyday interactions.  
In the current thesis, facial emotion expression recognition was measured using stimuli 
from the Facial Emotional Expressions: Stimuli and Tests (FEEST) set that had selected items 
from Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) Pictures of Facial Affect series. The FEEST images had been 
morphed so as to systematically differ in intensity between neutral and full blown expressions, 
and piloted in a previous study, so that items with suitable accuracies (i.e. no floor or ceiling 
effects) were able to be selected (Lewis et al., 2016). This meant that task difficulty was 
appropriately increased and subtle individual differences within neurotypical samples were 
able to be observed.  
2.1.2 Body Emotion Expression Recognition 
Much less empirical research has focused on emotion expressions conveyed by the 
body, relative to face or voice expression recognition. Of those that have, a variety of 
approaches have been taken to display bodily expression stimuli of the basic emotions, 
including static images of body postures, and dynamic videos of body movements. Dynamic 
body expressions are argued to be more ecologically valid than static displays, and are able to 
convey a greater amount of information to the receiver. For this reason, empirical findings 
suggest that dynamic displays are more accurately and efficiently recognised than their static 
counterparts (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004).  
One type of dynamic body expression is point-light displays (Brownlow, Dixon, 
Egbert, & Radcliffe, 1997). This type of display was first devised by Johansson (1973), and is 
generated by placing a number of light patches on joints of the body. The static form 
information is then removed, leaving only illuminated dots representing the location of the joint 
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patches. When static, the configuration of dots can look 
somewhat random, but when moving in a short video clip, the 
dots reliably give the percept of a dynamic individual. These 
point-light displays are sufficient for individuals to perceive 
gender, as well as detecting a familiar person through their gait 
or detecting a type of action being conveyed. In emotion 
research, the basic emotions can be reliably recognised from 
point-light displays (Walk & Homan, 1984), although 
differences in mean accuracies between the emotions have been noted (Atkinson et al., 2004).  
In this thesis, body emotion expression recognition was measured using point-light 
displays developed by Atkinson and colleagues (2004). These displays comprised 10 actors 
portraying the five basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) at three levels of 
emotional intensity (typical, exaggerated, very exaggerated), and were piloted in a previous 
study to select items suitable for individual differences research (Lewis et al., 2016).  
2.1.3 Voice Emotion Expression Recognition 
A considerable amount of research exists on vocal expression recognition, and findings 
suggest that emotional categories can be accurately recognised from the voice (Schröder, 
2003). An effective way of measuring vocal expression recognition of the basic emotions is 
through nonverbal bursts of affect, given that these require minimal linguistic processing and 
can be used across different cultures to test the universality of emotion hypothesis in the 
auditory domain.  
In this thesis, vocal emotion expression recognition was measured using stimuli drawn 
from the Montreal Affective Voices (MAV) set (Belin, Fillion-Bilodeau, & Gosselin, 2008). 
This set consists of 10 actors (five males) portraying nine emotions (anger, disgust, fear, pain, 
Fig 2. Exemplar image of a 
point light display (Atkinson et 
al., 2004).  
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sadness, surprise, happiness, pleasure and neutral) in short nonverbal audio bursts, for example, 
screams or laughs. For the purposes of comparison with the face and body stimuli, the audio 
bursts corresponding to the five basic emotions were selected, although it should be noted that 
the ‘pleasure’ bursts were used as a proxy for happiness, due to pervasive ceiling effects 
observed in the happiness category. An additional strength of using the MAV set is its design 
as a counterpart to the Ekman facial expression stimuli, and therefore is a suitable measure for 
comparing recognition accuracy across sensory modalities (Belin et al., 2008). Given that a 
fundamental research question of this thesis is the multi-modal nature of emotion recognition 
ability, it seems pertinent to choose stimuli sets that are somewhat comparable.  
2.2 Identity Recognition 
 Several tests of face identity recognition are presented within this thesis. Their overall 
format, strengths, and weaknesses are discussed below.  
2.2.1 Benton Facial Recognition Test 
The Benton Facial Recognition Test is a widely used test of unfamiliar face recognition, 
and the long form of the test involves 22 trials (and 54 responses) (Benton & Van Allen, 1968). 
A short form of the test comprising 13 trials (27 responses) was later developed (Levin, 
Hamsher, & Benton, 1975), and since then, the relative ease and brevity of administering the 
test has made it an established choice amongst face perception researchers.  
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The format of the test is as follows; for every trial, 
the participant is shown a target face, and below this, six 
test faces. The participant is required to indicate which of 
the test faces matches the identity of the target. In the first 
six trials, there is only one face that matches the target 
identity and this image is identical to the target. In the 
following seven trials, three of the six test faces match the 
target, and there is a change in viewpoint or lighting. The 
faces are cropped so no clothing and little hair is shown, and 
no time limit is imposed upon participants who can take as long as they need to respond.  
Whilst the test has been widely used, it has attracted some criticism regarding the 
possibility of individuals being able to use feature matching (e.g. using hairline or eyebrows) 
to obtain scores within ‘normal’ range on the test, even when such individuals have a diagnosis 
of prosopagnosia (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2004). Despite such individuals not appearing to 
use holistic face perception as in neurotypical face recognition, the simultaneous presentation 
of target and test faces means that they were able to match faces in a piecemeal manner (without 
relying on holistic face perception or face memory abilities) and obtain scores at or above the 
normal threshold. Duchaine and Weidenfeld (2003) thus suggested that normal Benton scores 
are possible without intact face recognition processes.  
However, it has also been acknowledged that normal scores obtained through featural 
matching takes the prosopagnosic individuals a much longer time to complete the test than 
typical individuals, and that should a time limit be enforced, differences in normal and 
prosopagnosic performance may be better identified (Duchaine & Weidenfeld, 2003). Other 
strengths of the test have been highlighted: accuracy of healthy samples has been reported as 
between 81 and 83%, which suggests that whilst scores are much above chance level, they also 
Fig 3. Exemplar image of a Benton 
target face [top image] and six test 
faces (Levin et al., 1975).  
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fall below ceiling performance, and are indicative of sensitive discrimination between typical 
and non-typical performance (Rossion & Michel, 2018). Within the range of typical 
performance, the test has been shown to identify considerable individual variation in 
performance (Schretlen, Pearlson, Anthony, & Yates, 2001). Because of these reasons, the test 
has substantial use in both clinical and neurotypical contexts. It has been used in the current 
thesis in two chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 7) as a perceptual measure of unfamiliar face 
matching ability.  
2.2.2. Cambridge Face Memory Test 
The Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) assesses memory for unfamiliar faces, and 
was developed as an improvement for diagnosing prosopagnosia on previous face perception 
tests, including the Benton Test of Facial Recognition, described above. The test’s developers, 
sought to address the two key limitations of the Benton test (the unlimited presentation duration 
of stimuli and the simultaneous presentation of both target and test faces) (Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2006).  
To do this, they developed the CFMT, which requires encoding of six faces for a 
specified period of time, and then recognition of 
these learned faces in a total of 72 items across 
three distinct stages: firstly, recognition of the 
same faces as in the learning phase. Secondly, 
recognition of the same facial identities in 
different viewpoints and/or lighting, and thirdly, 
recognition of the same facial identities in 
different viewpoints and/or lighting with 
additional heavy visual noise. The test shows 
Fig 4. Exemplar image of a CFMT learning 
phase [upper panel] and novel testing phase 
[lower panel] (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006).  
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absence of ceiling effects, and is able to reliably assess a wide range of individual differences 
in face memory ability in a neurotypical sample. Since its development, the CFMT has become 
one of the most widely used diagnostic assessments for prosopagnosia in clinical contexts 
(Bowles et al., 2009) and for assessment of individual variation in unfamiliar face memory 
ability in neurotypical samples. In Chapter 3, the second phase of this test is used. This was 
chosen as an abbreviated measure of face memory ability for purposes of keeping the survey 
at a reasonable length.  
2.2.3 Glasgow Face Matching Test 
The Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT) assesses unfamiliar face matching, and 
comprises pairs of colour face photographs, presented simultaneously in frontal view and with 
neutral posed expressions. The images were taken with different cameras (on the same day, 
approximately 15 minutes apart). Participants are shown each pair of faces one at a time and 
have unlimited time in which to make a same or different judgement as to the identity. The full 
version comprises 168 pairs of faces, whilst a shorter form of the most difficult 40 pairs is also 
widely used. In each version of the test, half of the face pairs are same-identity trials and half 
are different. The mean test accuracy was reported by the developers as 81%, although they 
also observed substantial individual differences in performance, ranging from 51% to 100%, 
making this test suitable for the research strategy of this thesis. It was chosen as a measure of 
unfamiliar face identity recognition in order to complement the CFMT measure of unfamiliar 
face learning. 
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2.3 General Intelligence 
The very high inter-correlations of individual performance across different tests of 
cognitive abilities was a phenomenon first discovered over a century ago (Spearman, 1904, as 
cited in Duncan, Burgess, & Emslie, 2000), and was interpreted as reflecting a general factor 
of cognition known as Spearman’s g (Jensen, 1998). Considerable empirical work supports the 
idea of g having a hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities (Carroll, 1993). Whilst g has not 
been without controversy in the field (Gottfredson, 1997), more recent empirical work that 
tested cognition in 42 tests across three different batteries found g factors that were completely 
correlated and interchangeable (Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger, McGue, & Gottesman, 2004).  
This finding was replicated and extended to five independent test batteries, across 
which the g factors were very strongly associated (Johnson, te Nijenhuis, & Bouchard, 2008).  
This is despite the five batteries in Johnson’s 2008 paper focusing more on reasoning and 
manual dexterity, as opposed to the more verbal and memory components included in the 
batteries of Johnson et al. (2004). This lends support to g extending across a large range of 
mental ability domains.  
There are a large number of measures of general intelligence available to researchers 
and their test of choice will depend on multiple factors, including brevity of the measure and 
length of their overall battery, the specific cognitive sub-area(s) of interest, the language or 
culture of the sample, and any other key variables they are assessing. Regardless of the chosen 
measure, however, research suggests that a well-established battery will reliably capture the 
breadth of variance associated with g. In this thesis, general intelligence was measured using 
two different tests, outlined below.   
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2.3.1 Alice Heim Test of General Intelligence 
This test (Heim, 1970) comprises 65 items, of which approximately half are verbal in 
nature and half are numerical. Furthermore, half of the items require participants to type their 
response in an ‘open-entry’ format, whereas the other half are presented in a five-alternative 
multiple-choice format. Participants have a maximum time limit of 10 minutes to complete as 
many of the items as possible. Importantly for the research questions addressed in this thesis, 
it is considered a good test of general intelligence as it corporates elements of both crystallized 
knowledge (vocabulary) and fluid intelligence (online manipulation of novel information).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Cattell Culture-Fair Intelligence Test 
This nonverbal test (Cattell, 1973) comprises four sub-tests consisting of Matrices, 
Series Completion, Conditions, and Classification. It has traditionally been presented as a pen-
and-paper test with a multiple-choice response format, and participants have set times in which 
to complete each subtest. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. Exemplar item from the Alice Heim test: numerical item [upper panel] and verbal item [lower 
panel] (Heim, 1970).  
Fig 6. Exemplar items from the Cattell Culture-Fair test: Series subtest [upper panel] and 
Matrices subtest [lower panel] (Cattell, 1973).  
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Given that the Cattell Culture-Fair Test (CCFT) comprises four matrix reasoning tasks 
with no verbal or crystallized components, the CCFT battery has been argued by some to be 
solely a measure of fluid intelligence. However, whilst constructs of fluid and general 
intelligence have been debated in the field, factor analytic research has shown very strong 
correlations (.77-96) between the CCFT and other more broadly constructed cognitive 
batteries, e.g. the General Aptitude Test Battery (van der Gissen, 1960, as cited in Johnson et 
al., 2008), indicating a very high level of common measurement across these various cognitive 
batteries. In comparison to single measures of matrix reasoning or processing speed, then, the 
CCFT battery is argued to adequately capture the breadth of general intelligence.  
2.4 Psychopathology 
Psychopathology is measured in this thesis in healthy populations, as opposed to 
clinical samples, and data was gathered using self-report. Specifically, the psychopathological 
areas of greatest interest for this thesis comprise autism-like traits, and the sub-clinical 
personality construct of alexithymia.  
2.4.1 Autism-like Traits 
Autism was traditionally conceptualised as a clinical construct wholly distinct from the 
neurotypical population, but recent work points to autistic behaviours and traits being 
distributed on a continuum across the general population, with adults of average intelligence 
also reporting a range of autistic-like attributes to varying degrees of moderation (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).   
Given that a large part of the autism phenotype concerns social behaviour and 
interactions, it is possible that autism-like traits may contribute to emotion recognition 
performance, and thus this was important to control for in the current thesis. Given also that 
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the individuals tested in this thesis are drawn from neurotypical populations, it was pertinent 
to choose a measure of autism-like traits suitable for use in healthy non-clinical adults.  
The Autism Quotient-Short is a 28-item self-report measure (Hoekstra et al., 2011) that 
provides a sensitive measure of autism-like characteristics in a neurotypical population, with 
participants having to rate their agreement to a series of statements concerning behaviours and 
attributes that they may or may not experience or display. It is a widely used, freely available, 
and easy-to-administer measure designed for adults with average IQ or above, and has been 
administered to both neurotypical and clinically-diagnosed autistic populations, as well as 
samples of individuals with schizophrenia, prosopagnosia, anorexia, and depression (Ruzich et 
al., 2015).  
The measure demonstrates psychometrically sound properties, with good internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Importantly for testing within 
the general population, it has high sensitivity for discriminating between individuals low or 
high on autism-like traits.   
2.4.2 Alexithymia 
Alexithymia was also measured using a brief self-report measure: the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20: Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994). This is the most widely used 
instrument for measuring alexithymia, with good internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
(Kerr, Johnson, Gans, & Krumrine, 2004). However, concerns have been raised regarding its 
introspective nature. Responding to the scale accurately and appropriately requires a good 
degree of meta-cognitive awareness regarding one’s emotional and internal state, something 
which is a core difficulty for alexithymic individuals (Li, Zhang, Guo, & Zhang, 2015). This 
raises question concerning the validity of the scale in clinical settings, particularly for those 
individuals at the high end of the construct. Even those with low alexithymia may rate 
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themselves disproportionately high if they have a biased perception of others’ emotional 
abilities (Hobson et al., 2019). Despite these concerns, the scale is the most frequently used 
measure in the field, and empirical data supports its validity in predicting empathic neural 
responses (Bird et al., 2010), emotional abilities (Lumley, Neely, & Burger, 2007), and clinical 
criteria.  
2.5 Online surveys 
Online testing has seen a surge in popularity in recent years, due to enabling data 
collection that is often larger (and thus better powered), less expensive, and more 
demographically diverse stimuli than traditional laboratory-based populations. Typical lab-
based samples have tended to be homogenous in nature with low generalisability, whereas web-
based participants exhibit a much greater diversity in age, sex, education, socioeconomic status, 
and geographic region. Web surveys also allow for collection of data from specific sub-
populations, including various types of psychopathology and twin studies (Kendler, Myers, 
Potter, & Opalesky, 2009). 
Despite some concerns over the quality and reliability of online data, results thus far 
appear positive. In the relevant context of face memory recognition ability, Germine and 
colleagues (2012) reported comparable performance on the Cambridge Memory Face Test in 
several large online samples and traditional lab-based samples.  
Germine et al. (2012) also compared a range of other cognitive perceptual measures in 
web and lab-based samples, including the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and Forward Digit Span from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scales (Wechsler, 2008). They reported comparable mean performances for the 
majority of the cognitive tests, and some in which the web-based sample performed more 
accurately, indicating no systematic differences between the online and offline samples. Thus, 
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concerns of lack of concentration, motivation, accuracy, or honesty in unsupervised web-based 
participants appear to be unwarranted at least for these measures, even when the participants 
were anonymous and not financially compensated. This conclusion is supported by other 
researchers, who dispel some of the myths surrounding online data collection: Gosling and 
colleagues report that online responders are no less motivated, more diverse, and no more 
maladjusted than offline responders, and findings are in line with traditional experimental 
methods (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004).  
2.5.1 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
One such way of collecting large-scale data online is through various crowdsourcing 
platforms, and the one chosen for the research conducted in this thesis was Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This platform allows experimenters (“requesters”) to advertise 
Human Intelligence Tasks, abbreviated to “HITs”, which MTurk “workers” will select and get 
paid a designated sum of money (“reward”) to complete. HITs are typically fairly brief and 
involve short surveys or marketing questionnaires, and requesters can advertise certain HITs 
only to workers who meet specific criteria, e.g. geographical region. Moreover, requesters can 
assign bonuses or reject completions, thus helping to maintain a high level of data quality 
(Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014).  
The demographics of MTurk workers have been found to be at least as representative 
of the US population as traditional samples (on measures of sex, age, race and education), and 
are often more diverse than the traditional lab-based undergraduate student samples (Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Regarding American MTurk samples, 65% of workers are 
reported to be female, with the average worker age being 36 years (Paolacci et al., 2010).  
Given that workers earn an average hourly rate of only $1.40 an hour (Paolacci et al., 
2010), the quality of collected data has been of concern to researchers. However, further 
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research suggests this concern may be somewhat unwarranted. Firstly, workers report 
completing tasks for enjoyment, rather than financial reasons, and only 13% of a tested sample 
used MTurk as a primary source of income. Secondly, researchers have systematically 
compared MTurk with data from traditional US college samples and other online platforms, 
and found comparable results. Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) observed good 
reliabilities (mean α=.87) for MTurk data (N=3006) collected at three different levels of 
monetary reward, and very high test-retest reliabilities (mean r =.88) for participants tested 
three weeks apart, suggesting that MTurk data quality paralleled, if not exceeded, that collected 
in traditional samples. This finding has been supported in the literature. Casler, Bickel, and 
Hackett (2013) reported equivalent behavioural responses in a comparison of MTurk workers, 
social media responses, and traditional undergraduate lab-based sample on a learning and 
categorisation task, with the MTurk sample in particular being very favourably diverse. This 
aligns well with recent focus on moving away from traditional ‘WEIRD’ samples (Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) who are not representative of the population 
at large (Casler et al., 2013).  
Another often-disputed drawback of online testing on platforms such as MTurk is the 
inability to monitor participant attention, concentration and motivation to complete the task 
seriously. However, many studies have reported successful approaches to reducing this risk in 
online samples, including attention check ‘catch’ trials, screening for series of identical 
responses, and as mentioned previously, examination of scale reliabilities. It has also been 
highlighted that the absence of a lab environment may actually be favourable in certain tasks 
in reducing demand characteristics, social desirability biases, and experimenter biases 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). Indeed, reporting of potentially uncomfortable health, drug use, or 
sexual information was shown to increase with increased anonymity (Turner et al., 1998). 
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In a large-scale study comparing a web-based sample (N=361,703) with 510 traditional 
lab-based samples, Gosling and colleagues (2004) addressed six common concerns regarding 
Internet-collected data (demographic diversity, socially isolated samples, generalisability 
across presentation formats, lack of motivation, participant anonymity, and discrepancy with 
traditional lab-based findings). They reported that all but one (anonymity of participants) of 
the concerns was shown to be unwarranted. The question of anonymous responses 
compromising the data was considered a potentially valid concern but one that could be 
addressed using various approaches available to web-based platforms. In the case of MTurk, 
repeat responders are rare given the time and effort invested in setting up several MTurk 
accounts, the collection of IP addresses, and the fact that each worker ID has to correspond 
with a unique credit card number (Horton et al., 2010). Moreover, workers are motivated to 
only use one account because higher-paying HITs are restricted to workers who have a history 
of high-quantity, high-quality HIT completion, and so it is not in the workers’ financial interest 
to have multiple MTurk accounts simultaneously (Chandler et al., 2014).  
In sum then, Gosling and colleagues (2004) concluded that many of the earlier 
preconceptions regarding web-based data collection appear unfounded, and there may be 
substantial advantages (e.g. large, diverse samples with high internal motivation to respond 
appropriately) to be had over lab-based samples, that can be used in collecting demographically 
diverse, well-powered data in many areas of psychology.  
 
2.6 Structural Equation Modeling 
In Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis, data is analysed using a structural equation modeling 
(SEM) approach. SEM is a powerful statistical technique that examines the relationships 
between observed (measured) and unobserved (latent) variables. It is a combination of factor 
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analysis and multiple regression analysis and is formed of two parts: the measurement model 
and the structural model. The measurement model defines the relationships between both the 
latent constructs and their manifest indicators (measured variables) that represent the 
underlying theory. The structural model specifies the relationships between the latent 
constructs. It is considered a particularly strong technique given that it can estimate relations 
between latent abstract constructs in a way that is free from measurement error.  
Model fit is typically assessed through a number of statistics. One of the most 
commonly reported is the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic, which tests whether there is a 
significant difference between the observed and the expected covariance matrices. Researchers 
typically hope that their model is not considerably different from the observed data, and thus 
look for a non-significant chi-square value in order to reject the null hypothesis. However, 
whilst the chi-square statistic is almost universally reported in studies using SEM, it has some 
key limitations to note. It typically can be unrealistically conservative and reject very well-
fitting models if they do not meet an exact fit. Secondly, it provides a binary outcome in which 
the null hypothesis is either accepted or rejected. If the model is accepted, it can provide no 
further estimation with regards to the degree of fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Most problematically, 
it will very commonly reject models with large sample sizes, even if they provide an excellent 
fit to the data (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). In the same vein, mis-specified models 
may be accepted by this statistic if they have a particularly small sample size. Based on these 
limitations, the chi-square continues to be reported but frequently alongside complementary fit 
indices (Hooper et al., 2008). Particularly with larger samples, a significant chi-square value is 
not necessarily interpreted as being reflective of a badly fitting model. Rather, the researcher 
will look to the other indices to give a more robust and indicative estimate of model fit.  
As highlighted above, these other fit indices have the advantage of providing an 
estimate of the degree of model fit (or lack of) on a continuous scale, as well as being less 
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sensitive to sample size than the chi-square value. However, they have some limitations of their 
own. Given the wide range of indices available, there is currently no agreed-upon standard on 
which of them to report, and some values can contradict each other as to the model’s degree of 
fit, thus making it difficult for the researcher to reliably interpret and report. Hu and Bentler 
(1998, 1999) carried out a number of simulations of the most commonly used fit indices under 
differing conditions of sample size, distribution, and estimation method, and with both correct 
and mis-specified models. They reported that under a maximum-likelihood estimation method, 
a two-index strategy is recommended to be employed to reliably assess model fit. This two-
step method comprises firstly the standardised root-mean-square residual (SRMR) which was 
the index most sensitive to simple model misspecification and was moderately sensitive to 
complex misspecification, although there is some indication of it being unduly affected by 
sample size (Cangur & Ercan, 2015). Alongside the SRMR, one of the other incremental or 
absolute indices should be reported, including comparative fit index (CFI) and the root-mean-
square error of approximation (RMSEA). Both the CFI and RMSEA were noted to be 
moderately sensitive to simple misspecification and highly sensitive to complex 
misspecification. Recommended cut-off’s for these indices are suggested as .08 for SRMR, .95 
for the CFI and .06 for the RMSEA, although the authors acknowledge that concrete cut-offs 
are difficult to estimate given the differences in sample sizes or distributions (Hu & Bentler, 
1998, 1999).  
One of the more recent issues in fit indices evaluation is whether the cut-off criteria 
specified above and by different researchers can be generalised to different types of models. 
That is, two different models may be mis-specified to the same extent, and it is crucial to 
establish whether the fit indices would give the same model fit outcomes across these instances. 
Results suggest an undesirable degree of sensitivity to model type across a variety of indices, 
indicating that cut-off criteria would be unduly and unequally affected by differences in model 
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structure. This poses another problem to establishing agreed-upon cut-off values across the 
range of indices. Of particular note, the RMSEA showed good sensitivity for model 
misspecification but less sensitivity to irrelevant factors of sample size and model type, 
suggesting this index may be a good choice for model fit index, at least with regard to differing 
model types. In contrast, the SRMR did show a less than ideal sensitivity to model type (Fan 
& Sivo, 2007). Furthermore, a recent paper advised more caution about using the SRMR, 
evidencing its ‘unacceptably’ low power to reject models with mis-specified covariance 
structures. As an alternative, the RMSEA showed very high power in these instances (Wu, 
West, & Taylor, 2009).  
The final index to be considered here is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike, 1973). This is a comparative model with the advantage of being able to assess 
saturated models, i.e., models with zero degrees of freedom. It also penalises for model 
complexity, and rewards for parsimony. It therefore strikes a fine balance between goodness-
of-fit of the model and overall model simplicity. For this index, lower values indicate a superior 
model fit.  
What appears clear from the various studies assessing fit indices is that reporting of 
more than one fit index for each SEM model is paramount, in order to allow for the most valid 
interpretation of fit (Bentler, 2007). From reviews and simulations of various fit indices, it 
remains difficult as to decide which indices are most appropriate and valid to include, as it may 
heavily depend on the model type, estimation method, normality distribution, and sample size 
in question. In order to provide the most well-rounded and transparent evidence possible, the 
structural models in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis will be accompanied by up to four fit indices, 
namely the chi-square statistic, RMSEA, CFI, and AIC. 
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Outline of samples in thesis 
 This thesis includes a combination of novel and secondary data, and this section seeks 
to clarify in which chapters each samples are presented.  
Chapter 3: All three studies in this chapter are novel data, collected for the purpose of this 
thesis. These samples do not overlap with any other sample in the thesis.  
Chapter 4: This sample is secondary data and was collected as part of the Cambridge Centre 
for Ageing and Neuroscience (Cam-CAN) project (Shafto et al., 2014).  
Chapter 5: This chapter includes a combination of novel and secondary data. The Study 1a 
sample came from Study 2 of Lewis et al., 2016. The Study 1b sample came from a novel 
collected study (no overlap with any other study in this thesis). The Study 2 sample was also a 
novel collected sample which was pre-registered before data collection, and which did not 
overlap with any other thesis study.  
Chapter 6: This chapter includes a combination of novel and secondary data. The Study 1 
sample comprises the combined samples from Study 1 and 2 of Lewis et al., 2016. The Study 
2 sample came from Study 3 of Lewis et al., 2016. The Study 3 sample was novel collected 
and pre-registered before data collection, and does not overlap with any other sample.  
Chapter 7: This sample was collected as part of the Cambridge Centre for Ageing and 
Neuroscience (Cam-CAN) project (Shafto et al., 2014), and is the same core dataset as that 
used in Chapter 4. The total sample sizes differ slightly due to some participants being excluded 
in the Chapter 7 study because they did not have age information.  
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Chapter 3: Supramodal Emotion Recognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion recognition ability: evidence for a supramodal factor and its links 
to social cognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Carmen Lefevre, 
Andrew Young, and Gary Lewis (supervisor) and has been published in Cognition.   
Connolly, H. L., Lefevre, C. E., Young, A. W., & Lewis, G. J. (2020). Emotion recognition 
ability: Evidence for a supramodal factor and its links to social cognition. Cognition, 
197, 104166. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104166   
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Abstract 
 
Accurate recognition of others’ emotions is an important skill for successful social 
interaction. Unsurprisingly, it has been an enduring topic of interest, and notable individual 
differences have been observed. Despite this focus, the underlying functional architecture of 
this ability has not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning emotion recognition 
across different sensory domains and stimulus modalities. Using a structural equation 
modelling approach, Study 1 (N=284) established the structure of emotion recognition ability 
across three expressive domains – face, body and voice – and observed strong evidence for 
a superordinate ‘supramodal’ emotion recognition factor, over and above domain-specific 
factors. Additionally, we observed a significant moderate negative association between this 
superordinate factor and alexithymia. In Study 2 (N=218), findings indicated that supramodal 
emotion recognition ability and face identity recognition are two related but independent 
constructs. In Study 3 (N=249), we examined links from both supramodal emotion 
recognition and face identity recognition to broader cognitive ability, and observed that 
general intelligence was a significant predictor of supramodal emotion recognition ability. In 
contrast, there was no association between intelligence and face identity recognition ability. 
Across three independent samples, then, our findings offer strong support for an emotion 
recognition ability factor existing across visual and auditory domains encompassing social 
signals conveyed by face, body and voice, and outline its associations to broader cognitive 
and affective traits.   
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3.1 Introduction 
 The ability to recognise emotions underpins much of human social interaction by 
providing important information regarding the mental states and potential intentions of 
others. Although the extent to which expressions of emotion involve spontaneous or more 
deliberately manipulative social signals is debated (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018), accurate 
perception of emotional expressions is associated with better social functioning (Brackett, 
Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006) and greater relationship well-being (Carton, 
Kessler & Pape, 1999). Conversely, impairment in emotion recognition is associated with 
neuropsychiatric and psychopathological disorders including (but not limited to) depression 
(Surguladze et al., 2004), social anxiety (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006), and borderline 
personality disorder (Fenske et al., 2015). 
 Unsurprisingly, then, individual differences in emotion recognition ability have been 
a topic of broad and enduring interest. However, much of this work has been restricted to 
facial expressions, and this is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is clear that 
emotion recognition ability is not limited to expressions communicated solely by the face; 
affective states are expressed through additional channels, including the body and voice. 
Secondly, theoretical perspectives have posited that cues to emotional expression from 
different modalities are often closely integrated in emotion perception (Calder & Young, 
2005; Schirmer & Adolphs, 2017; Young, 2018). Data from behavioural (de Gelder & 
Vroomen, 2000) and brain imaging studies (de Gelder, Böcker, Tuomainen, Hensen, & 
Vroomen, 1999; Hagan et al., 2009; Hagan, Woods, Johnson, Green, & Young, 2013; Peelen, 
Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010) support this contention. A major driver of this type of 
organisation may be that cross-modal integration can be particularly useful in circumstances 
where signals from each separate channel are ambiguous and have significant temporal 
demands (Bruce & Young, 2012; de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003; Young & Bruce, 2011; 
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Young, 2018). This is often the case in everyday life, where someone's emotional reactions 
may change from moment to moment, or where one channel is sometimes obscured or not 
available (e.g. being able to see another person's face but struggling to hear them clearly). 
Crucially, however, it is not yet known if individual differences in emotion recognition ability 
reflect this theorized integrated organisation. If, as Young (2018) has argued, emotion 
recognition performance reflects an ability that immediately integrates relevant cues across 
modalities, one should expect to see the individual differences across modalities reflecting a 
higher-order general latent factor. Such a factor would not offer direct evidence of an 
integrated system per se, but it would provide evidence of a coherent clustering of emotion 
recognition abilities, in line with recent theorising by Young (2018) and others. 
Of the work to address this question to date, some support for such a model has been 
reported. Firstly, across two studies (NStudy 1 = 305, NStudy 2 = 295), Schlegel, Grandjean, and 
Scherer (2012) assessed participants using the Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test, 
comprising both facial and auditory stimuli for two versions of each of five basic emotions 
(i.e. anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness). They analysed their data using 
confirmatory factor analysis, and noted the presence of a general emotion recognition ability 
factor that acted across the modalities of face and voice. More recently, Lewis, Lefevre, and 
Young (2016) – also using a confirmatory factor analysis approach – reported evidence for a 
general ability factor acting across the modalities of face and body. 
The above findings are consistent with the notion of a supramodal emotion 
recognition ability factor. However, a more complete test of this putative architecture 
requires assessment of all three main communicative channels in a single sample: the above-
mentioned studies addressed only two types of stimuli (faces and voices, or faces and bodies). 
More generally, if emotion recognition ability is indeed supramodal in nature, a key 
question is whether it reflects an emotion-specific ability or instead if it is reflective of 
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broader socio-cognitive or general cognitive abilities. With the above in mind, in the current 
set of studies we sought to answer the following questions: 1) does emotion recognition 
ability reflect a superordinate ability factor encompassing face, body, and voice?; 2) if yes, 
is this supramodal ability factor specific to emotion, or reflective of broader socio-cognitive 
or general cognitive ability?  
 
3.2 Study 1 
In Study 1, we addressed the possible existence of a supramodal emotion recognition 
ability factor by examining the factor structure of emotion recognition ability across three 
expressive domains – face, body, and voice. We tested five models (schematically presented 
in Figure 1), each representing a different theoretical perspective in the field. The first model 
posited uncorrelated domain-specific factors underlying recognition of emotion from the 
face, body and voice, in line with the perspective that distinct mechanisms underlie emotion 
recognition from different sources of information. The second model posited a single 
overarching factor acting directly on all the manifest variables, in line with the idea of a 
general factor underlying performance across communicative modalities. The structure of the 
third model included latent factors for face, body, and voice emotion recognition, but also 
included an emotion-general factor acting directly on all three domain-specific factors (i.e. a 
higher-order structure). This model was posited in line with findings that emotion recognition 
processes are argued to be both domain-specific and domain-general across both visual (face) 
and auditory (voice) modalities (e.g. Lewis et al., 2016; Schlegel et al., 2012). The fourth 
model posited a similar higher-order structure to the third model but with the superordinate 
factor encompassing only the two visual domains (faces and bodies), thus allowing voice 
emotion recognition to be modelled as an independent factor. The final model proposed a 
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bifactor solution whereby a supramodal factor and three domain-specific factors all 
contribute direct influences on the manifest variables. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the five tested models in Study 1.  
 
 
 Additionally, we took the opportunity to examine whether this putative supramodal 
factor of emotion recognition ability was associated with a cluster of socio-affective traits 
with relevance for psychopathology: specifically, alexithymia, autism-like traits, and social 
anxiety. Our previous work (Lewis et al., 2016) highlighted a moderate negative association 
with alexithymia but no association with a short form measure of autism-like traits (the AQ-
10). Here we sought to provide a confirmatory test of the link to alexithymia, and to further 
probe possible links with autism-like traits by assessing two core autism domains - Social 
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Behaviour/Interactions and Attention to Detail/Numbers and Patterns by using the longer 28-
item Autism Quotient (AQ-28). In addition, we sought to determine whether social anxiety is 
linked with emotion recognition ability. This was prompted by mixed results in this domain 
(e.g. Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004) alongside recent work (White, Bray, & Ollendick, 
2012) highlighting that social anxiety can mimic autism-like traits and thus may be the more 
appropriate construct to assess in the context of understanding associations between autism-
like traits and emotion recognition ability. 
The studies reported here were carried out on a commonly used online data collection 
platform: Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and which we have used extensively in our previous 
work (e.g. Lewis et al., 2016). Despite some researchers’ early concerns about online data 
collection, recent studies have indicated that most of the earlier preconceptions regarding web-
based data collection appear unfounded, and there may be substantial advantages to be had 
over lab-based samples (e.g. larger, more diverse samples with high internal motivation to 
respond appropriately) (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). Specifically for Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, the demographics of participants have been found to be at least as 
representative of the American population when compared to traditional samples (on measures 
of sex, age, race, and education), and are often more diverse than the traditional lab-based 
undergraduate student samples.  
Importantly for the current paper, psychometrically sound performance in online 
settings has been observed in the contexts of face and voice recognition. Germine and 
colleagues (2012) reported comparable performance on the Cambridge Memory Face Test in 
several large online samples and traditional lab-based samples (Germine, Nakayama, 
Duchaine, Chabris, Chatterjee, & Wilmer, 2012). In a validation study of the Glasgow Voice 
Memory Test, Aglieri and colleagues (2017) found no significant difference between 
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performance of an online sample (N=1120) and a controlled lab sample (N=63) (Aglieri, et al., 
2017). 
 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants 
A total of 308 participants (131 males) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
service. As is the norm for online stimuli presentation, a proportion of participants experienced 
technical failures (e.g. videos not loading); therefore we included only those individuals who 
completed at least 90% (≥45 of 50) of trial blocks for each emotion and modality. In addition, 
we excluded participants who showed chance level performance on at least two of the emotion 
recognition tasks, in line with our previous work (e.g. Connolly, Young, & Lewis, 2019). This 
resulted in the omission of 24 participants, producing a final sample size of 284 (117 males). 
Mean age of participants was 38.1 years, and ethnicity was reported as follows: White 
(n=222), Hispanic (n=13), Asian (n=13), Black (n=27), Native American (n=1), Arab 
American (n=1), Indian American (n=3) and undisclosed (n=4). These represent a typical 
demographic pattern for MTurk samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Participants gave informed 
consent and ethical approval was granted by the Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics 
Committee.   
Emotion Recognition Measures 
 Face Emotion Recognition: To assess face emotion recognition ability, we used static 
images taken from the Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli and Tests (FEEST) set (Young, 
Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). They comprise 10 identities each depicting 
five basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness) morphed to different levels 
of intensity (i.e., N=50 images). The prototype images from which morphs were created came 
from the ‘Pictures of facial affect’ series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Intensity of expression was 
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varied from neutral in 25% steps up to 125% relative to the 100% prototypical expression from 
the Ekman and Friesen series, using the image manipulation software Psychomorph 
(Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001). These morphed stimuli were piloted in a previous study 
(Lewis et al., 2016), and images at varying degrees of morphed intensity were selected. This is 
an important step as it created appropriate levels of recognition for assessment of individual 
differences and in order to avoid floor/ceiling effects. This selection approach was also applied 
to the remaining body and voice stimulus set. The emotion recognition stimuli and task 
paradigm for face and body domains was the same as used in Studies 1 and 2 in Lewis et al. 
(2016).  
 Body Emotion Recognition: To assess emotion recognition ability from the body, we 
used point-light displays described in Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, and Young (2004). This 
stimulus set comprises 10 different actors portraying the same five basic emotions as the face 
stimuli (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness), at three levels of intensity (typical, 
exaggerated, very exaggerated), and lasting between 4.2 and 8 seconds in length. As with the 
face stimuli, Lewis et al. (2016) piloted the whole range of video stimuli, and chose 50 that 
displayed enough variance in recognition for individual differences purposes. These stimuli 
were again used in our current study.  
 Voice Emotion Recognition: To assess vocal emotion recognition ability, we used 
stimuli drawn from the Montreal Affective Voices (MAV) set (Belin, Fillion-Bilodeau, & 
Gosselin, 2008), which comprises 10 different actors portraying nine different emotions (anger, 
disgust, fear, pain, sadness, surprise, happiness and pleasure, and neutral), each lasting between 
1.45 and 2.23 seconds. We ensured this stimulus set was in line with the face and body sets of 
stimuli by including vocal bursts of only the five basic emotions (note, due to ceiling 
performance of the happiness vocal bursts, we instead used pleasure as a proxy for this 
emotion). Similarly to the other stimuli, the bursts were first piloted to arrive at 50 vocal stimuli 
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(10 of each emotion) with psychometric properties comparable to the other two expressive 
domains.  
 Each of these emotional modalities (face, body, voice) were included in the tested 
models as latent variables, with sum scores for each emotion as manifest variables.  
Additional Measures 
Participants were also asked to complete a series of brief questionnaires assessing the following 
constructs. Scale sum scores were included as manifest variables, in line with other comparable 
work of this kind.  
 Autism Quotient – Short (AQ-Short): The AQ-Short is a 28-item instrument that 
assesses five domains of autism-like traits: ‘Social Skills’, ‘Routine’, ‘Switching’, 
‘Imagination’, and ‘Attention to Detail/Numbers and Patterns’. The majority of confirmatory 
factor analysis studies in the field suggest that these domains can be reliably summarized by 
two higher order factors: i. Social Behaviour/Interactions; and ii. Attention to Detail/Numbers 
and Patterns (Hoekstra et al., 2011). The Social Behaviour factor (AQ-Social) reflects the first 
four domains and comprises 23 items: Social Skills (7 items), Routine (4 items), Switching (4 
items) and Imagination (8 items). The Attention to Detail factor (AQ-Detail) reflects the final 
domain and comprises 5 items. Responses were made on a 4-point Likert scale, with 1 being 
‘definitely disagree’, and 4 being ‘definitely agree’, with 14 of the 28 items being reverse-
scored. Example items from the AQ-Social factor include “Reading a story, I find it difficult 
to work out the character’s intentions”, and examples from the AQ-Detail factor include “I am 
fascinated by numbers”. Scale scores were generated by summing the responses from the 
respective sub-scales: a higher score indicates a greater degree of autism-like traits. Cronbach’s 
alpha for our data was good for both sub-scales (Social Behaviour α=.81; Attention to Detail 
α=.78).  
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 Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20): The TAS-20 is a 20-item instrument that 
assesses alexithymic traits in three broad sub-domains: Difficulty Identifying Feelings, 
Difficulty Describing Feelings, and Externally Oriented Thinking (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994). Examples of items from each subscale respectively include “I am often puzzled by 
sensations in my body”, “People tell me to describe my feelings more”, and “I prefer to analyse 
problems rather than just describe them”. Responses were made on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
1 being ‘strongly disagree’, and 5 being ‘strongly agree’, with five of the 20 items being 
reverse-scored. Total score was generated by summing the responses from all 20 items: a higher 
score indicates a greater degree of alexithymic traits. Scale scores for each individual sub-scale 
were also generated. Cronbach’s alpha for our data was acceptable-to-good for all sub-scales 
(Difficulty Identifying Feelings α=.89; Difficulty Describing Feelings α=.78; Externally-
Oriented Thinking α=.60).  
 Mini-Social Phobia Inventory (Mini-SPIN): The Mini-SPIN is a three-item measure 
of social anxiety disorder (Connor, Kobak, Churchill, Katzelnick, & Davidson, 2001). An 
example of an item is “Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid doing things or speaking to 
people”. Responses were made on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 being ‘not at all, and 5 being 
‘extremely’. Total score was generated by summing the responses from all three items: higher 
scores indicate a greater degree of social anxiety. Cronbach’s alpha for our data was good 
(α=.86).  
Procedure 
Stimuli were blocked according to modality. Voice, face and body blocks were each 
presented to the participant once, and in the same block order. The within-block presentation 
order was fully randomised. In a five alternative-choice paradigm, participants had to select the 
emotion they perceived was being portrayed. Stimulus presentation consisted of a black screen 
for 500ms, a fixation cross for 750ms and a further 500ms black screen that preceded the onset 
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of the stimulus. Face stimuli were presented for 1000ms. Body and vocal stimuli lasted for the 
duration of each individual video or audio clip. Participants could respond at any point 
following the stimulus onset. Following the three emotion recognition blocks, participants were 
asked to complete the self-report questionnaires. The participants were fully debriefed 
following completion of the survey.  
Analysis 
Structural equation models were fitted and assessed using maximum likelihood 
estimation with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) running in R. We assessed absolute fit of 
our models using the Chi-Square value, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The Chi-Square value has been the traditional 
measure of model fit but is particularly sensitive to large sample sizes and will often reject 
sensible models on this basis (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). Therefore, we evaluated our 
proposed models with further indices. For the CFI and RMSEA, values of ≥.95 and ≤.06 
respectively are viewed as indicative of good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Additionally, 
we also measured relative model fit using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC: Akaike, 
1973), with a lower AIC indicating better model fit.  
 
3.2.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are shown in Table 1. Out of 
the 105 possible correlations, a total of 101 (81 of which in the expected positive direction) 
were significant at the 5% level. This pattern broadly conforms to previous work of this kind 
(Lewis et al., 2016).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between emotions and across expressive domain in Study 1. Skew ranged from -1.47 to 
0.55; kurtosis ranged from -0.80 to 1.81. Note. * p ≤ .05; ** p < .01; Bold indicates p < .001; CI95% are presented in square brackets. 
 Mean SD 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Faces                 
1.1 Anger .50 .21               
1.2 Disgust .59 .21 .18**  
[.07, .30] 
             
1.3 Fear .67 .18 .31  
[.20, .41] 
.20**  
[.09, .31] 
            
1.4 Happiness .81 .16 .27  
[.16, .37] 
.18**  
[.07, .30] 
.17**  
[.05, .28] 
           
1.5 Sadness .43 .21 .31  
[.20, .41] 
.16**  
[.04, .27] 
.24  
[.13, .35] 
.25 
[.14, .36] 
          
Bodies                 
2.1 Anger .67 .22 .37 
[.27, .47] 
.10 
[-.02, .21] 
.26 
[.14, .36] 
.31 
[.20, .41] 
.34 
[.23, .44] 
         
2.2. Disgust .29 .18 .16** 
[.05, .27] 
.14* 
[.02, .25] 
.04 
[-.08, .16] 
-.00 
[-.12, .11] 
.07 
[-.04, .19] 
.09  
[-.03, .20] 
        
2.3 Fear .65 .20 .27 
[.16, .38] 
.19** 
[.07, .30] 
.25 
[.14, .36] 
.29 
[.18, .39] 
.19** 
[.07, .30] 
.43 
[.33, .52] 
.03 
[-.09, .15] 
       
2.4 Happiness .47 .18 .08 
[-.04, .19] 
.11 
[-.01, .22] 
.18** 
[.07, .29] 
.15* 
[.03, .26] 
.15* 
[.03, .26] 
.17**  
[.05, .28] 
.11  
[-.01, .22] 
.23 
[.12, .34] 
      
2.5 Sadness .63 .21 .33 
[.23, .43] 
.20** 
[.09, .31] 
.25 
[.13, .35] 
.27 
[.16, .38] 
.29 
[.18, .39] 
.50  
[.41, .58] 
.12  
[-.02, .21] 
.36  
[.25, .46] 
.19**  
[.07, .30] 
     
Voices                 
3.1 Anger .73 .22 .32  
[.21, .42] 
.03 
[-.09, .14] 
.18** 
[.06, .29] 
.23 
[.11, .33] 
.30 
[.19, .40] 
.34 
[.23, .44] 
.15** 
[.04, .27] 
.28 
[.17, .39] 
.16** 
[.04, .27] 
.23 
[.12, .34] 
    
3.2 Disgust .77 .18 .14*  
[.02, .25] 
.12* 
[.00, .23] 
.18** 
[.07, .29] 
.14* 
[.02, .25] 
.15* 
[.04, .26] 
.19** 
[.08, .30] 
.11 
[-.01, .22] 
.22 
[.10, .33] 
.08 
[-.04, .20] 
.19** 
[.07, .30] 
.18**  
[.06, .29]     
3.3 Fear .78 .18 .15*  
[.04, .27] 
.08 
[-.04, .19] 
.23 
[.11, .33] 
.12* 
[.01, .24] 
.26 
[.14, .36] 
.29 
[.18, .39] 
.12* 
[.01, .23] 
.23 
[.11, .33] 
.17** 
[.05, .28] 
.21 
[.10, .32] 
.18**  
[.07, .29] 
.22 
 [.11, .33]   
3.4 Happiness .82 .22 .08  
[-.04, .20] 
.03 
[-.08, .15] 
.12* 
[.00, .23] 
.16** 
[.05, .28] 
.17** 
[.05, .28] 
.12* 
[.00, .23] 
-.02 
[-.13, .10] 
.17** 
[.05, .28] 
.16** 
[.02, .26] 
.11 
[-.01, .22] 
.22  
[.11, .33] 
-.01  
[-.13, .11] 
.18** 
[.06, .29]  
3.5 Sadness .86 .15 .15* 
[.03, .26] 
.02 
[-.09, .14] 
.04 
[-.08, .16] 
.15* 
[.04, .26] 
.13* 
[.01, .24] 
.19** 
[.08, .30] 
.01 
[-.11, .12] 
.12* 
[.00, .23] 
-.05 
[-.16, .07] 
.21 
[.09, .32] 
.16**  
[.05, .27] 
.09  
[-.03, .21] 
.21  
[.10, .32] 
.24 
 [.13, .35] 
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Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Model fit statistics are presented in Table 2. The first model, positing three 
uncorrelated and independent factors, showed at best a weak fit to the data (CFI: .61, 
RMSEA: .09, AIC: 17344.90). The single general factor model showed a good fit to the data 
(CFI: .94, RMSEA: .04, AIC: 17165.73). The third model, with a higher order structure, also 
showed a good fit to the data (CFI: .96, RMSEA: .03, AIC: 17155.94). The model with a 
general visual emotion recognition factor and a specific voice emotion recognition factor, 
showed a poor fit to the data (CFI: .80, RMSEA: .07, AIC: 17244.37). Finally, the model 
positing a bifactor structure was not identified and exhibited several improper parameter 
estimates: specifically, the Vocal Happiness variable showed substantial negative error 
variance (i.e. unlikely to be due to random sampling variability), and thus indicates model 
misspecification. Attempts to generate a proper model solution – e.g. omitting potentially 
offending indicators – were not successful and so we did not probe this model any further. 
 
Table 2. Model output for confirmatory factor analyses in Study 1. Note that model fit values 
are unavailable for non-identified models, and therefore these are denoted by dashes. 
 
It is noteworthy that the model positing a single general ability factor showed only a 
marginally poorer fit, and the residual variance for each of the domain-specific (i.e. face, body, 
and voice) ability factors was modest. With this in mind, a χ2 difference test was used as an 
additional point of adjudication. This analysis showed that the single factor model (with fewer 
estimated parameters) showed a significantly worse fit relative to the higher-order model (χ2 
Model Description χ2 (df) RMSEA CFI AIC 
1 Uncorrelated factors 304.47 (90) .09 .61 17344.90 
2 Single factor 125.31 (90) .04 .94 17165.73 
3 Higher order 
supramodal 
109.52 (87) .03 .96 17155.94 
4 Supramodal visual 
modalities  
199.94 (88) .07 .80 17244.37 
5 Bifactor - - - - 
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(3, N=284) = 15.79, p=.002). In sum, then, the higher-order model with a supramodal and 
subordinate domain-specific factors was the best fitting model and so was retained for 
subsequent analyses (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the final model of Study 1 parameter estimates 
(and 95% confidence intervals). All path coefficients in bold were significant at p<.02.  
Face Anger 
Face Disgust 
Face Fear 
Face Happiness 
Face Sadness 
Body Anger 
Body Disgust 
Body Fear 
Body Happiness 
Body Sadness 
Face 
Body 
Voice Anger 
Voice Disgust 
Voice Fear 
Voice Happiness 
Voice Sadness 
Voice 
Supra-
modal 
.92 
[.80, 1.0] 
.91 
[.80, 1.0] 
.87 
[.74, 1.0] 
.59 
[.49, .69] 
.46 
[.34, .58] 
.30 
[.17, .42] 
.46 
[.35, .58] 
.48 
[.37, .59] 
.54 
[.43, .65] 
.73 
[.65, .81] 
.15 
[.02, .28] 
.59 
[.50, .68] 
.30 
[.18, .42] 
.65 
[.56, .74] 
.54 
[.42, .66] 
.35 
[.22, .48] 
.32 
[.19, .45] 
.34 
[.21, .47] 
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Relationship between Socio-Affective Traits and Emotion Recognition Ability  
We next moved to considering the associations between the supramodal factor we 
identified and our socio-affective measures (autism-like traits, alexithymia, and social anxiety). 
We added in these variables individually to the higher-order model, allowing them to correlate 
with the supramodal factor. 
We observed a moderate negative correlation between the supramodal emotion 
recognition factor and alexithymia (r=-.33, p<.001, [CI95%: -.41, -.25]). The associations with 
the three alexithymia sub-scales were as follows: Difficulty Identifying Feelings (r=-.33, 
p<.001, [CI95%: -.41, -.25]); Externally-Oriented Thinking (r=-.27, p<.001, [CI95%:  
-.34, -.20]); Difficulty Describing Feelings (r=-.19, p=.006, [CI95%: -.23, -.14]). 
In contrast, no significant associations emerged for either of the Autism Quotient 
subscales (Social Behaviour: r=.04, p=.61, [CI95%: -.09, .17]; Attention to Detail: r=-.12, 
p=.08, [CI95%: -.25, .01]), or the measure as a whole (r=.00, p=.97, [CI95%: -.14, .13]). 
Finally, the social anxiety measure showed no association with the supramodal factor (r=-.01, 
p=.94, [CI95%: -.14, .12]). The correlations between the emotion recognition and affective 
measures are shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Associations between the emotion recognition modality blocks, and measures of 
autism-like traits (AQ-28), alexithymia (TAS-20) and social anxiety (Mini-SPIN) in Study 1.  
Note. Bold indicates p < .001.   
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide evidence for a supramodal emotion recognition factor 
that operates across all three of the expressive domains, encompassing both visual (i.e. face 
and body) and auditory (voice) sources of information. This finding is consistent with recent 
theories that suggest emotion recognition abilities generalise across modalities (e.g. Young, 
2018). It is also interesting that the results are consistent with cross-modal work (e.g. de Gelder 
& Vroomen, 2000) that indicates multisensory integration of complex social auditory and 
visual information, such as moving bodies, facial expressions, and verbal and nonverbal vocal 
bursts.  
Additionally, we observed significant negative associations between the supramodal 
emotion recognition ability factor and broader socio-affective functioning: specifically, with 
alexithymia, as measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale. This observation is consistent 
with the findings reported by Lewis et al. (2016) and thus appears to be a robust association. 
We did not find any association between the two sub-scales assessing autism-like traits 
(i.e. social behaviour/interactions difficulties; or attention to detail/ numbers and patterns) and 
 
Voice Face Body AQ-28 TAS-20 
r p r p r p r p r p 
Face .41 <.001         
Body .46 <.001 .53 <.001       
AQ-28 .01 .840 .01 .887 .06 .337     
TAS-20 -.11 .056 -.24 <.001 -.22 <.001 .49 <.001   
Mini-SPIN .12 .039 -.04 .559 .02 .798 .56 <.001 .45 <.001 
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supramodal emotion recognition ability. Similarly, no association was observed between social 
anxiety and supramodal emotion recognition ability. These results contrast with previous 
literature that reports biases in the recognition of specific emotional expressions (e.g. Joormann 
& Gotlib, 2006; Attwood et al., 2017). However, discrepancies may be due to testing different 
samples of participants (general or clinical population) or assessing different aspects of anxiety 
(state or trait). An alternative perspective comes from recent work suggesting that emotion 
recognition difficulties observed in autism may actually reflect alexithymia (Cook, Brewer, 
Shah, & Bird, 2013), which is often co-morbid with autism (Bird & Viding, 2014). The current 
findings are consistent with this position.  
 
3.3 Study 2 
Results from Study 1 provided evidence for the existence of a supramodal ability factor 
underpinning emotion recognition from the face, body, and voice. However, since this 
observation derives from a study involving recognition of basic emotions, it leaves open a 
number of questions. In Study 2, we sought to address two of these. Firstly, does this 
supramodal ability factor extend to naturalistic stimuli involving more complex emotional 
expressions? Secondly, does this supramodal factor specifically represent emotion recognition 
ability per se, or does it instead reflect broader socio-cognitive or general cognitive ability? 
To examine the first question, we investigated the relationship between the supramodal 
ability factor and a well-used and more naturalistic test – the Reading the Mind in Films test 
(Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006) – which assesses the recognition of complex 
emotions and mental states from short social scenes taken from feature films. 
To examine the second question, we assessed broader performance on a set of non-
emotional face processing tests. For this purpose we chose the Mooney test (Mooney, 1956; 
Verhallen et al., 2014) as a measure of face perception, the Glasgow Face Matching Test 
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(Burton, White & McNeill, 2010) to measure recognition of unfamiliar face identity, and an 
abbreviated version of the Cambridge Face Memory Test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) as a 
measure of face learning. These tasks thus probe different aspects of face identity perception 
posited in widely-used cognitive and neural models (e.g. Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby, 
Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000). In order to assess whether the supramodal factor was reflective of 
broader cognitive ability, we also assessed participants on a short measure of verbal 
intelligence.  
3.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
A total of 252 participants (104 males) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
service. As in Study 1, there were a number of participants who experienced technical failures, 
therefore we included only those individuals who completed 90% (≥13 of 15) of trial blocks 
for each emotion and modality. In addition, we again excluded participants whose responses 
suggested chance level responding. This resulted in an omission of 34 participants, producing 
a final sample size of 218 (86 males). 
Mean age of participants was 37.9 years, and ethnicity was reported as follows: White 
(n=167), Hispanic (n=14), Asian (n=10), Black (n=16), Native American (n=3), Indian 
American (n=3) and Other (n=5). These characteristics match the typical demographic pattern 
for MTurk samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015). 
Stimuli 
Emotion Recognition Ability: To assess this ability, we drew on the same face, body 
and voice stimuli as detailed in Study 1. However, in order to reduce the time taken to complete 
the emotion recognition tasks and avoid any potential fatigue effects (given the additional 
measures used in Study 2), we selected three items from each emotion in each modality, so that 
each modality block comprised 15 items (5 emotions x 3 items) rather than the previous 50 (5 
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x 10). The selection procedure involved taking items displaying means between .50 and .80 
(i.e. those items not showing floor or ceiling effects and thus suitable for individual differences 
research). Where a surplus of items was available, we chose those items varying in gender and 
age as much as possible. Where three items between this range of means were not available, 
we chose three that showed means closest to this range. 
Reading the Mind in Films Task (RMFT): To assess the first question of Study 2, we 
tested participants on the more naturalistic Reading the Mind in Films test (Golan et al., 2006). 
This test in its full form comprises 22 short video clips taken from four British feature films, 
and showing scenes of characters engaging in complex social interactions. The participant 
perceives how a particular character is feeling from a choice of four emotional categories. 
Following a pilot experiment on Amazon’s MTurk (n=37: 22 males), we selected only those 
video clips showing mean emotion recognition accuracies between .50 and .80, thus resulting 
in a total of 12 video clips. As before, this step is important in ensuring our stimuli sets are 
suitable for individual differences research.  
Mooney Face Test: The Mooney test was originally developed in the late 1950’s, but 
has recently been made suitable for online administration (Verhallen et al., 2014). The task 
measures perceptual closure using high contrast face images consisting of exclusively dark or 
light regions. Participants view an array of three images and in a three-alternative forced-choice 
paradigm, they are required to decide which image shows a face. In a pilot experiment 
involving MTurk participants (n=40: 26 males), we chose those items most suitable for 
individual variation (means between .70 and .88 in this case), resulting in a total of 10 items 
(from a total of 40 available) for the current study.  
Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT): This unfamiliar face matching test involves 
showing the participant pairs of photographed faces in clear frontal view with neutral 
expressions and taken on the same day but photographed with different cameras. The 
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participant has to make a same/different person judgement, with unlimited stimulus 
presentation time. We used the shortened version of the test comprising 40 pairs (Burton et al., 
2010), and since this test has been widely used in the field (Fysh & Bindemann, 2017), we 
deemed it unnecessary to pilot this for use in individual differences research.  
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT): The original version of this unfamiliar face 
memory test was developed in order to diagnose individuals with prosopagnosia, and comprises 
a total of 72 items shown over three different phases (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). For 
purposes of keeping the total survey at a reasonable length, we chose to only use Phase 2 from 
this test. This phase consists of one image shown for 20 seconds at the start of the task in which 
six frontal-view target faces are viewed by the participant. The participant is then shown a 
series of 30 test images, each comprising a three-face array consisting of two distractor faces 
and one target face in a novel viewpoint. Their task is to select which one of the three faces 
they have learnt before, with unlimited time in which to make this decision.  
Verbal Intelligence: The participant views a series of words (10 in total) and must 
choose the answer option whose meaning is closest to the word in question. The ten items in 
this vocabulary test were taken from the Gallup-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence Test, Form A 
(Thorndike, 1942, as cited in Beaujean & Sheng, 2010) and the test has been used in large scale 
surveys (General Social Survey: Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2012). It offers a reasonable 
proxy for general intelligence since it shows a strong correlation (.87) with measures of 
intelligence (Jensen, 2001).   
Procedure 
The three emotion recognition blocks were shown to the participant first, with the same 
fixed order (voice, face, and body) as in Study 1. The participants then completed the face 
recognition tasks, in the same fixed order: GFMT, CFMT, and Mooney (each with unlimited 
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stimulus exposure time), then the RMFT, followed by the vocabulary test. The whole procedure 
took approximately 30 minutes. Participants were debriefed following completion.  
Analysis 
Appraisal of our models was based on the same fit criteria as used in Study 1, namely 
the χ2 test, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square of the Error Approximation 
(RMSEA), and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
 
3.3.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between the emotion recognition variables are 
shown in Table 4. Out of 105 possible correlations, a total of 20 (19 of which in the expected 
positive direction) were significant at the 5% level. This pattern of correlations might raise 
concerns about the evidence for an underlying supramodal emotion recognition factor. We 
elected to aggregate as per our study plan, but discuss this issue in more detail below. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between emotions and across expressive domain in Study 2. Skew ranged from -1.44 
to 0.21; kurtosis ranged from -1.09 to 1.52. Note. * p ≤ .05; ** p < .01; Bold indicates p < .001; CI95% are presented in square brackets.  
 Mean SD 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Faces                 
1.1 Anger .69 .28               
1.2 Disgust .63 .27 -.01  
[-.15, .12] 
             
1.3 Fear .69 .29 .09  
[-.04, .22] 
-.02  
[-.16, .11] 
            
1.4 Happiness .74 .29 -.04  
[-.17, .09] 
.02  
[-.12, .15] 
.01  
[-.12, .14] 
           
1.5 Sadness .61 .29 .19**  
[.06, .32] 
.04  
[-.09, .18] 
.01  
[.15, .37] 
-.03 
[-.13, .14] 
          
Bodies                 
2.1 Anger .80 .26 .10 
[-.03, .23] 
.04 
[-.09, .18] 
.14* 
[.01, .27] 
.13* 
[.00, .26] 
.11 
[-.03, .24] 
         
2.2. Disgust .39 .26 .04 
[-.09, .17] 
.15* 
[.01, .27] 
.01 
[-.12, .15] 
.10 
[-.04, .23] 
.06 
[-.08, .19] 
.19**  
[.06, .32] 
        
2.3 Fear .74 .27 .06 
[-.08, .19] 
.00 
[-.13, .14] 
.11 
[-.02, .24] 
-.01 
[-.14, .13] 
-.04 
[-.17, .10] 
.18** 
[.04, .30] 
-.06 
[-.19, .08] 
       
2.4 Happiness .67 .26 .08 
[-.05, .21] 
-.01 
[-.14, .13] 
.11 
[-.03, .24] 
.07 
[-.07, .20] 
.04 
[-.09, .18] 
.19**  
[.05, .31] 
-.03 
[-.16, .11] 
.28 
[.13, .36] 
      
2.5 Sadness .77 .25 .25 
[.13, .37] 
-.03 
[-.16, .11] 
.24 
[.11, .36] 
.00 
[-.13, .14] 
.10 
[-.04, .23] 
.11  
[-.02, .24] 
.13  
[-.00, .26] 
.08  
[-.05, .21] 
.02  
[-.11, .15] 
     
Voices                 
3.1 Anger .68 .28 .08  
[-.05, .21] 
-.03 
[-.16, .11] 
-.10 
[-.04, .23] 
.07 
[-.07, .20] 
.03 
[-.11, .16] 
.07 
[-.06, .20] 
.01 
[-.12, .15] 
-.02 
[-.16, .11] 
-.08 
[-.21, .05] 
.19** 
[.06, .32] 
    
3.2 Disgust .74 .24 -.02  
[-.15, .11] 
.02 
[-.12, .15] 
-.04 
[-.17, .09] 
.13 
[-.00, .26] 
.03 
[-.11, .16] 
.04 
[-.10, .17] 
.09 
[-.05, .22] 
-.01 
[-.15, .12] 
-.07 
[-.20, .07] 
.03 
[-.11, .16] 
.10  
[-.03, .23]     
3.3 Fear .82 .24 .15*  
[.02, .28] 
-.04 
[-.17, .09] 
.21** 
[.08, .34] 
.06 
[-.07, .19] 
.14* 
[.00, .26] 
.24 
[.11, .36] 
.06 
[-.07, .19] 
.06 
[-.08, .19] 
.15* 
[.02, .28] 
.07 
[-.07, .20] 
-.10  
[-.23, .04] 
-.08 
 [-.21, .06]   
3.4 Happiness .61 .35 .06  
[-.08, .19] 
-.06 
[-.19, .07] 
.01 
[-.13, .14] 
.22** 
[.09, .35] 
-.14* 
[-.27, -.00] 
-.02 
[-.15, .11] 
.09 
[-.05, .22] 
-.04 
[-.17, .09] 
.06 
[-.07, .19] 
-.02 
[-.15, .12] 
-.05  
[-.18, .09] 
-.03  
[-.16, .10] 
-.03  
[-.16, .11]  
3.5 Sadness .82 .26 .03 
[-.10, .16] 
.11 
[-.03, .24] 
.08 
[-.05, .21] 
-.07 
[-.20, .06] 
-.10 
[-.23, .03] 
-.01 
[-.14, .13] 
-.05 
[-.18, .08] 
-.04 
[-.17, .10] 
.10 
[-.04, .23] 
.03 
[-.10, .16] 
.03 
[-.10, .17] 
.17*  
[.04, .30] 
.03  
[-.11, .16] 
.16* 
 [.03, .29] 
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Correlations between the emotion recognition, face perception and verbal intelligence 
measures are shown in Table 5. Out of 28 possible correlations, a total of 17 were significant 
at the 5% level.  
Table 5. Associations between the emotion recognition modality blocks, the Reading the Mind 
in Films Task (RMFT), the face recognition tasks (GFMT: Glasgow Face Matching Test, 
CFMT: Cambridge Face Memory Test, and the Mooney Face Test) and the Vocabulary test in 
Study 2.  
Note. Bold indicates p < .05.  
 
 Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
We first addressed whether a supramodal ability factor for emotion recognition was 
apparent, and particularly whether the Reading the Mind in Films Task (RMFT) showed a 
coherent path loading onto this general factor. A model with a latent emotion recognition ability 
factor loading onto face, body and voice emotion recognition and the RMFT fitted well (CFI: 
1.00, RMSEA: .00, AIC: 3680.60). The RMFT showed a strong loading from the supramodal 
factor (.50) which was comparable to the factor loadings for the face (.53) and body emotion 
recognition scores (.53), and higher than the loadings of the voice scores (.28). 
We next examined whether this supramodal emotion recognition factor was better 
understood at a more general, socio-cognitive level of abstraction, or reflected a specific ability 
 
Voice Face Body RMFT GFMT CFMT Mooney 
r p r p r p r p r p r p r p 
Face .14 .045             
Body .13 .054 .29 <.001           
RMFT .17 .010 .26 <.001 .26 <.001         
GFMT .16 .015 .19 .004 .12 .071 .09 .176       
CFMT .10 .152 .23 .001 .09 .201 .13 .052 .28 <.001     
Mooney 
-
.01 
.885 .06 .349 .08 .247 .17 .012 .15 .023 .08 .269   
Vocabulary .14 .046 .22 .001 .18 .009 .42 <.001 .01 .897 .18 .007 .14 .041 
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factor. A model positing two uncorrelated latent factors – one for the emotion recognition 
variables and one for the non-emotion face variables – fitted the data poorly (CFI: .82, RMSEA: 
.07, AIC: 7233.01). A model positing a single overarching general factor fitted the data 
reasonably well (CFI: .92, RMSEA: .05, AIC: 7224.02). A model that specified a higher order 
social cognition factor loading on the emotion recognition factor and the ‘non-emotional face’ 
factor provided an excellent fit to the data (CFI: 1.00, RMSEA: .00, AIC: 7217.21). As in Study 
1, a χ2 difference test was carried out to assess whether the higher-order model showed 
significant fit increment relative to the single factor model. Results suggested that the single 
factor model showed a significantly worse fit relative to the higher-order model (χ2 (1, N=218) 
= 8.82, p=.005).  
Finally, we examined a bifactor solution; however, this model was not able to be 
identified and showed substantial negative error variance (i.e. unlikely to be due to random 
sampling variability). As such, we also examined a reduced bifactor model, including the 
general social cognition factor and either the emotion recognition factor (CFI: 1.00, RMSEA: 
.00, AIC: 7220.77) or face factor (CFI: 1.00, RMSEA: .00, AIC: 7220.00) – with both models 
exhibiting excellent fit. Overall, however, the higher order model was judged to be the best 
fitting model by the AIC and thus was taken forward for subsequent tests. This model, which 
has an overall social cognition factor and subordinate factors for emotion recognition (Face, 
Body, Voice, RMFT) and face perception (Mooney, GFMT, CFMT) is shown in detail in 
Figure 3. Of note, the emotion recognition factor forms an analogue of the supramodal emotion 
recognition factor observed in Study 1. 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of the final model of Study 2 parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals). All path coefficients in bold 
were significant at p<.02. Note RMFT = Reading the Mind in Films Task; GFMT = Glasgow Face Matching Test; CFMT = Cambridge Face 
Memory Test.  
.55 
[.35, .75] 
Voice 
Face 
Body 
Emotion 
recognition 
RMFT 
GFMT 
Mooney 
Face 
perception CFMT 
Social 
cognition 
.48 
[.32, .64] 
.58 
[.42, .74] 
.49 
[.33, .65] 
.50 
[.31, .70] 
.24 
[.06, .42] 
.76 
[.60, .92] 
.76 
[.60, .92] 
.30 
[.13, .46] 
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Relationship between Verbal Intelligence and Emotion Recognition Ability 
We next assessed whether verbal intelligence was predictive of the higher order general 
social cognition factor. A model including this parameter led to a poorly fitting model (CFI: 
.87, RMSEA: .06, AIC: 8062.05). We were concerned that this poor fit reflected the high verbal 
requirements of the RMFT, and the fact that the omission of a pathway between verbal 
intelligence and the RMFT essentially models these constructs as wholly unrelated; as such an 
additional loading directly from verbal intelligence to the RMFT was included. This model 
provided an excellent fit (CFI: .98, RMSEA: .02, AIC: 8048.26). Verbal intelligence was a 
modest-to-moderate predictor of the general factor (.40), and a modest predictor of the RMFT 
(.30). The final model is detailed in Figure 4, and the fit statistics for all models are shown in 
Table 6.   
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Figure 4. Graphical representation of the final model of Study 2 parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and inclusion of verbal 
intelligence. All path coefficients in bold were significant at p<.02. Note RMFT = Reading the Mind in Films Task; GFMT = Glasgow Face 
Matching Test; CFMT = Cambridge Face Memory Test. 
.48 
[.29, .66] 
Verbal Intelligence 
Voice 
Face 
Body 
Emotion 
recognition 
RMFT 
GFMT 
Mooney 
Face 
perception CFMT 
Social 
cognition 
.36 
[.19, .58] 
.60 
[.44, .77] 
.48 
[.32, .64] 
.54 
[.34, .73] 
.25 
[.07, .43] 
.30 
[.17, .43] 
.78 
[.61, .94] 
.78 
[.61, .94] 
.40 
[.22, .59] 
.29 
[.12, .46] 
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Table 6. Model output for confirmatory factor analyses in Study 2. Note that model fit values 
are unavailable for non-identified models, and therefore these are denoted by dashes. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 provide further support for the existence of a supramodal emotion 
recognition ability factor, and suggest that this supramodal factor extends beyond artificial 
laboratory-based stimuli to include more naturalistic emotional stimuli, as assessed by the 
Reading the Mind in Films Test (RFMT). In addition, results suggest the existence of a 'non-
emotional' face perception ability factor. Most notably, our results indicate that these two latent 
factors represent highly related abilities – consistent with the existence of a relatively general 
overall socio-cognitive ability factor. Finally, we found that verbal intelligence was moderately 
associated with the general social cognition ability factor. 
We note that the magnitude of the correlations between the individual emotion variables 
in Study 2 were modest and in several cases not significantly different from zero. This of course 
suggests that our necessarily brief measure of supramodal emotion recognition ability was 
noisier than desirable. Nonetheless, we still observed significant correlations across the 
Model Description χ2 (df) RMSEA CFI AIC 
1 Uncorrelated factors 29.68 (14) .07 .82 7233.01 
2 Single factor 20.70 (14) .05 .92 7224.02 
3 Higher order socio-cognitive 11.88 (13) .00 1.00 7217.21 
4 Bifactor - - - - 
4a Reduced bifactor with emotion 
factor 
9.45 (10) .00 1.00 7220.77 
4b Reduced bifactor with face factor 10.67 (11) .00 1.00 7220.00 
5 Higher order: verbal IQ to socio-
cognitive 
36.00 (19) .06 .87 8062.05 
6 Higher order: verbal IQ to socio-
cognitive and RMFT 
20.21 (18) .02 .98 8048.26 
7 Higher order: verbal IQ to socio-
cognitive, RMFT and emotion 
factor 
18.27 (17) .02 .99 8048.32 
 CHAPTER 3: SUPRAMODAL EMOTION RECOGNITION 
82 
 
emotion domains, indicating that these individual items did not merely capture noise, and that 
as well as being part of our study plan, our aggregation was reasonably principled.  
 
3.4 Study 3 
While the findings of Study 2 provide fairly clear evidence for the existence of a socio-
cognitive ability factor, the brief and low-fidelity verbal intelligence measure did not allow 
strong assertions concerning the degree of association between socio-cognitive ability and 
general intelligence. With this mind, in Study 3 we sought to further probe the relationship 
between socio-cognitive ability and general intelligence with a broader test of intelligence that 
included both numerical and verbal components. Despite noting some reservations with our 
brief emotion recognition measure from Study 2, we elected to use the same assessment. This 
decision was largely a pragmatic one: including the longer emotion recognition ability measure 
alongside our other measures would have made our battery too long for maintaining high 
quality data collection. In addition, we wanted to further examine the quality of these items so 
as to determine if they represented a viable means to assess supramodal emotion recognition 
ability. 
 
3.4.1 Methods 
Participants 
A total of 283 participants (147 males) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
service. There was again a proportion of participants who experienced technical failures, 
therefore we included only those individuals who completed 90% (≥13 of 15) of trial blocks 
for each emotion and modality. In addition, we excluded participants whose responses 
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indicated chance level responding. This resulted in an omission of 34 participants, producing a 
final sample size of 249 (126 males). 
Mean age of participants was 35.9 years, and ethnicity was reported as follows: White 
(n=185), Hispanic (n=12), East Asian (n=12), Black (n=26), Native American (n=2), Indian 
American (n=8), Middle Eastern (n=1) and Other (n=3). These participants represent the 
typical demographic pattern for MTurk samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015).  
 
Stimuli and Measures 
Alice Heim 4 Test of General Intelligence (AH4) Part 1 (Heim, 1970): This test 
consists of 65 items which are either numerical or verbal in nature. Half of the questions require 
multiple choice responses (from a choice of 5), and half require open entry ‘creative answers’. 
The participants have a maximum time limit of 10 minutes to complete as many of the items 
as they can, after which the page automatically advances to the next section of the survey. They 
are encouraged to complete the questions in the order in which they are given, but are also told 
they may skip to the next questions if they become stuck. The participants are awarded one 
point for every correct answer, and their total score is generated out of a maximum of 65.  
Emotion Recognition Ability: To assess this ability, we used the same abbreviated face, 
body and voice batteries of stimuli as detailed in Study 2. As before, each modality block 
comprised 15 items (3 items for each of the 5 basic emotions).  
Facial Recognition Tasks: The latent 'non-emotional' face factor in Study 2 showed 
the weakest loading onto the Mooney score, and the highest loadings onto the Glasgow Face 
Matching and Cambridge Face Memory tasks. Therefore we chose to use only these two latter 
tasks.    
Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT): This test is fully outlined in Study 2. For time-
saving purposes, here we generated an abbreviated version that was two-thirds of the length of 
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the original Short version. Specifically, we took the 27 best performing items that showed no 
evidence of ceiling or floor effects and thus were suitable for individual differences research 
(i.e. these had means between .66 and .87).  
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT): This test is fully outlined in Study 2. Again, 
for time-saving purposes we shortened this phase to two-thirds of its original length, by 
including only the 20 items with accuracy means most suitable for individual differences 
research (i.e. these had means between .40 and .62).  
Procedure 
The general intelligence test was shown to the participants first. They had a maximum 
of 10 minutes in which to answer as many questions as possible. Participants then completed 
the three emotion recognition blocks, with the same fixed order (voice, face, and body) as in 
Studies 1 and 2. This was followed by the facial recognition tasks, in the same fixed order: 
GFMT and CFMT. The whole procedure took approximately 25 minutes. Participants were 
debriefed following completion. 
Analysis 
Appraisal of our models was based on the same fit criteria as used in Studies 1 and 2, 
namely the χ2 test, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square of the Error 
Approximation (RMSEA), and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Latent factors 
typically require three or more indicators to ensure stable identification (Floyd & Widaman, 
1995). To this end, we used the first and second half of the GFMT and CFMT such that the 
face perception factor loaded onto four indicators. We also allowed residual correlations 
between the two halves of each test, as one would expect a test specific association between 
them. Importantly, if these associations were not formally modelled, it could lead to an 
unwarranted rejection of the whole model.  
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3.4.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between emotion variables are shown in Table 7. 
Out of 105 possible correlations, a total of 52 (51 of which in the expected positive direction) 
were significant at the 5% level. Of note, we observed a pattern of correlations between the 
emotion variables that more clearly supported the aggregation of these variables, although the 
correlations were still typically modest. This is discussed further below.  
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between emotions and across expressive domain in Study 3. Skew ranged from -1.12 
to 0.22; kurtosis ranged from -1.10 to 2.68. Note. * p ≤ .05; ** p < .01; Bold indicates p < .001; CI95% are presented in square brackets
 Mean SD 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Faces                 
1.1 Anger .66 .28               
1.2 Disgust .59 .32 .14*  
[.03, .24] 
             
1.3 Fear .67 .29 .03  
[-.09, .16] 
.19**  
[.07, .31]   
          
1.4 Happiness .70 .31 .11  
[-.02, .23] 
.15*  
[.03, .27] 
.08  
[-.05, .20] 
           
1.5 Sadness .59 .29 .19**  
[.07, .31] 
.02  
[-.10, .15] 
.09  
[-.03, .21] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
          
Bodies                 
2.1 Anger .71 .31 .31 
[.20, .42] 
.27 
[.15, .38] 
.20** 
[.08, .32] 
.10 
[-.03, .22] 
.17** 
[.05, .29] 
         
2.2. Disgust .37 .27 .08 
[-.05, .20] 
.09 
[-.03, .21] 
.04 
[-.09, .16] 
.04 
[-.09, .16] 
.08 
[-.05, .20] 
.27  
[.15, .38] 
        
2.3 Fear .73 .28 .14* 
[.02, .26] 
.18** 
[.06, .30] 
.18** 
[.06, .30] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
.21** 
[.09, .33] 
.34 
[.23, .45] 
.20** 
[.07, .31]        
2.4 Happiness .65 .29 .20** 
[.07, .31] 
.02 
[-.10, .15] 
.09 
[-.04, .21] 
.12 
[-.00, .24] 
.09 
[-.04, .21] 
.27  
[.15, .38] 
.23  
[.11, .34] 
.30 
[.18, .41] 
      
2.5 Sadness .67 .28 .23 
[.11, .34] 
.12* 
[.00, .25] 
.13* 
[.01, .25] 
.13* 
[.00, .25] 
.25 
[.13, .36] 
.37  
[.26, .47] 
.16*  
[.03, .27] 
.34  
[.23, .45] 
.19**  
[.06, .30]      
Voices                 
3.1 Anger .32 .16 .08  
[-.05, .20] 
.06 
[-.06, .18] 
.10 
[-.03, .22] 
.05 
[-.08, .17] 
.12 
[-.01, .24] 
.08 
[-.04, .21] 
.07 
[-.06, .19] 
.06 
[-.06, .19] 
.02 
[-.10, .15] 
.12 
[-.01, .24]     
3.2 Disgust .70 .27 .05  
[-.07, .18] 
.10 
[-.03, .22] 
.06 
[-.06, .19] 
.07 
[-.06, .19] 
.07 
[-.06, .19] 
.18** 
[.06, .30] 
.15* 
[.02, .27] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
.07 
[-.06, .19] 
.02  
[-.11, .14]     
3.3 Fear .79 .27 .02  
[-.11, .14] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
.18** 
[.06, .30] 
.04 
[-.09, .16] 
.02 
[-.11, .14] 
.31 
[.20, .42] 
.13* 
[.01, .25] 
.19** 
[.07, .31] 
.09 
[-.03, .22] 
.26 
[.14, .37] 
-.13*  
[-.25, -.01] 
.16* 
 [.03, .28]   
3.4 Happiness .61 .35 .07  
[-.06, .19] 
.19** 
[.07, .31] 
.08 
[-.04, .21] 
.10 
[.03, .22] 
.04 
[-.08, .17] 
.19** 
[.07, .31] 
.08 
[-.04, .20] 
.17** 
[.05, .29] 
.04 
[-.08, .17] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
.03  
[-.10, .15] 
-.02  
[-.14, .11] 
.20** 
[.01, .24]  
3.5 Sadness .80 .27 .08 
[-.04, .21] 
.20** 
[-.08, .31] 
.10 
[-.03, .22] 
.04 
[-.08, .17] 
.00 
[-.12, .12] 
.19** 
[.07, .31] 
.00 
[-.12, .12] 
.14* 
[.01, .26] 
.07 
[-.06, .19] 
.14* 
[.02, .26] 
.10  
[-.03, .22] 
.10  
[-.02, .22] 
.11  
[-.01, .23] 
.32 
 [.20, .42] 
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Correlations between the emotion recognition, face perception and general intelligence 
measures are shown in Table 8. Out of 15 possible correlations, a total of 11 were significant 
at the 5% level. 
Table 8. Associations between the emotion recognition modality blocks, the face recognition 
tasks (GFMT: Glasgow Face Matching Test, and CFMT: Cambridge Face Memory Test, and 
the Alice Heim general intelligence test in Study 3.   
Note. Bold indicates p < .05.  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
We first sought to assess the fit of the models that were tested in Study 2. A model 
positing uncorrelated emotion recognition and 'non-emotional' face perception factors was not 
identified. A model positing a single overarching factor also provided a poor fit to the data 
(CFI: .63, RMSEA: .21, AIC: 7753.85). We next examined a model that specified a higher 
order social cognition factor loading on the emotion recognition factor and the face factor. This 
model provided a good fit to the data (CFI: .97, RMSEA: .06, AIC: 7617.56), and is shown in 
Figure 5. Of note, this structure mirrors that of the higher-order model in Study 2 (Figure 3), 
suggesting that it is robust across independent samples.  
 
 
  
 
Voice Face Body GFMT CFMT 
r p r p r p r p r p 
Face .29 <.001         
Body .38 <.001 .41 <.001       
GFMT -.01 .902 .22 .004 .28 <.001     
CFMT .02 .706 .30 <.001 .19 .002 .37 <.001   
General 
Intelligence 
.38 <.001 .32 <.001 .46 <.001 .08 .202 .10 .106 
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Figure 5. Graphical representation of the higher-order model of Study 3 parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals). All path coefficients 
in bold were significant at p<.001. Note GFMT = Glasgow Face Matching Test; CFMT = Cambridge Face Memory Test.  
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Finally, for purposes of completion, we assessed a bifactor model with the general 
social cognition factor acting directly on the manifest variables, but as in the previous two 
studies, this was not able to be identified. A reduced bifactor model with a general socio-
cognitive factor and a specific emotion recognition factor showed an excellent fit (CFI: 1.00, 
RMSEA: .00, AIC: 7606.81. In contrast, a bifactor model with a general socio-cognitive factor 
and specific face perception factor was not identified. 
The reduced bifactor model showed a better fit compared to the higher order model, 
although the difference was relatively small. In line with the higher-order model showing the 
best fit in Study 2, we retained this model for testing the association to general intelligence, 
and we report the reduced bifactor model in the Supplementary Materials (Figure S1).  
 
Relationship between General Intelligence and Emotion Recognition Ability 
In the higher order model, we observed a path from general intelligence to the general 
socio-cognitive factor that was large in magnitude (.59); however, this model showed a 
relatively poor fit to the data (CFI: .91, RMSEA: .10, AIC: 9571.33). Accordingly, we explored 
whether general intelligence instead showed direct links to either the emotion or face factors. 
A model with general intelligence directly predicting the emotion recognition factor (with no 
path to the general socio-cognitive factor) showed a good fit to the data (CFI: .98, RMSEA: 
.05, AIC: 9539.48), and the pathway from general intelligence to emotion recognition was 
significant and substantial in magnitude (.61). In contrast, a model with general intelligence 
directly predicting face perception (again, with no path to the general socio-cognitive factor) 
did not show a good fit to the data (CFI: .82, RMSEA: .14, AIC: 9614.27), and the pathway 
from general intelligence to face perception was modest (-.12) and non-significant. 
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As an additional test, we examined a model with general intelligence directly loading 
on both emotion recognition and the general socio-cognitive factor. This model also fitted the 
data well (CFI: .98, RMSEA: .05, AIC: 9539.64). Of note, the path from general intelligence 
to emotion recognition was still significant and substantial in magnitude (.55), whereas the path 
from general intelligence to the general socio-cognitive factor was modest in magnitude (.15) 
and non-significant. This model is detailed in Figure 6. 
 
 
  
 CHAPTER 3: SUPRAMODAL EMOTION RECOGNITION 
91 
 
Figure 6. Graphical representation of the final higher-order model of Study 3 parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and the inclusion 
of general intelligence. All path coefficients in bold were significant at p<.001. Note RMFT = Reading the Mind in Films Task; GFMT = Glasgow 
Face Matching Test; CFMT = Cambridge Face Memory Test. 
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We next performed the equivalent tests with the reduced bifactor specification. 
Including a direct path from general intelligence to the general socio-cognitive factor produced 
an unidentified model. We next examined whether a model including an additional path to the 
emotion recognition factor was identified. This model was identified and fitted the data well 
(CFI: 1.00, RMSEA: .00, AIC: 9527.17). The path from general intelligence to the emotion 
recognition factor was significant and substantial in magnitude (.66), whereas the path from 
general intelligence to the socio-cognitive factor was modest in magnitude (.12) and non-
significant. This model is detailed in the Supplementary Materials (Figure S2). The fit values 
for all tested models are shown in Table 9.  
Table 9. Model output for confirmatory factor analyses in Study 3. Note that model fit values 
are unavailable for non-identified models, and therefore these are denoted by dashes. 
 
 
Subsidiary Analysis of Data from Study 2 
Given these findings from Study 3 of the emotion recognition factor being significantly 
predicted by general intelligence, we took an exploratory step of reanalysing data from Study 
2 to assess whether verbal intelligence in Study 2 was more related to either the emotion 
recognition factor or the Reading the Mind in Films Test (RMFT) score. In a hierarchical model 
with verbal intelligence predicting the higher order socio-cognitive factor and the RMFT, we 
Model Description χ2 (df) RMSEA CFI AIC 
1 Uncorrelated factors - - - - 
2 Single factor 163.93 (14) .21 .63 7753.85 
3 Higher order socio-cognitive 422.92 (21) .06 .97 7617.56 
4 Bifactor - - - - 
4a Reduced bifactor with emotion factor 6.89 (9) .00 1.00 7606.81 
4b Reduced bifactor with face factor - - - - 
5 Higher order: intelligence to socio-cognitive 60.66 (17) .10 .91 9571.33 
6 Higher order: intelligence to emotion factor 28.81 (17) .05 .98 9539.48 
7 Higher order: intelligence to face factor 103.60 (17) .14 .82 9614.27 
8 Higher order: intelligence to socio-cognitive 
and emotion factor 
26.97 (16) .05 .98 9539.64 
9 Reduced bifactor: intelligence to emotion 10.49 (14) .00 1.00 9527.17 
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also included an additional path from verbal intelligence to emotion recognition, and this model 
showed an excellent fit to the data (CFI: .99, RMSEA: .02, AIC: 8048.32). Verbal intelligence 
was a significant and moderate predictor of both the socio-cognitive factor (.27) and the RMFT 
(.28), but showed no significant association with the emotion recognition factor. This suggests 
that verbal intelligence does not predict emotion recognition ability, once the association 
between the RMFT and broader socio-cognitive perceptual ability has been accounted for.  
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
In line with the previous two studies, the results of Study 3 offer support for the 
existence of a distinct supramodal emotion recognition ability factor across face, body and 
voice stimuli. Consistent with Study 2, a model positing two distinct, albeit highly related, 
factors reflecting emotion recognition and 'non-emotional' face perception abilities with a 
general social cognition factor in a hierarchical structure fitted the data better than a single 
overarching general factor model. Secondly, we noted a strong positive association between 
supramodal emotion recognition ability and general intelligence, broadly in line with previous 
studies in the field (Lewis et al., 2016; Connolly et al., 2019).  
In contrast, no significant association was observed between general intelligence and 
either the face perception or the general socio-cognitive factors. This finding contrasts with 
earlier work showing an association between fluid intelligence and unfamiliar face identity 
matching, as measured by the Benton Facial Recognition Test (Connolly et al., 2019), but is 
consistent with other studies that report no correlation between intelligence and face learning, 
as measured by the Cambridge Face Memory Test (Wilmer et al., 2010; Palermo, O’Connor, 
Davis, Irons, & McKone, 2013). These studies posit that perception of face identity is a specific 
cognitive ability separate from general intelligence, and our findings here support this 
contention.  
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3.5 General Discussion 
Being able to accurately interpret others’ emotional expressions is an important skill 
for social interaction. However, to date, there has been little knowledge concerning whether 
individual differences in this ability reflect domain-specific or superordinate processes. In three 
studies, we sought to address this issue by examining the structure of individual differences in 
emotion recognition ability across the face, body, and voice, and the associations of this ability 
to various affective and cognitive traits.  
The findings of these studies offer several interesting observations. Firstly, in Study 1, 
we provide strong support for a supramodal emotion recognition ability factor that extends 
beyond visual domains (facial and bodily stimuli) to also include recognition of auditory 
emotional stimuli from the voice. Notably, evidence for the existence of this factor was also 
apparent in the findings from Studies 2 and 3 and therefore appears to represent a highly 
replicable pattern. Secondly, we observed a moderate negative association between the 
supramodal emotion recognition factor and alexithymia. In contrast, no significant associations 
with either autism-like traits or social anxiety were seen.  
In Study 2, results showed that the supramodal emotion recognition factor is also linked 
to recognition of complex emotional stimuli that are arguably more representative of everyday 
scenarios. Nonetheless, the emotion recognition factor was found to be distinct from, albeit 
moderately-to-strongly related to, a relatively 'non-emotional' face factor derived from various 
tests of face perception. Emergence of this factor is consistent with recent work reporting a 
general face perception factor ‘f’, distinct from other cognitive abilities (Verhallen, et al., 2017; 
McCaffery, Robertson, Young & Burton, 2018). These authors’ work assessed identity 
perception and other non-emotional face tasks, and therefore our observations both support the 
proposed existence of the f factor and expand its scope. Our data also suggest that f is related 
to but still somewhat distinct from other high-level visual perception abilities including 
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emotion recognition, even when the emotional stimuli comprise facial expressions. A third 
latent factor that encompassed the commonality between emotion and face recognition factors 
in a higher order structure was posited to reflect social cognition, and this factor showed a 
moderate association with a brief measure of verbal intelligence.   
In Study 3, results also suggested the existence of two distinct latent factors: one 
capturing supramodal emotion recognition ability and the other capturing face perception. As 
in Study 2, the commonality between these two factors was considerable and was modelled as 
a higher order factor that we again suggest is reflective of general social cognition. In addition, 
the results of Study 3 showed that general intelligence was a strong predictor of the emotion 
recognition factor. Accurate recognition of emotion thus appears to reflect broader, non-
affective cognitive processes, and this may be for a number of reasons. In particular, our 
emotion recognition tasks used a multiple-choice paradigm with examples of basic emotional 
expressions that were selected on the basis that they were sufficiently difficult to avoid ceiling 
performance. As such, when participants were unsure as to the target emotion, some may have 
resorted to cognitive strategies to ‘solve’ the intended expression, such as by a process of 
elimination. Implementation and success of these strategies may reflect the individual’s general 
cognitive ability. The tasks may also demand holding vocal or dynamic visual information in 
mind whilst simultaneously attending to five emotion labels in order to make a choice, and 
these working memory demands may conceivably underlie the strong relationship between 
emotion recognition and our test of general intelligence (Palermo et al., 2013). However, it 
should be noted that whilst emotion recognition and intelligence are related, they do not reflect 
the same construct. We note also that the presentation of the emotion stimuli lasted for the 
duration of each individual item (1 second for facial stimuli, between 4.2 and 8 seconds for 
body stimuli, and between 1.45 and 2.23 seconds for voice stimuli), and that participants had 
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unlimited time in which to give their response. Therefore, the tests were likely capturing their 
ability to accurately perceive emotion, rather than simply a measure of processing speed.  
In contrast to emotion recognition, no significant associations were observed between 
general intelligence and the general social cognition or non-emotional face perception factors. 
Previous research has noted the distinction between general intelligence and face perception 
(Wilmer et al., 2010), so the absence of association between these factors is not surprising. The 
face identity tests included here presented items with no time limit, and participants had as long 
as they needed to decide on their response. Therefore, as before, it is unlikely that processing 
speed or reaction time was being captured in performance on these tests.  
 Moreover, this further supports Verhallen et al.’s (2017) findings that neither the 
putative f’ factor nor any of their individual face recognition measures show an association 
with scores on the standard British school qualification: General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE). In Study 3, we likewise observed no significant relationship between 
general intelligence and our latent face perception factor or either of the two face recognition 
tasks, in line with the idea that face recognition ability may be distinct from broader cognition. 
Our findings extend the pattern found between Verhallen’s largely undergraduate-based 
sample and school test results to the general intelligence scores we measured in a more diverse 
sample of adults at the same time point as the face tasks, and suggest this independence of 
abilities is a robust finding and is stable over time.   
Some possibilities for future research are noteworthy. Firstly, our online sample 
consisted solely of US participants, and so our results may not generalize to a non-Western 
sample. Studies of the kind reported here in broader samples would be of value. Secondly, as 
highlighted in Study 2, the inter-correlations of items on the shorter emotion recognition 
measure were limited, and as such, we advise some caution in using abbreviated scales of this 
kind. The limitations of abbreviated measures are a challenge for many fields of social 
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psychology, including personality, where short form measures are commonly used, despite 
concerns over their validity (Bakker & Lelkes, 2018). There are clearly situations in which it 
is important to keep the battery length reasonable so as to avoid participant fatigue; however, 
the brevity of a shorter measure will often result in lower fidelity and construct validity. The 
balancing of test length and validity, as well as considering power, will be an ongoing 
challenge, and the wider community should bear this in mind when deciding which measures 
to include in their future studies.  
Conclusion 
 In summary, across three independent samples, our findings provide support for a 
robust supramodal emotion recognition ability factor that underlies the recognition of 
expressions across face, body and voice, and that is in itself somewhat distinct from broader 
face identity perception and recognition. In addition, we have outlined the association of the 
supramodal emotion recognition factor to various important affective and cognitive traits, 
specifically alexithymia and general intelligence, as well as demonstrating that it can extend to 
recognising more complex and naturalistic emotional stimuli.  
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3.6 Supplementary Materials 
Figure S1. Graphical representation of the reduced bifactor model of Study 3 parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and the inclusion 
of general intelligence. All path coefficients in bold were significant at p<.001.  
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Figure S2. Graphical representation of the final reduced bifactor model of Study 3 parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and the 
inclusion of general intelligence. All path coefficients in bold were significant at p<.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
General intelligence 
CFMT 2 
Voice 
Face 
Body 
Emotion 
recognition 
GFMT 1 
CFMT 1 
Social 
cognition 
GFMT 2 
.66 
[.55, .77] 
  
.12 
[-.03, .28] 
  
.59 
[.47, .72] 
  
.43 
[.30, .56] 
  
.63 
[.51, .75] 
  
.22 
[-.05, .49] 
  
.60 
[.50, .69] 
  
-.02 
[-.16, .13] 
  
.37 
[.22, .51] 
  
.33 
[.19, .46] 
  
.60 
[.42, .77] 
.69 
[.52, .86] 
  
.45 
[.30, .60] 
  
.51 
[.36, .65] 
  
 CHAPTER 4: FACE EXPRESSION AND IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
100 
 
Chapter 4: Facial Expression and Facial Identity Recognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognition of facial expression and identity in part reflects a common 
ability, independent of general intelligence and visual short-term memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Andrew Young and 
Gary Lewis (supervisor) and is published in Cognition and Emotion.   
Connolly, H. L., Young, A. W., & Lewis, G. J. (2019). Recognition of facial expression and 
identity in part reflects a common ability, independent of general intelligence and 
visual short-term memory. Cognition and Emotion, 33(6), 1119-1128.  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699931.2018.1535425  
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Abstract 
 
Recognising identity and emotion conveyed by the face is important for successful 
social interactions and has thus been the focus of considerable research. Debate has surrounded 
the extent to which the mechanisms underpinning face emotion and face identity recognition 
are distinct or share common processes. Here we use an individual differences approach to 
address this issue. In a well-powered (N=605) and age-diverse sample we used structural 
equation modelling to assess the association between face emotion recognition and face 
identity recognition ability. We also sought to assess whether this association (if present) 
reflected visual short-term memory and/or general intelligence (g). We observed a strong 
positive correlation (r = .52) between face emotion recognition ability and face identity 
recognition ability. This association was reduced in magnitude but still moderate in size (r = 
.28) and highly significant when adjusting for measures of g and visual short-term memory. 
These results indicate that face emotion and face identity recognition abilities in part share a 
common processing mechanism. We suggest that face processing ability involves multiple 
functional components and that modelling the sources of individual differences can offer an 
important perspective on the relationship between these components. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Recognising someone's identity and their moods and feelings is critical to effective 
social interaction; identity recognition allows behaviour to be based on past experience and 
personal knowledge, whilst emotion recognition allows behaviour to be adjusted to current 
circumstances. In most everyday conditions, the face is a key source of information for both 
identity and emotion recognition (Bruce & Young, 2012), but the demands of these tasks differ 
in important ways (Young, 2018). In particular, a core requirement of face identity recognition 
is to be able to recognise the faces of people we know across different emotional expressions, 
whereas a core requirement of facial emotion recognition is to be able to recognise expressions 
across different identities. These differing demands imply that at some level there must be some 
degree of separation between mechanisms involved in recognising identity and emotion, but 
considerable debate has centred on the extent and nature of this functional segregation (Calder 
& Young, 2005).  
Association between face emotion recognition and face identity recognition abilities 
Classic cognitive (Bruce & Young, 1986) and neural (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2000) models have posited functionally distinct pathways for processing of changeable (i.e. 
expression) and stable (i.e. identity) facial characteristics that diverge after a common early 
stage in face perception. This perspective of substantial functional segregation is supported by 
evidence from clinical studies of brain-injured patients, which have reported double 
dissociations between recognition of facial expression and facial identity (Shuttleworth, 
Syring, & Allen, 1982; Kurucz, Feldmar, & Werner, 1979; Parry, Young, Shona, Saul, & Moss, 
1991; Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993). 
Despite this evidence of functional separation between identity and emotion 
recognition, other data point to some degree of overlap. For example, Rhodes et al. (2015) 
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reported that facial expression and identity aftereffects are positively associated, whereas no 
such association was observed with gaze or tilt aftereffects. In addition, fMRI studies have also 
been taken to argue against a complete independence of identity and expression processing; 
specialised brain areas thought to be involved in processing invariant facial signals (fusiform 
face area) and processing changeable signals (posterior superior temporal sulcus) can show 
sensitivity to changes in both types of facial cues (Fox, Moon, Iaria, & Barton, 2009). Similarly, 
interactions between identity and expression have also been noted in an early component of 
ERPs from neurologically normal participants (Fisher, Towler, & Eimer, 2016). 
The potential discrepancy between reports of functional overlap and functional 
separation might be resolved if the evidence of overlap derives from the common perceptual 
stage posited in classic models (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000) and the evidence 
of separation pertains to later stages. Time-sensitive data such as ERPs suggest that this may 
indeed be the case (Martens, Leuthold, & Schweinberger, 2010; Fisher et al., 2016). Moreover, 
analysis of the image statistics that underlie recognition of identity and emotion shows that a 
common initial perceptual representation may be optimal. Calder, Burton, Miller, Young, and 
Akamatsu (2001) investigated the image statistics that underlie representations of facial 
identity and emotional expression through a principal component analysis (PCA) of the shape 
and surface properties of images from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series of 'Pictures of facial 
affect'. They found that different combinations of principal components (PCs) can be used 
successfully to decode emotion or identity, but with two important caveats. First, multiple PCs 
are always needed. Second, whilst some PCs are mainly useful for decoding emotional 
expression and some are mainly useful for decoding identity, other PCs are useful for both 
identity and emotion. In other words, emotion and identity can be represented through 
combinations of PCs, but not in a fully exclusive manner. Hence while there are differences 
between the visual properties underlying identity and emotional expression, there is also 
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substantial covariation; the principal components coding facial identity and facial expression 
perception show a partial overlap, rather than absolute independence.  
Although some relevant lines of research already exist, then, we reasoned that the 
assessment of individual differences – the focus of the current study – represents a relatively 
novel route through which to gain further traction on this question. Existing models (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000) were formulated in an era in which it was assumed that most 
neurologically normal individuals will experience little difficulty in recognising facial identity 
and emotion. More recently, however, the existence of substantial individual differences in 
ability has become apparent (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006; Burton, White & McNeill, 2010; 
Lewis, Lefevre & Young, 2016; Young & Burton, 2017, 2018), allowing the pattern of these 
differences to be informative concerning the underlying functional architecture. For example, 
if face emotion recognition and face identity recognition reflect contributions from a common 
functional component, one would expect to see an association between these abilities. 
Furthermore, if this common component is perceptual in nature, it should not link strongly to 
more general cognitive abilities (such as general intelligence), and if it is a relatively face-
specific ability then it may not link strongly to other forms of perceptual aptitude (such as 
visual short-term memory). 
Some initial work of this kind has already indicated that face emotion recognition 
ability and face identity recognition ability are associated. In three samples (N=40 in each) of 
individuals with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and normal health, Addington and Addington 
(1998) reported positive associations (rrange =.35-.65) between performance on the Benton Test 
of Facial Recognition and a facial emotion expression labelling task. Borod et al. (2000) 
observed a similar positive correlation of r=.44 (N=100) between these measures in a sample 
of healthy adults. In a study of undergraduate students (N=80), correlations of r=.40 and r=.27 
were found between performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT: Duchaine & 
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Nakayama, 2006) and tests of facial emotion-matching and emotion-labelling, respectively 
(Palermo, O’Connor, Davis, Irons, & McKone, 2013). In a meta-analysis of 8 studies of 
schizophrenic individuals, a correlation of .53 was reported between facial recognition and 
facial emotion processing (Ventura, Wood, Jimenez, & Hellemann, 2013). Most recently, 
Rhodes and colleagues (2015) reported a significant positive correlation of r=.38 (N=161) 
between an individual’s performance on the CFMT and a six alternative forced-choice facial 
expression recognition task. 
The studies noted above provide fairly consistent evidence that individual differences 
in face emotion recognition ability and face identity recognition ability reflect some degree of 
shared processing. However, all of those examining a typical population have been based on 
relatively small samples (i.e. Nrange = 40-161). As such it is possible that the reported 
association between face emotion and identity recognition ability is reflective of publication 
bias and may be inflated in its magnitude (Ioannidis, 2008) (a point we return to shortly). 
Association between face emotion recognition, face identity recognition, and other 
cognitive abilities 
 To the extent that emotion and identity recognition abilities overlap, a natural question 
concerns whether this shared variance is reflective of face-specific ability, or instead reflects 
broader cognitive ability (e.g. general intelligence). A range of studies have examined the 
relationship between emotion/identity recognition ability and general intelligence. In the 
domain of emotion recognition, Lewis et al. (2016) (N=389) reported a moderate positive 
association (r=.43) between a latent variable of visual (face and body) emotion recognition 
ability and a brief general intelligence measure. Similarly, a comparable positive association 
(r=.44) between multimodal emotion recognition ability (simultaneous cues of face, body, and 
voice) and a measure of non-verbal intelligence was observed in 128 participants by Schlegel 
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and Scherer (2016). Borod and colleagues (2000) (N=100) observed a significant positive 
correlation (r=.25) between facial emotion recognition and intelligence. In contrast, Palermo 
and colleagues (2013) (N=80) observed no significant association between non-verbal 
intelligence and either face emotion matching (r=.07) or face emotion labelling (r=.04). 
Similarly, in a sample of primary school-aged children (N=968), Nowicki and Duke (1994) 
reported that emotion recognition scores were not significantly associated with a standardized 
IQ measure.  
 A broadly equivalent pattern of findings has been noted for identity recognition ability 
and general intelligence. For example, work examining face memory (alongside broader face 
perception variables) has reported modest-to-moderate links to general intelligence using a 
variety of study designs, including genetic analyses (Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015 [r=.16, 
N=718]) and structural equation modelling, as in the current study (Wilhelm et al., 2010 [r=.21, 
N=209]). Similarly using a latent modelling approach, Gignac, Shankaralingam, Walker, and 
Kilpatrick (2016) (N=211) observed a moderate, positive association (r=.34) between face 
recognition ability, as measured by the CFMT, and general intelligence. Finally, Hildebrandt 
and colleagues (2011) (N=448) reported that general intelligence accounted for approximately 
half of the variance of face perception and face memory abilities. In contrast, other work has 
found no evidence of an association between face identity recognition and other cognitive 
abilities (Davis et al., 2011 [N=137, r=-.08]; Peterson & Miller, 2012 [N=42, r=.01-.21]; 
Palermo et al., 2013 [N=80, r=-.01]).  
 While the above findings show there is still some debate on whether these associations 
exist between general intelligence and face emotion/identity recognition, it is clear that any test 
of association between identity and emotion recognition ability requires additional examination 
of general intelligence in order to establish the degree to which such an association is reflective 
of broader cognitive ability.   
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The Current Study 
 We sought to overcome some of the limitations of previous studies in the field. To this 
end we used a structural equation modelling approach with data from a sample of healthy, 
age-diverse adults, which was well-powered (see Methods) to detect even a modest association 
between our face emotion and identity recognition measures. Indeed, the sample size of the 
current study (N=605) is larger than has previously been used in the field, and can therefore 
offer a more robust indication of the strength of the association between face emotion and 
identity recognition.  
In line with previous work we predicted an association of r=.40, which represented the 
approximate weighted mean of previous studies in the field. We also sought to test whether 
this association (if present) was independent of broader perceptual or cognitive processes – 
specifically, visual short-term memory and general intelligence. Adjusting for broader 
cognitive processes is necessary for our individual differences approach so that any association 
between face emotion and face identity recognition ability that we present is not merely an 
artefact of a more general ability factor. For this question, we were exploratory with our 
analyses given the mixed findings reported in this literature to date (Gignac et al., 2016; Lewis 
et al., 2016; Palermo et al., 2013; Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015), although we expected to see 
some attenuation of the association between emotion and identity recognition ability. 
4.2 Methods 
Participants 
Data analysed in this study were collected by a different research group as part of a 
larger project - the Cambridge Centre for Ageing and Neuroscience (Cam-CAN) cohort 
(N=2681) (Shafto et al., 2014). This cohort consists of a cross-sectional adult sample (aged 
18-87 years), which was randomly selected from GP listings to be demographically 
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representative of the UK population. The cohort completed demographic questionnaires and 
general cognitive and memory assessments in a home interview. Following this initial 
assessment, 700 individuals (50 males and 50 females for every age decile) who were MRI-
suitable and showed no serious cognitive impairment were invited to complete a range of 
neuroimaging sessions and cognitive-behavioural tasks. A total of 656 participants were thus 
recruited and additional analyses of their data forms the basis for the current study. 
The Cam-CAN data set includes many measures. To ensure a rigorous approach we 
chose the measures of interest and pre-registered the approach we adopted before analysing 
any of the data. Note, however, that we had access to the data prior to submitting this protocol 
(although no analyses were performed). This was because the data were not sufficiently 
documented prior to receipt to be able to formulate a precise analysis plan. 
In line with our pre-registration protocol 
(https://osf.io/e5zp8/register/565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67), participants were excluded if they 
showed chance levels of performance on two or more of the cognitive-behavioural tasks, or 
had not completed all of the cognitive-behavioural tests (see Measures). This required the 
omission of 51 participants, resulting in a final sample size of 605 (291 males). The mean age 
of participants was 54.0 years (SD=18.2), and ethnicity was as follows: White (N=583), Asian 
(N=7), Black (N=1), Mixed Race (N=8) and undisclosed (N=6). All participants were native 
English speakers from birth.   
Measures 
Face Emotion Expression Recognition Test: This test is a measure of facial emotion 
recognition and stimuli were drawn from the Emotion Hexagon test (Young et al., 1997, 2002). 
This test was created by using a model from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) ‘Pictures of facial 
affect’ series displaying each of six basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
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and surprise). These images were each then morphed with another basic emotion to form 
emotional expressions with graded levels of difficulty (expression pairs morphed together 
consist of happiness-surprise, surprise-fear, fear-sadness, sadness-disgust, disgust-anger, and 
anger-happiness). In the Cam-CAN version of the test participants were shown faces with 70 
or 90% of the target emotion, with a six alternative forced-choice response involving 20 trials 
for each of the emotions. Stimuli were shown for 3 seconds each. A percentage accuracy score 
for each of the six emotions was generated for use in subsequent analyses. The six Emotion 
Expression Recognition sub-scores were significantly associated: r ranged from .12 to .46, and 
all p < .003. 
Benton Test of Facial Recognition: Participants completed the short-form of the 
Benton Test of Facial Recognition (Levin, Hamsher, & Benton, 1975), which measures an 
individual’s ability to match pictures of unfamiliar faces. The test consists of 27 trials in which 
the participant is shown one target face and an array of six faces. The participant has to find 
one or more examples of the target face in the array. Changes in head orientation or lighting 
can occur between the target and array faces. Each correct response receives a score of 1, and 
a total percentage accuracy score was generated for use in subsequent analyses.  
Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test: Participants completed the standard form of the 
Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence test, Scale 2 Form A (Cattell, 1973). The test contains four 
nonverbal subtests: Series Completion, Classification, Matrices, and Conditions, and 
participants are given 3, 4, 3, and 2.5 minutes to complete each subtest respectively. The Cattell 
test is a pen-and-paper test where the participant chooses a response on each item from multiple 
response options, and records responses on an answer sheet. Correct responses are given a score 
of 1 and the percentage correct for each sub-test was calculated for use in subsequent analyses. 
The four Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence subtests were significantly associated: r ranged from 
.53 to .64, and all p < .001. 
 CHAPTER 4: FACE EXPRESSION AND IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
110 
 
Visual short-term memory (VSTM): This task assesses participants’ short-term 
memory for colour, and is adapted from a previous experiment (Zhang & Luck, 2008). It is 
tested using a continuous colour-wheel paradigm, and consists of two blocks of 112 trials. On 
each trial, participants see a display for 250ms containing a central fixation and one to four 
coloured discs in the surround. A blank screen is then displayed for 900ms. Following this, one 
of the disc locations is highlighted and the participant has unlimited time in which to indicate 
the colour of the cued disc that was previously in the highlighted location using a continuous 
colour response wheel. The participant's accuracy of reported disc colour (precision) was 
generated for each learning set size (1, 2, 3 or 4 discs). Three out of the four visual short-term 
memory sub-scores were significantly associated with each other (r ranged from .17 to .42, all 
p < .001), although the scores for learning set size 4 were not significantly associated to the 
other three learning set sizes (r ranged from .02 to .05, p ranged from .23 to .67). As such, we 
used learning set sizes 1, 2 and 3 to form an aggregate accuracy score. This variable was used 
in the reported analyses. As a sensitivity check we also ran our analyses where the VSTM 
accuracy score was derived just from learning set size 4 (see Supplementary Materials).  
Analysis 
We used a structural equation modelling approach to address our research questions. 
Specifically, we modelled face emotion recognition ability as a latent variable loading on the 
six manifest variables of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise recognition 
scores. We did not have access to the raw items for the Benton Test of Facial Recognition 
and so here we used the total score as a manifest variable. The latent face emotion recognition 
ability factor and the Benton Test score were allowed to covary in our model to assess if an 
association was present (see Figure 1). To assess if the association between face emotion and 
identity recognition ability was independent of general intelligence and visual short-term 
memory in a second model (see Figure 2) we regressed these variables onto a latent factor of 
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general intelligence (which was defined by the four Cattell sub-tests) and visual short-term 
memory.     
We examined absolute fit of our models using the χ2 value, the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The χ2 value is the 
traditional measure of model fit, but is very sensitive to large sample sizes and often rejects 
sensible models on this basis (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). For the CFI and RMSEA, values 
of ≥.95 and ≤.06 respectively are viewed as indicative of good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). 
 
4.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are shown in Table 1. All study 
variables were approximately normally distributed. In summary, of the 78 possible 
correlations, all were positively signed and 74 were significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 1. Correlations between the emotion recognition scores, the Benton Test of Facial Recognition, the Cattell Fluid Intelligence test and its four 
subtests, and the Visual Short-term Memory (VSTM) combined accuracy score.   
Note. Performance scores ranged from 5 to 100% accuracy. Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; Bold indicates p < .001.
 Mean SD Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise Benton 
Cattell 
Total 
Series 
Completion 
Classification Matrices Conditions 
Anger 83.4 19.6             
Disgust 86.2 18.3 .43             
Fear 75.3 21.9 .46  .28           
Happiness 97.5 5.4 .20 .18 .19          
Sadness 92.5 13.3 .40 .23 .43 .18         
Surprise 89.5 11.1 .26 .12** .18 .12 .31        
Benton 85.0 8.5 .30 .09* .38 .03 .35 .27       
Cattell Total 69.5 14.6 .43 .15 .48 .12** .42 .33 .42      
-Series 
Completion 
78.6 16.9 .39 .17 .41 .12** .41 .34 .41 .84     
-Classification 58.1 15.2 .30 .06 .34 .07 .29 .22 .26 .81 .54    
-Matrices 75.7 18.2 .40 .15 .46 .13** .36 .27 .43 .85 .64 .58   
-Conditions 66.2 23.0 .32 .10* .37 .08* .31 .27 .29 .79 .56 .53 .54  
VSTM 1.43 .37 .13 .07 .26 .08* .13** .10* .17 .30 .24 .25 .28 .22 
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Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
We first assessed the association between face emotion recognition ability (face 
emotion) and face identity recognition ability (face identity). This model showed an acceptable 
fit to the data (CFI: .91, RMSEA: .09), and in answer to our first research question, we 
observed a strong positive correlation between the face emotion and face identity recognition 
variables (r=.49, p<.001).  
While the model fit was acceptable, it was not good by conventional standards. When 
global model fit is less than good, this can lead to biased estimates of local parameters 
(Tomarken & Waller, 2003) – in the current model we were concerned that this might inflate 
the estimate of the association between emotion and identity recognition. Therefore, we 
examined modification indices as a sensitivity analysis, in order to assess whether additional 
paths would improve model fit. These highlighted a covariance path between anger and disgust 
recognition which would enhance model fit. As such, we re-ran our model, but here including 
this additional parameter (see Figure 1). This model showed a good fit to the data (CFI: .95, 
RMSEA: .06), and we again observed a strong positive correlation between the face emotion 
and face identity recognition variables (r=.52, p<.001). No other model modifications were 
examined.    
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of the first theoretical model with standardized parameter 
estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and the added Anger-Disgust pathway. All path 
coefficients in bold were significant at p<.001.  
 
 
We then fitted a model (including the additional Anger-Disgust parameter as in Figure 
1) which included measures of general intelligence and visual short-term memory (VSTM) to 
assess whether the association between face emotion recognition and face identity recognition 
was robust to their effects. This model is detailed in Figure 2 and the overall model showed a 
good fit to the data (CFI: .97, RMSEA: .05). General intelligence was a strong predictor of face 
emotion recognition (β = .74, p<.001) and face identity recognition (β = .48, p<.001). In 
contrast, VSTM was unrelated to these two abilities. Of importance, adjusting for general 
intelligence and VSTM, the association between face emotion and face identity recognition 
reduced to r = .28, albeit still remaining highly significant (p<.001). 
As noted in the Methods, we ran our models again exchanging our chosen measure for 
VSTM with an alternative formulation (i.e. one derived from learning set size 4, rather than the 
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aggregate of learning set sizes 1, 2 and 3), This did not lead to any notable changes in parameter 
estimates with regard to our core tests; however, the association between general intelligence 
and VSTM was no longer significant (see Table 2 and Figure 3 in the Supplementary 
Materials).   
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of the second theoretical model with standardized parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and the 
added Anger-Disgust pathway. All path coefficients in bold were significant at p<.001.  
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4.4 Discussion 
In a well-powered and age diverse sample, we observed a large positive association 
between face emotion recognition and face identity recognition abilities. Importantly, this 
association – while reduced in magnitude – was still present and highly significant when 
general intelligence was modelled as a covariate. Moreover, the association remained even 
when visual short-term memory was modelled as a covariate, consistent with the notion that 
the overlap reflects face-specific processes. 
 The results observed here are interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, the magnitude 
of the observed association between face emotion recognition and face identity recognition 
ability is in line - and in fact here largely exceeds - correlations reported in related studies in 
the field (e.g. Borod et al., 2000; Palermo et al., 2013). Concerns of sample-specific effects and 
inflated parameter estimates therefore appear to be unwarranted. Secondly, the observation that 
face emotion recognition and identity recognition ability are associated, over and above the 
effect of broader cognitive or perceptual processes, is consistent with the idea that that face 
processing ability reflects different contributions at multiple levels of individual differences 
that include general cognitive processing, generalised face-perceptual processes, and emotion- 
and identity-specific processes. This converges both with existing models drawn from other 
sources of data (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000) and with related individual 
differences research highlighting a hierarchy of abilities (e.g. Lewis et al., 2016). Thirdly, the 
current findings provide additional support for recent work reporting a general face perception 
factor ‘f’, distinct from other cognitive abilities (Verhallen, Bosten, Goodbourn, Lawrance-
Owen, Bargary, & Mollon, 2017; McCaffery, Robertson, Young, & Burton, 2018). This work, 
however, only assessed identity and other non-expression relevant face tasks. As such, our 
observations both strengthen the likely existence and broaden the scope of the putative f factor. 
Finally, we observed moderate-to-strong positive correlations between general intelligence and 
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identity recognition ability and emotion recognition ability, respectively. Given the relatively 
inconsistent reports in the literature of these associations (e.g. Gignac et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 
2016; Palermo et al., 2013; Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015), and the large and diverse sample of 
the current study, these findings offer a more robust indication of the strength of the association 
between these two face cognition abilities and general intelligence.  
 Our use of the Cam-CAN data set restricted us to using the Benton Test of Facial 
Recognition as our measure of face recognition ability. As a test that involves matching 
relatively standardised images of unfamiliar faces, this has the limitations that it does not tap 
key skills of familiar face recognition (Young & Burton, 2017) and the ability to cope with 
everyday image variability (Bruce, 1994; Burton, 2013). It has also been suggested that the 
Benton Test allows the use of atypical feature-matching strategies, even by prosopagnosic 
individuals (Newcombe, 1979; Bowles et al., 2009), though in fact many normal participants 
rely on feature matching in a variety of matching tasks with unfamiliar faces (Hancock, Bruce, 
& Burton, 2000). As noted, we observed a strong positive correlation between general 
intelligence and our measure of face identity recognition ability (the Benton Test of Facial 
Recognition). This is consistent with the idea of a strategic component and is also of interest 
because some previous studies did not find a correlation between general intelligence and the 
related Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT: e.g. Wilmer, Germine & Nakayama, 2014) 
which, as its name implies, has an additional face memory component. One such example is 
Verhallen and colleagues (2016), who reported no significant correlation between CFMT 
performance and scores on the standard British school qualification: General Certificate of 
Secondary Education (GCSE).  
It is possible that our observed association between face emotion and identity 
recognition abilities may have been bolstered by the relatively high perceptual demands of both 
the Benton Test and the face emotion expression recognition test. We note that a weaker 
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relationship may have been observed if a different face identity test had been used that required 
less contribution from earlier perceptual processes and more contribution from later cognitive 
stages (as in the case of the CFMT). Nonetheless, we consider it informative that the correlation 
between our face identity (Benton test) and face emotion (Ekman expressions) recognition 
tasks remained evident when intelligence was modelled as a covariate.  
 Some further caveats should be noted. Firstly, our model fit was improved by adding 
an Anger-Disgust parameter. We had not anticipated a need to do this, but it is in line with 
modern research that points to a close relation between some forms of anger and disgust (Calder 
et al., 2010). Indeed, the modern meaning of the word ‘disgust’ seems to be moving away from 
mere physical revulsion emphasised by Darwin (1872) toward a kind of moral outrage (people 
say they are disgusted by the greed of bankers, etc.) (Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009). Secondly, 
our participants were Western and so we cannot infer that the overlap in face emotion and 
identity recognition ability necessarily extends to other ethnicities and cultures. Thirdly, we 
acknowledge that our data here do not make it possible to examine the underlying processes of 
face emotion and face identity recognition or to detect asymmetric associations between them. 
We are able only to model covariances between the two abilities, and whilst these are 
undoubtedly informative, we note that this may be considered a relative limitation of the current 
design. Finally, it is somewhat difficult to directly compare the association between facial 
expression and identity recognition that we have observed here with other studies that have 
measured these abilities using different tasks (e.g. emotion-matching and the CFMT in Palermo 
et al., 2013). Future studies that can corroborate the pattern we report using a variety of tests 
and measures will support the stability of these associations. 
 CHAPTER 4: FACE EXPRESSION AND IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
120 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, we took an individual differences approach to understanding the extent 
and nature of overlap between emotion and identity recognition abilities. We observed a strong 
positive correlation between face emotion recognition ability and face identity recognition 
ability. While this association was reduced in magnitude when adjusting for measures of g and 
visual short-term memory, it remained moderate and highly significant. These results show a 
common component involved in face emotion and face identity recognition that is distinct from 
other cognitive and perceptual mechanisms. We suggest that face processing ability reflects 
contributions from multiple levels of individual differences, ranging from general cognition to 
general face processing to emotion-specific and identity-specific processes, and that modelling 
individual differences can offer an important new perspective on these. 
.
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Supplementary Materials 
Table 2. Correlations between the emotion recognition scores, the Benton Test of Facial Recognition, the Cattell Fluid Intelligence test and its 
four subtests, and the Visual Short-term Memory (VSTM) Learning Set Size 4 accuracy score.   
Note. Performance scores ranged from 5 to 100% accuracy. Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; Bold indicates p < .001. 
 Mean SD Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise Benton 
Cattell 
Total 
Series 
Completion 
Classification Matrices Conditions 
Anger 83.4 19.6             
Disgust 86.2 18.3 .43             
Fear 75.3 21.9 .46  .28           
Happiness 97.5 5.4 .20 .18 .19          
Sadness 92.5 13.3 .40 .23 .43 .18         
Surprise 89.5 11.1 .26 .12** .18 .12 .31        
Benton 85.0 8.5 .30 .09* .38 .03 .35 .27       
Cattell Total 69.5 14.6 .43 .15 .48 .12** .42 .33 .42      
-Series 
Completion 
78.6 16.9 .39 .17 .41 .12** .41 .34 .41 .84     
-Classification 58.1 15.2 .30 .06 .34 .07 .29 .22 .26 .81 .54    
-Matrices 75.7 18.2 .40 .15 .46 .13** .36 .27 .43 .85 .64 .58   
-Conditions 66.2 23.0 .32 .10* .37 .08* .31 .27 .29 .79 .56 .53 .54  
VSTM 1.43 .37 .01 -.02 .01 .001 -.07 .03 -.05 .01 -.06 .05 .06 -.01 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of the model with standardized parameter estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) and the added Anger-
Disgust pathway and Visual short-term memory (VSTM) derived from Learning Set Size 4. All path coefficients in bold were significant at 
p<.001. 
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Chapter 5: Alexithymia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consistent Evidence of a Link between Alexithymia and General 
Intelligence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Andrew Young and 
Gary Lewis (supervisor) and a revision has been submitted to Cognition and Emotion.    
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Abstract 
 
Alexithymia is a personality construct characterised most notably by a difficulty in 
identifying and expressing feelings. Although the emotional difficulties in alexithymia are well 
established, to date little work has examined its relationship to broader cognitive abilities, such 
as general intelligence. Across three independent healthy adult samples (Ns = 389, 318, & 273), 
we examined the association of alexithymia to a measure of general intelligence. In all three 
samples, we observed a significant negative association between alexithymia and general 
intelligence. In two of the samples, general intelligence was a significant predictor of 
alexithymia even when accounting for performance on tests of facial expression recognition 
and of supramodal emotion recognition (measured with faces, bodies, and voices). From a 
theoretical perspective, these results suggest that models of alexithymia need to incorporate a 
role for more generalised cognitive functioning. From a practical perspective, studies 
examining links between alexithymia and clinical disorders, many of which have known links 
to general intelligence, should consider including a measure of general intelligence in order to 
adjust for this potentially confounding factor. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Alexithymia is a stable, sub-clinical personality construct characterised by difficulties 
with emotional awareness, and comprising three components including difficulties in 
identifying feelings, difficulties in expressing feelings to others, and an externally-oriented 
style of thinking (Preece, Becerra, Allan, Robinson, & Dandy, 2017). Alexithymia is an 
important individual differences construct as it has known links to broader psychological 
difficulties (Mattila, Salminen, Nummi, & Joukamaa, 2006). Indeed, many studies have 
reported wide-ranging associations with clinically-relevant disorders, such as depression 
(Grynberg et al., 2012), anxiety (Korkoliakou et al., 2014), eating disorders (Brewer, Cook, 
Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, 2015), autism spectrum disorder (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013), 
atypical empathy (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012), alcohol dependence (Lyvers, Onuoha, Thorberg, 
& Samios, 2012), and medically unexplained somatic symptoms (De Gucht & Heiser, 2003). 
To date, most studies of alexithymia have considered it a deficit in emotion processing. 
For example, Bird and colleagues (2010) described alexithymia as a “subclinical phenomenon 
marked by difficulties in identifying and describing feelings and difficulties in distinguishing 
feelings from the bodily sensations of emotional arousal” (p. 1516). While this description does 
indeed appear to capture key features of alexithymia, here we sought to address a largely 
unexamined issue: the possibility that the alexithymia construct might to some extent reflect 
individual differences in general intelligence. 
There are several reasons to posit this broader psychological footprint. Firstly, it has 
been noted that alexithymia is related to non-emotional interoceptive abilities, with individuals 
higher in alexithymia showing a poorer ability to accurately count their own heartbeat (Herbert, 
Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). A more recent study has bolstered this earlier finding, reporting 
that alexithymia is negatively correlated with other interoceptive abilities; specifically, the 
ability to accurately gauge if a drinking solution is saltier than a target solution, to estimate and 
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balance the weights of two-rice filled buckets in each hand, and to gauge the strength of one's 
own respiratory output (Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2018). Such findings indicate that 
alexithymia cannot be adequately characterised by emotion-related processes alone. 
Secondly, several of the items in the most widely-used measure of alexithymia, the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), appear to capture, at least in part, the ability to 
understand and integrate complex information, which of course is one of the cardinal features 
of general intelligence (Gottfredson, 1998). For example, agreement with the following items 
‘I prefer to analyse problems rather than just describe them’ (reverse-scored) and ‘I prefer to 
just let things happen rather than to understand why they turned out that way’ both reflect 
higher levels of alexithymia. Stronger agreement to these items may indeed reflect difficulty 
with emotional awareness. Equally, it seems plausible that such agreement, at least in part, 
might reflect difficulties in processing complex contingencies and thus general intelligence.  
Thirdly, there are a number of abilities and clinically-relevant disorders that are known 
to be related both to alexithymia and general intelligence. These include emotion recognition 
ability in the normal population (Lewis, Lefevre, & Young, 2016) and clinical conditions such 
as depression (Honkalampi et al., 2000), eating disorders (Lopez, Stahl, & Tchanturia, 2010; 
Brewer et al., 2015), schizophrenia (Gawęda & Krężołek, 2019), and dementia (Sturm & 
Levenson, 2011). These again suggest that a link between alexithymia and broader intelligence 
is plausible.  
Only a handful of studies have examined this putative link, and these have mainly relied 
on measuring focal aspects of intelligence. For example, negative associations have been noted 
with vocabulary (N=81: Bagby, Taylor, & Ryan, 1986; N=115: Hsing, Mohr, Stansfield, & 
Preston, 2013). Similarly, Lumley and colleagues (2005) noted a moderate inverse link 
between verbal ability and the Externally Oriented Thinking subscale of the TAS-20 (N=140: 
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Lumley, Gustavson, Partridge, & Labouvie-Vief, 2005). In a recent study comprising three 
samples (Ns=296, 131, and 121), alexithymia was associated with poorer memory for neutral 
words and poorer executive functioning, as measured by the Trail-making Tests, the Symbol 
Digit Modalities Test, and a test of category fluency (Correro, Paitel, Byers, & Nielson, 2019). 
Finally, in a number of large-scale community studies, alexithymia has shown negative 
associations with the proxy measure of level of education (N=2297: Kauhanen, Kaplan, 
Julkunen, Wilson, & Salonen, 1993; N=5028: Kokkonen, Karvonen, Veijola, Läksy, & 
Jokelainen, 2001), consistent with a link to general intelligence (Deary, Strand, Smith, & 
Fernandes, 2007). However, not all studies have reported a link between alexithymia and 
intelligence measures. Parker, Taylor, and Bagby (1989) found no association of the TAS-26 
scale to the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, which comprises both vocabulary and abstract 
reasoning subscales.   
These studies have thus provided grounds for further examination of how alexithymia 
might relate to general intelligence; but a number of weaknesses in their study designs 
necessitate further work. For example, a number of the empirical samples have been small 
(N≤140) and often limited to university students (e.g. Lumley et al., 2005; Hsing et al., 2013). 
Many of them use a proxy measure for general intelligence (e.g. Kauhanen et al., 1993, 
Kokkonen et al., 2001) or use a measure that taps only a limited aspect of intelligence, such as 
reading ability (Lumley et al., 2005). A comprehensive measure tapping the broad range of 
intelligence is needed to fully explore a possible link with alexithymia, and may be why 
Lumley et al. (2005) observed a link between verbal ability and only one of the TAS-20 
subscales. Moreover, most of the above studies do not include a good measure of emotion 
recognition ability (that is, the ability to accurately recognise emotional expressions in other 
people). Given that emotion recognition has been linked to both intelligence and alexithymia 
(Lewis et al., 2016), it is important to adjust for this variable to validly assess a link between 
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alexithymia and intelligence. This will enable us to determine whether any association between 
them is unique or if it is merely reflecting the known association between intelligence and 
emotion recognition.   
With this in mind, we sought here to provide a strong test of the proposed link between 
alexithymia and general intelligence using well-established measures. Study 1 involved a 
retrospective analysis of data collected for other purposes from two large adult samples (each 
with N>300). Study 2 was pre-registered to give a sample (N>270) derived from power 
calculations based on the effect sizes in Study 1. 
5.2 Study 1 
 In two relatively large adult samples (N>300), we tested whether general intelligence 
and alexithymia are negatively associated. We also examined the extent to which any such 
association provides incremental prediction over and above facial expression recognition and 
supramodal measures of emotion recognition ability (i.e. measures of emotion recognition 
ability that incorporate stimuli from more than one sensory modality: Study 1a: face and body; 
Study 1b: face and voice).  
5.2.1 Methods 
Participants 
 Study 1a: 400 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) service as part of an unrelated study that included a measure of alexithymia and 
general intelligence (Lewis et al., 2016). We excluded participants who scored at or below 
chance level on two or more of the emotion recognition tasks. This resulted in the omission of 
11 participants, producing a final sample size of 389 (131 men). Mean age of participants was 
37.0 years (SD = 11.7), and ethnicity was reported as follows: White (n=290), Hispanic (n=14), 
Asian (n=22), Black (n=11), Native American (n=2), Other (n=32) and Undisclosed (n=18).  
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Study 1b: 412 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service as 
part of an unrelated study that included a measure of alexithymia and of general intelligence 
(Connolly, Lefevre, Young, & Lewis, in press). The exclusion criteria were the same as above, 
with the addition of participants also being excluded if they failed an auditory test at the 
beginning of the survey. This resulted in the omission of 94 participants, producing a final 
sample size of 318 (159 men). Mean age of participants was 35.9 years, and ethnicity was 
reported as follows: White (n=254), Hispanic (n=21), East Asian (n=14), Black (n=22), Native 
American (n=2), South Asian (n=1), and Other (n=4). These participant demographics 
represent the typical pattern observed for MTurk samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015).  
Stimuli 
Facial Expression Recognition Ability (Face Exp):  
Study 1a: Stimuli were static images taken from the Facial Expressions of Emotion: 
Stimuli and Tests (FEEST) set (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002), and 
were morphed to differing intensities of expression, from 25% (a morph that involved a 75% 
neutral and 25% emotional expression) to 100% (representing the prototype expressions from 
the Ekman series). They were piloted across different levels of emotional intensity in a previous 
study (Lewis et al., 2016), and in order to try and avoid floor or ceiling effects, exemplars for 
each emotion with appropriate means and variabilities were selected. In Study 1a, the modality 
block comprised 50 selected items (10 items for each of the 5 basic emotions: anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, and sadness) shown twice to the participants. 
Study 1b. For the participants in Study 1b the block comprised an abbreviated subset 
of stimuli, which were fully outlined in a previous study (Connolly et al., 2020). The subset 
block comprised 15 items (3 items for each emotion) shown once each.  
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Alice Heim 4 Test of General Intelligence (AH4):  
Study 1a: This test consists of 65 items which are either numerical or verbal in nature. 
Half of the questions require multiple-choice responses (from a choice of 5), and half require 
open entry ‘creative answers’. The participants have a maximum time limit of 10 minutes to 
complete as many of the items as they can, after which the page automatically advances to the 
next section of the survey. They are encouraged to complete the questions in the order in which 
they are given, but are also told they may skip to the next questions if they become stuck. The 
participants were awarded one point for every correct answer, and their total score was 
generated out of a maximum of 65. This test is suitable for the current research question given 
that it is considered a good test of general intelligence as it corporates elements of both 
crystallized knowledge (vocabulary) and fluid intelligence (online manipulation of novel 
information). It is also easy and relatively quick to administer online, and relates well to other 
measures of g (e.g. Tombaugh, 2006). 
Study 1b: The identical procedure as for Study 1a was followed. 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20): The TAS-20 is a 20-item instrument that assesses 
alexithymic traits in three broad sub-domains: Difficulty Identifying Feelings (7 items), 
Difficulty Describing Feelings (5 items), and Externally Oriented Thinking (8 items) (Bagby, 
Parker, & Taylor, 1994). Participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 being ‘strongly 
disagree’, and 5 being ‘strongly agree’. A total score was generated by summing the responses 
from all 20 items: a higher score indicates a greater degree of alexithymic traits. Scale scores 
for each individual sub-scale were also generated. Cronbach’s alpha for both datasets was good 
for the total scale (α=.89; α=.89, respectively), and the Difficulty Identifying Feelings (α=.91; 
α=.94) and Difficulty Describing Feelings (α=.84; α=.83) sub-scales. The Externally-Oriented 
Thinking subscale had a relatively low alpha in both samples (α=.67; α=.61), and as such, 
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results of this sub-scale should be interpreted with a degree of caution. Participants in both 
Studies 1a and 1b completed this test. 
Additionally in Study 1a, a measure of body expression recognition ability was included, 
and in Study 1b, a measure of voice expression recognition ability was included. These are 
outlined below.  
Point-light Bodily Expression Recognition Ability (Body Exp): Stimuli were dynamic 
point-light walker stimuli previously described by Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, and Young 
(2004). In short, 10 actors were recorded performing each of five emotions, and subsequent 
rendering removed all information other than high visibility patches from each video, resulting 
in a short video clip of light points whose combined movement simulated a human body 
expressing a natural, dynamic emotion. Video clips lasted between 4.2 and 8 seconds. As with 
the facial expression stimuli selected for Study 1a, 10 stimuli for each emotion were chosen 
(i.e., total N=50) that showed adequate means and variances following a pilot experiment in a 
previous study (Lewis, Lefevre, & Young, 2016). Participants in Study 1a were shown the 50-
item block of bodily expression stimuli twice.  
Vocal Expression Recognition Ability (Voice Exp): Stimuli were short audio clips 
from the Montreal Affective Voices (MAV) set (Belin, Fillion-Bilodeau, & Gosselin, 2008), 
which comprises actors portraying different emotions in vocal bursts, with each audio burst 
lasting between 1.45 and 2.23 seconds. To ensure that this set was in line with the other emotion 
stimuli, it was first piloted in a previous study (Connolly et al., 2020) to select appropriate 
items for the five basic emotions, and then to select 15 items (3 for each emotion) with 
psychometric properties comparable to the other two expressive domains. Participants in Study 
1b were presented with the 15-item block of vocal expression stimuli once. 
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Procedure 
In both samples, the emotion expression recognition blocks were first presented to the 
participant (faces and bodies in Study 1a, faces and voices in Study 1b), with the within-block 
presentation order being fully randomised. In a five alternative-choice paradigm, participants 
had to select the emotion they perceived was being portrayed. Stimuli presentation consisted 
of a black screen for 500ms, a fixation cross for 750ms, and a further 500ms black screen that 
preceded the onset of the stimulus. Facial stimuli in both samples were presented for 1000ms. 
Bodily (Study 1a) and vocal (Study 1b) stimuli lasted for the duration of each individual video 
or audio clip.  Participants could respond at any point following the stimulus onset. Following 
the emotion expression recognition blocks, participants completed as much of the general 
intelligence test as possible in the maximum time of 10 minutes allowed. Following this, they 
completed the alexithymia questionnaire. Participants were debriefed following completion.  
 
5.2.2 Results 
 A similar pattern of associations was noted across both samples. First, we explored 
links to facial expression recognition, as this has been a focus in previous theorising. 
Alexithymia was significantly negatively correlated with general intelligence (Study 1a: r=-
.11, p=.026; Study 1b: r=-.38, p<.001) and with facial expression recognition ability (Study 1a: 
r=-.28, p<.001; Study 1b: r=-.35, p<.001). Additionally, facial expression recognition was 
significantly positively correlated with general intelligence (Study 1a: r=.28, p<.001; Study 1b: 
r=.38, p<.001).  
For completeness, we then investigated links to emotion recognition more generally,  
by examining the correlations when emotion recognition was based on a composite supramodal 
score derived from the face and body expression recognition scores (Study 1a) or face and 
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voice expression recognition scores (Study 1b). Alexithymia was significantly negatively 
correlated with supramodal expression recognition ability (Study 1a: r=-.18, p=.003; Study 1b: 
r=-.36, p<.001). Additionally, supramodal expression recognition was significantly positively 
correlated with general intelligence (Study 1a: r=.38, p<.001; Study 1b: r=.45, p<.001).  
Hierarchical regression analysis then enabled our other hypotheses to be tested. In the 
first step, age and sex were entered as predictors of alexithymia. In Study 1a, neither of these 
variables were significant predictors. In Study 1b, age was a significant negative predictor of 
alexithymia (β=-.11, p=.046), whereas sex was not. In the second step, facial expression 
recognition ability was entered into the respective models. In both samples, this was a 
significant negative predictor of alexithymia (Study1a: β=-.27, p<.001; Study 1b: β=-.34, 
p<.001). In Study 1a, this was the only significant predictor, but in Study 1b, age also remained 
a significant negative predictor (β=-.12, p=.031).  
 In the critical third step, general intelligence was entered into the model. In Study 1a, 
this variable was not a significant predictor of alexithymia, but facial expression recognition 
remained a significant negative predictor (β=-.26, p<.001). Including intelligence in the model 
did not improve the overall fit (R2 changed from .081 to .082, p=.560). In Study 1b, however, 
both general intelligence (β=-.29, p<.001) and facial expression recognition ability (β=-.23, 
p<.001) were significant negative predictors of alexithymia, and the inclusion of general 
intelligence significantly improved the fit of the model (R2 changed from .135 to .205, p<.001). 
The full results of both regression analyses are shown in Tables 1 (Study 1a) and 2 (Study 1b). 
Note that the coefficients for sex reflect alexithymia scores being higher for women in Study 
1a, and higher for males in Study 1b, although neither of these reach statistical significance. 
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Table 1: Multiple regressions predicting alexithymia scores from age, sex, facial expression 
recognition ability (Face Exp), and general intelligence in Study 1a.  
 
Table 2: Multiple regressions predicting alexithymia scores from age, sex, facial expression 
recognition ability (Face Exp), and general intelligence in Study 1b.  
 
Again, for completeness, we ran the regression models with ‘supramodal’ emotion 
recognition scores derived from a composite of either face and body expression recognition 
(Study 1a) or face and voice expression recognition (Study 1b). The results were highly similar 
to the models that tested face expression recognition alone. That is, they followed the exact 
pattern as in the outputs in Tables 3 and 4: the magnitude of the beta values were not 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Independent 
Variables 
β Sig β Sig β Sig 
Age -.08 .119 -.05 .302 -.05 .285 
Sex .09 .068 .04 .439 .04 .413 
Face Exp  -.27 <.001 -.26 <.001 
General Intelligence   -.03 .560 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Independent 
Variables 
β Sig β Sig β Sig 
Age -.11 .046 -.12 .031 -.10 .059 
Sex -.10 .081 -.04 .513 -.04 .406 
Face Exp  -.34 <.001 -.23 <.001 
General Intelligence   -.29 <.001 
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appreciably different and the same predictor variables at each step were significant as in the 
facial expression regression models.  
5.2.3 Discussion 
  We observed the expected negative association between alexithymia and emotional 
expression recognition in both samples. Importantly, we also observed a significant negative 
correlation between alexithymia and general intelligence across samples. Of note, though, in 
Study 1a, general intelligence was not a significant predictor of alexithymia over and above 
that of emotion recognition. In contrast, in Study 1b, both general intelligence and emotion 
recognition were significant predictors when entered in the model simultaneously. These 
patterns held regardless of whether emotion recognition was measured from facial expressions 
alone or from supramodal performance involving faces and voices or bodies. 
 These findings clearly leave unanswered the question as to whether intelligence has a 
unique association with alexithymia once expression recognition ability is statistically adjusted 
for. In order to provide a more definitive answer to this research question, we addressed this 
issue using an independent sample and a pre-registered study plan.  
 
5.3 Study 2 
5.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
This pre-registered study (https://osf.io/67zda/) sought to provide 80% power with an 
alpha level of .05 to detect an increase in R2 of .03. It also sought to provide 80% power with 
an alpha of .05 (one-tailed) to test for a zero-order association of r ≥ .15. These effect sizes 
allowed us to provide a strong test of the results observed in Study 1b. A power analysis 
indicated that an N of 270 was required to achieve sufficient power under these conditions and 
 CHAPTER 5: ALEXITHYMIA AND INTELLIGENCE 
136 
 
so we recruited participants until the desired N was reached after removing those who met our 
exclusion criteria. Therefore, a total of 357 participants were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk service. A proportion of participants failed the pre-survey auditory test, and 
were excluded before completing the survey (N=25). We also excluded participants who 
showed chance level performance on at least two of the emotion recognition batteries (N=53). 
Finally, a small number of participants indicated that they had not completed the survey 
seriously and were thus excluded (N=6). This resulted in an omission of 84 participants, 
producing a final sample size of 273 (138 men). Participants gave informed consent and ethical 
approval was granted by the Royal Holloway Ethics Committee. 
Mean age of participants was 38.5 years (SD = 12.2, Range=19-74), and ethnicity was 
reported as follows: White (n=192), Hispanic (n=18), Asian (n=18), Black (n=36), Native 
American (n=1), Middle Eastern (n=1), Other (n=6) and Undisclosed (n=1). As with the 
previous two samples, these participants represent the typical demographic pattern for MTurk 
samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015).  
 
Stimuli 
Facial Expression Recognition Ability (Face Exp): The same facial expression battery 
was used as in Study 1b; i.e. a subset of items from Study 1a taken from the FEEST set (Young 
et al., 2002). The subset block comprised 15 items (3 items for each basic emotion) that were 
shown to participants once each.  
Bodily Expression Recognition Ability (Body Exp): Bodily emotional stimuli were 
taken from the same battery used in Study 1a (Atkinson et al., 2004). In line with the facial and 
vocal batteries, a subset of these 50 items were piloted in a previous study to ensure suitability 
for individual differences research, and 15 items with appropriate psychometric properties were 
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selected. This abbreviated battery comprised 15 items (3 items for each basic emotion) shown 
to participants once.  
Vocal Expression Recognition Ability (Voice Exp): The same vocal stimuli battery 
was used as in Study 1b (Belin et al., 2008). The battery comprised 15 items (3 items for each 
basic emotion) presented to participants once. 
Alice Heim 4 Test of General Intelligence (AH4): This same 65-item general 
intelligence was used as in Studies 1a and 1b.  
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20): The same 20-item alexithymia measure was 
used as in Studies 1a and 1b. Cronbach’s alpha for our data was good for the total scale (α=.91) 
and for the Difficulty Identifying Feelings (α=.94) and Difficulty Describing Feelings (α=.83) 
sub-scales. As with the previous two samples, the alpha for the Externally-Oriented Thinking 
subscale was fairly low (α=.67). Low reliability for this subscale has been noted by several 
other researchers in the field (e.g. Meganck, Vanheule, & Desmet, 2008; Preece et al., 2017) 
and future revision of this scale has been suggested.  
Procedure 
The emotion expression recognition blocks were first presented to the participant in the 
same fixed order (voice, face, body), with the within-block presentation order being fully 
randomised. Stimulus presentation duration and response format were identical to the previous 
samples. Following the emotional expression recognition blocks, participants completed as 
many items on the general intelligence test as they were able to in 10 minutes. Finally, they 
completed the alexithymia questionnaire. Participants were debriefed following survey 
completion.  
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Analysis 
 The same analyses were conducted as in Studies 1a and 1b, but with one difference. In 
both Studies 1a and 1b, expression recognition ability comprised either facial expression 
stimuli alone, or a composite supramodal score across two different expressive modalities 
(faces and bodies in Study 1a; faces and voices in Study 1b). In Study 2, all participants were 
tested on facial, bodily, and vocal expression recognition, and therefore, expression recognition 
ability was measured as both facial (in line with the previous two samples) and as a trimodal 
supramodal score (derived from facial, vocal, and bodily emotion recognition, and intended as 
a more ecologically generalisable measure). Therefore, each of the following analyses was 
carried out twice, with either facial or supramodal emotion recognition measures, in line with 
our pre-registered protocol.  
Firstly, we assessed the association between our variables of interest, in order to answer 
our first research question of whether alexithymia is negatively correlated with intelligence and 
(facial or supramodal) expression recognition ability. Secondly, hierarchical regression 
analyses were used to examine the unique associations of general intelligence and emotional 
expression recognition ability to alexithymia. As in the previous two samples, we conducted a 
three-step multiple regression analysis with alexithymia as the dependent variable.  
5.3.2 Results 
Pre-registered analyses 
As seen in Study 1, alexithymia was significantly negatively correlated with both 
general intelligence (r=-.42, p<.001) and with facial expression recognition ability (r=-.22, 
p<.001). Facial expression recognition was significantly positively correlated with general 
intelligence (r=.35, p<.001).  
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A very similar pattern of results was also observed for supramodal emotion recognition 
ability. Alexithymia was significantly negatively correlated with supramodal emotion 
recognition ability (r=-.35, p<.001). Supramodal emotional expression recognition was 
significantly positively correlated with general intelligence (r=.51, p<.001).   
We next used hierarchical linear regression to test whether general intelligence was a 
predictor of alexithymia over and above emotion recognition ability (and other variables). In 
the first of these models, age and sex were entered as predictors of alexithymia in the first step. 
Neither of these variables reached statistical significance.  In the second step, facial expression 
recognition ability was entered, which was a significant negative predictor of alexithymia (β=-
.20, p=.001). In the third step, general intelligence was entered into the model. This variable 
was a significant predictor of alexithymia (β=-.40, p<.001), but facial expression recognition 
was then no longer significant. Inclusion of general intelligence in the model significantly 
improved model fit (R2 changed from .054 to .191, p<.001). The full results of the regression 
analysis are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Multiple regressions predicting alexithymia scores from age, sex, facial expression 
recognition ability (Face Exp), and general intelligence in Study 2.  
 
In the second of these models, age and sex were first entered as predictors of 
alexithymia: the results were of course identical to those above.  In the second step, supramodal 
emotion recognition ability was entered and was observed to be a significant negative predictor 
of alexithymia (β=-.34, p<.001). In the third step, general intelligence was entered into the 
model. General intelligence was a significant predictor of alexithymia (β=-.33, p<.001), and 
supramodal expression recognition also remained a significant negative predictor (β=-.17, 
p=.008). The full results of this regression analysis are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Multiple regressions predicting alexithymia scores from age, sex, supramodal emotion 
recognition ability (Supra Emotion), and general intelligence in Study 2.  
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Independent 
Variables 
β Sig β Sig β Sig 
Age -.03 .614 -.03 .672 -.03 .576 
Sex -.11 .068 -.08 .209 -.10 .094 
Face Exp  -.20 .001 -.06 .317 
General Intelligence   -.40 <.001 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Independent Variables β Sig β Sig β Sig 
Age -.03 .614 -.05 .391 -.04 .449 
Sex -.11 .068 -.06 .324 -.08 .156 
Supra Emotion  -.34 <.001 -.17 .008 
General Intelligence   -.33 <.001 
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Subsidiary Exploratory Analyses 
As an exploratory step to complement the pre-registered analyses, we examined the 
correlations between general intelligence and the three alexithymia subscales across all three 
of our sets of data. 
In Study 1a, only the Externally Oriented Thinking (EOT) subscale showed a 
significant negative association with intelligence: r=-.13, p=.014). Neither the Difficulty 
Identifying Feelings (DIF) nor the Difficulty Describing Feelings (DDF) subscales showed 
significant associations with intelligence (DIF: r=-.09, p=.077; DDF: r=-.06, p=.251). In Study 
1b, all three of the subscales were significantly and negatively associated with intelligence 
(DIF: r=-.38, p<.001; DDF: r=-.25, p<.001; EOT: r=-.26, p<.001).   
In Study 2, all three of the alexithymia subscales were significantly and negatively 
correlated with intelligence (DIF: r=-.38, p<.001; DDF: r=-.31, p<.001; EOT: r=-.34, p<.001).  
The results from across the three samples therefore suggest that the association between 
total alexithymia score and general intelligence is not being solely driven by any particularly 
cognitively oriented items, for example, those in the Externally Oriented Thinking subscale.  
Secondly, in light of an interesting recently proposed perspective, involving the idea of 
verbal difficulty giving rise to the alexithymia construct, we carried out some exploratory post-
hoc analyses that were also not included in our original pre-registration plan. Hobson and 
colleagues (2019) recently proposed the alexithymia-language hypothesis positing that verbal 
impairment may be one of several mechanisms underpinning the aetiology of the alexithymic 
phenotype. This idea arose from the finding that language processes are widely considered to 
contribute to typical emotional development (Ornaghi & Grazzani, 2013). Indeed, Hobson et 
al. (2019) report evidence from clinical populations in which early speech and language 
difficulties are associated with emotion processing difficulties in later life, for example in deaf 
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or autistic children, and cite alexithymia as a key mediator between linguistic and emotional 
capabilities (Hobson, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2019).  
Since our measure of general intelligence included both verbal and nonverbal 
components, we sought to provide a test of this alexithymia-language hypothesis by assessing 
whether the verbal intelligence sub-score was more predictive of alexithymia than nonverbal 
intelligence. In Study 1a, the correlations between the verbal and nonverbal components with 
alexithymia were -.11 (p=.039) and -.11 (p=.028), respectively, which did not differ 
significantly from each other (p=.50). In Study 1b, the correlations between the verbal and 
nonverbal components with alexithymia were -.40 (p<.001) and -.33 (p<.001), respectively, 
which did significantly differ from each other (p=.023). In Study 2, the correlations between 
the verbal and nonverbal components with alexithymia were -.43 (p<.001) and -.37 (p<.001), 
respectively, and whilst these did not statistically differ from each other (p=.053), interpreting 
p values close to the nominal threshold should be done with caution. Overall, then, these results 
suggest that alexithymia is associated with general intelligence and that this association is not 
driven by a specific relationship with verbal intelligence. However, we discuss this 
interpretation in more depth below.  
5.4 General Discussion 
 The construct of alexithymia as an impairment in emotional understanding has been 
studied in some depth, especially in clinical populations. To date, however, little work has 
examined the relation of alexithymia to broader cognitive abilities. In the current study, across 
three independent samples, we consistently observed a significant negative association 
between alexithymia and general intelligence, and the magnitude of this association was 
moderate-to-large in two of our three samples. 
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 Regarding the question of whether alexithymia and intelligence have an independent 
association, over and above the effects of emotion recognition ability, the results were 
somewhat more mixed. However, on the balance of evidence – that is, the results from Study 
1b and our pre-registered Study 2 – we conclude that general intelligence is uniquely associated 
with alexithymia, over and above emotion recognition ability. This finding is important 
because it provides consistent evidence that the psychological footprint of alexithymia extends 
beyond affect/emotion-relevant processes and abilities, and that a full understanding of 
individual differences in alexithymia will likely require including a role for general 
intelligence.  
 In addition to our core research questions, data from the current study enabled us also 
to test a recent hypothesis in the literature that posited a specific link between verbal 
intelligence and alexithymia (Hobson et al., 2019). Across the three samples, we observed 
relatively limited evidence in favour of this hypothesis. In Study 1a, we observed a nominally 
significant difference between the verbal and non-verbal associations with alexithymia in the 
predicted direction. In Study 1b, we did not see this difference. In Study 2, we observed a 
‘marginally’ significant difference in the predicted direction. These mixed results, along with 
the modest observed effect sizes, indicate that verbal intelligence does not seem to be a special 
relative of alexithymia, in contrast to the model proposed by Hobson et al. (2019).   
What might underlie the observed association between alexithymia and general 
intelligence? There are several proposed aetiologies of alexithymia, one of them concerning 
difficulties in evaluating an emotional response, as posited by the attention-appraisal model 
(Preece et al., 2017). In this model, it is proposed that alexithymic individuals have under-
developed emotion schemas, and as such, they experience an emotional response but do not 
attend to it or evaluate it appropriately, leading to difficulties such as poor emotional regulation. 
Given that the development of emotion schemas depends on sufficient cognitive development 
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(Izard, 2011), it is plausible that poor development of cognitive structures may underlie the 
difficulties in both emotion recognition and general intelligence. For example, if an individual 
is poor at evaluating complex information, this would have an adverse effect on their general 
cognitive ability and their recognition of emotional stimuli. 
Our findings have some practical implications for examining alexithymia in clinical 
disorders that are known to show an association with general intelligence, including 
schizophrenia (Fett, Viechtbauer, Penn, van Os, & Krabbendam, 2011) and depression 
(Marazziti, Consoli, Picchetti, Carlini, & Faravelli, 2010). In these populations, what may 
appear to be alexithymic traits may actually reflect deficits in broader cognitive ability, and 
given the associations reported here, it will be important in future to adjust for general 
intelligence to eliminate this potential confound.  
Some potential limitations of the current work require mention. Firstly, the studies 
reported here were carried out online on a commonly used data collection platform: Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Although there have been concerns raised about the quality of 
online data, other studies have suggested that they provide reliable, replicable results in a cost- 
and time-efficient way (Miller, Crowe, Weiss, Maples-Keller, & Lynam, 2017). Indeed, there 
may be benefits to online testing over traditional lab-based student samples; for example larger, 
more diverse samples that are more representative of the general US population and who have 
high internal motivation to respond honestly and accurately (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & 
John, 2004). Our choice of the MTurk platform is bolstered by the extensive use of it in 
previous work (e.g. Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016; Mortensen & 
Hughes, 2018).  
Secondly, while we make a case here that alexithymia is associated with general 
intelligence, over and above emotion recognition ability, it is conceivable that this association 
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would be better characterised at a more focal level: that is, our measure of general intelligence 
may simply be a proxy measure of a construct like interoceptive ability or some kind of general 
social perception ability. Although this perspective does not invalidate our core argument – 
namely, that alexithymia clearly extends beyond the emotion sphere itself - further work will 
now be required to examine this possibility and thus further refine our understanding of the 
alexithymia construct.  
Finally, future work should build on the association we report by including a measure 
of mood. Recent evidence suggests that the DIF subscale of the TAS-20 captures an 
individual’s distress level rather than their alexithymia (Preece et al., 2020). Given also that 
there exists an association between cognitive ability and depression (Rock, Roiser, Riedel, & 
Blackwell, 2014), it would be appropriate to adjust for a measure of negative affect to assess if 
and how the association between alexithymia and intelligence changes with the inclusion of 
this potential confound. 
Conclusion 
In summary, across three independent healthy samples, we observed significant 
negative associations between alexithymia and general intelligence. Importantly, in two of the 
samples, intelligence was a significant predictor of alexithymia even after adjusting for 
emotional expression recognition ability. These results suggest that to achieve a full 
understanding of the alexithymia construct, theorists will need to engage with broader cognitive 
abilities and processes.  
 
 CHAPTER 6: SEX DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION RECOGNITION 
146 
 
Chapter 6: Sex Differences in Emotion Recognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sex differences in emotion recognition: evidence for a small overall female 
superiority on facial disgust 
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Abstract 
 
Although it is widely believed that females outperform males in the ability to recognise 
other people's emotions, this conclusion is not well supported by the extant literature. The 
current study sought to provide a strong test of the female superiority hypothesis by 
investigating sex differences in emotion recognition for five basic emotions using stimuli well-
calibrated for individual differences assessment, across two expressive domains (face and 
body), and in a large sample (N=1022: Study 1). We also assessed the stability and 
generalisability of our findings with two independent replication samples (N=303: Study 2, 
N=634: Study 3). In Study 1, we observed that females were superior to males in recognising 
facial disgust and sadness. In contrast, males were superior to females in recognising bodily 
happiness. The female superiority for recognition of facial disgust was replicated in Studies 2 
and 3, and this observation also extended to an independent stimulus set in Study 2. No other 
sex differences were stable across studies. These findings provide evidence for the presence of 
sex differences in emotion recognition ability, but show that these differences are modest in 
magnitude and appear to be limited to facial disgust. We discuss whether this sex difference 
may reflect human evolutionary imperatives concerning reproductive fitness and child-care. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The ability to accurately recognise other people's emotions is a core socio-cognitive 
skill (Bruce & Young, 1986, 2012; Young, 2016). Although much work in this domain has 
emphasised that emotion recognition ability is to some extent akin to an innate human faculty 
(Darwin, 1872), such that certain emotions are universally recognised, regardless of culture 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971), it is also clear that not all people can recognise emotional 
expressions equally well (Lewis, Lefevre, & Young, 2016). With regard to these individual 
differences, one of the most widely discussed factors that may influence emotion recognition 
ability is biological sex (Kret & de Gelder, 2012), where meta-analytic work has claimed that 
on average women outperform men (Hall, 1978; McClure, 2000; Thompson & Voyer, 2014).  
However, despite the widely-held assertion of female ‘superiority’ in emotion 
recognition ability, a closer examination of the literature reveals a more mixed picture, as 
detailed below. Furthermore, the literature is almost entirely reliant on studies of facial 
expression recognition. In other expressive domains, such as recognition of emotion from body 
postures, little is known regarding sex differences. This warrants further work, as emotion 
recognition ability has important real-world implications: accurate recognition of emotions is 
associated with better social functioning (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 
2006), whereas recognition difficulties are linked to interpersonal problems and to the aetiology 
and maintenance of several psychiatric disorders, such as depression (Surguladze et al., 2004). 
Given the different prevalence rates of psychopathology across the sexes, sex differences in 
basic socio-cognitive processes (such as emotion recognition ability) which may contribute to 
such outcomes (e.g. in depression: Harmer, Goodwin, & Cowen, 2009) are thus important 
phenomena to delineate and study. Moreover, different evolutionary and socialisation niches 
occupied by males and females make the study of sex differences important for basic scientific 
enquiry.  
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Sex Differences in Facial Emotion Recognition – A Brief Overview 
Much of the earlier work in the field has investigated emotion recognition as a general 
ability based on a global score rather than distinguishing between individual emotions (e.g. 
Buck, Miller, & Caul, 1974; Kirouac & Doré, 1985). More recent work instead tests recognition 
of affect more specifically through the use of a wider range of individually-scored basic 
emotions. In line with this approach, here we explicitly focus on recent research examining the 
five basic emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness. 
In a study addressing recognition ability for negatively-valenced basic emotions (anger, 
disgust, fear, and sadness), Rotter and Rotter (1988) (NStudy1=727: 214 males; NStudy2=399: 162 
males) noted a female advantage across all expressions. Hall and Matsumoto (2004), across 
two studies with different stimuli exposure times (Study 1: 10s, Study 2: 200ms) and using five 
basic emotions, found that females were significantly more accurate for disgust, happiness, and 
sadness (Study 1: N=96: 69 males), and for anger, disgust, fear, and sadness (Study 2: N=363: 
126 males). Lee and colleagues (2013), using a large sample of adolescents (N=1954: 956 
males), found a female advantage for discriminating morphed facial expressions on the 
continua of Happiness-Fear and Happiness-Sadness (but not the Anger-Sadness or Anger-Fear 
continua). More recently, Duesenberg and colleagues (2016) tested 80 participants (40 males) 
on two emotions, anger and sadness, each presented at two intensities of expression, 40% and 
80%. These authors reported no sex differences for the sadness stimuli, but found a significant 
female advantage for accurately identifying anger at both intensities. 
However, in contrast to these studies that were broadly supportive of a female 
advantage in emotion recognition, a number of studies have reported either no sex differences 
or even a male advantage. Rahman, Wilson and Abrahams (2004) assessed 240 participants 
(120 males) on happiness and sadness, but reported no accuracy advantage for either emotion. 
Grimshaw, Bulman-Fleming, and Ngo (2004) (N=73: 36 males) presented stimuli for 50ms 
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portraying three basic emotions of anger, happiness, and sadness, but found no sex difference 
in accuracy or reaction times. Unlike many other studies in this area which used a forced choice 
paradigm, Williams and Mattingley (2006) tested 156 (78 males) participants on rapid 
detection of angry or fearful faces amongst neutral distractors. Males were found to be 
significantly faster at identifying angry male faces, but there was no difference in speed 
between sexes to detect fearful stimuli. Again using a visual search paradigm, Sawada and 
colleagues (2014) (N=90: 46 males) measured participant ability in detecting either an angry 
or happy face amongst other neutral faces, and found no significant effect of sex on reaction 
time. Testing a large sample of undergraduates (N=993: 211 males) on facial expressions in 
both frontal and profile views, Matsumoto and Hwang (2011) did not observe significant sex 
differences in ability to categorise the five basic emotions. Most recently, Lyusin and 
Ovsyannikova (2016) tested a large sample of participants (N=684: 221 males) on recognition 
accuracy and sensitivity on 15 different emotions (including the five basic emotions) using 
naturalistic video recordings, but reported no significant difference between the sexes on these 
measures.  
 
Sex Differences in Bodily Emotion Recognition – A Brief Overview 
Bodily emotion recognition is the ability to distinguish a portrayed emotion from the 
stimulus’ body form alone. It is a fundamental component of accurate emotion perception, with 
research showing that body posture can be critical in resolving ambiguous facial expressions 
(Aviezer, Trope, & Todorov, 2012). The ability to accurately perceive emotion from both face 
and body may therefore represent an optimal strategy for emotion recognition, in that all the 
available cues are integrated to form the most informed interpretation (Young & Bruce, 2011; 
Young, 2018). This strategy seems especially pertinent in situations in which one channel is 
occluded or ambiguous, or when moving face and body signals are expressed very rapidly. 
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 Body emotion recognition ability can be assessed through both static and dynamic 
stimuli. In the case of static stimuli, a photograph of a person with their face occluded and 
expressing a given emotion is presented to the participant. Dynamic stimuli often consist of 
point-light displays showing a set of locations on a human body making a natural movement 
(see Johansson, 1973, and Figure 1, or the video in the Supplementary Materials). Whereas a 
large body of research has addressed sex differences in facial emotion recognition, only a 
handful of studies to date have addressed sex differences in body emotion recognition. An early 
study by Sogon and Izard (1987) (N=94: 47 males) involved short video clips of scenes 
portraying five emotions (surprise, contempt, affection, anticipation, or acceptance), and found 
females to be significantly better at identifying disgust and fear. Additionally their ability to 
recognise sadness also approached significance (Sogon & Izard, 1987).  A more recent study 
(N=37: 15 males) involving happy, sad, and angry body stimuli found females to be faster in 
recognising these emotions from point-light displays, but found no significant sex difference 
in overall accuracy rates (Alaerts, Nackaerts, Meyns, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2011). Two 
further studies used happy and angry point-light displays, and observed a significant superiority 
for males in identifying happiness, as well as a tendency, albeit non-significant, for females to 
perform better at identifying anger (Sokolov et al., 2011; Krüger et al., 2013). However, it 
should be noted that all of these more recent studies used small samples (N<100) and assessed 
only two (Sokolov, 2011; Krüger, 2013) or three (Alaerts et al., 2011) of the basic emotions.  
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The Current Study 
To summarise the literature, a wide variety of claims have been made regarding sex 
differences in face and body emotion recognition ability. Despite meta-analytic work reporting 
an overall female advantage (Hall, 1978; McClure, 2000; Thompson & Voyer, 2014), a number 
of studies – some with relatively large samples (e.g. Lyusin & Ovsyannikova, 2016; 
Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011) – have not reported this pattern. Various studies reported sex 
differences only for specific emotion(s), and limited consensus can be reached given the nature 
of the extant literature.  
Several factors may explain these mixed findings. Firstly, sample sizes have tended to 
be modest (N<200) and as such may be underpowered to detect what are unlikely to be large 
effect sizes. For example, Thompson and Voyer (2014) reported a Cohen’s d of .19 in favour 
of females on emotion recognition tasks and a suitably powered test for an effect of this 
magnitude would require several hundred participants. Secondly, methodological factors may 
play a role, as widely used stimulus sets have often been developed with a view to creating 
easily recognised expressions. In consequence, a number of published studies show clear 
ceiling effects for their stimuli, which will diminish the possibility of detecting group 
differences (e.g. Hampson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006; Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, 
& Traue, 2010). Thirdly, while a recent meta-analysis reported evidence for a generalised sex 
difference in emotion recognition ability (Thompson & Voyer, 2014), evidence of publication 
bias (as assessed by the Test of Excess Significance method proposed by Ioannidis & 
Trikalinos, 2007) was apparent. Finally, in the specific case of body emotion recognition, too 
few studies have been performed to gain traction on possible sex differences. 
The present work therefore examined whether sex difference are present in emotion 
recognition ability, and if so, whether this sex difference is restricted to a specific emotion 
(across five basic emotions) or expressive domain (i.e., face or body stimuli). With the 
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aforementioned issues in mind, our study made a contribution to the literature in four important 
ways. Firstly, we used a large sample of adults (N=1022: Study 1) in order to provide adequate 
statistical power to detect even modest group differences. Second, we used carefully developed 
stimulus sets – piloted prior to the current investigation – that do not show floor or ceiling 
effects and thus enhance the power to detect group differences (see Methods and Lewis et al., 
2016 for further details). Thirdly, we used both face and body stimuli in order to examine if 
sex differences are restricted to one expressive domain or instead reflect more general 
processes. Finally, and with recent discussions of reproducibility of some findings in 
psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) very much in mind, we used two further 
independent participant datasets (N=303: Study 2; N=634: Study 3) and additional different 
sets of face and body stimuli (Study 2) to test the robustness of any effects observed. 
  
6.2 Study 1 
6.2.1 Methods 
Participants 
1063 participants were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk service as part of a previous 
study that did not analyse sex differences in the obtained data (Lewis et al., 2016: Studies 1 
and 2). Ethical approval for this study was granted by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee at the University of York. As expected with an online presentation, a number of 
participants experienced technical failures (e.g. stimuli not displaying properly). Consequently, 
and in line with our previous data exclusion strategy we only included participants in our 
analyses who completed at least 90% (≥18 of 20) of trial blocks for each emotion (anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) and expressive domain (face and body). We also excluded 
participants for whom responses indicated low attention (e.g. using the same response key 
repeatedly) and those who did not disclose their sex (N=7). This led to the omission of 41 
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participants and a final sample size of 1022 (322 males). The gender ratio was near-identical 
across White and non-White participants. In order to detect the effect size reported in the most 
recent meta-analysis (Thompson & Voyer, 2014), our sample size provided power of .80 for a 
Cohen’s d of .19 with a two-tailed t-test and an alpha level of .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Note, this power analysis reflects an allocation ratio of 2.2: i.e. there were just 
over twice as many females than males in this sample. The mean age of the sample was 36.2 
years (SD = 12.0). A range of ethnicities were reported in the final sample: White (n=775), 
Hispanic (n=47), Asian (n=53), Black (n=30), Native American (n=11), Other (n=74), and 
Undisclosed (n=32). These demographics are typical for MTurk samples (Paolacci, Chandler, 
& Ipeirotis, 2010).  
 
Stimuli 
Examples of each of the stimulus sets are shown in Figure 1. Examples of the two 
dynamic stimulus sets are presented in a video file in the Supplementary Materials.  
Face stimuli (static): To capture individual differences in facial expression recognition 
abilities we used static image stimuli taken from the Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli 
and Tests (FEEST) set (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). In brief, a 
total of 10 identities each posing five basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and 
sadness) were selected from the Ekman and Friesen series of Pictures of Facial Affect (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976). In order to avoid floor/ceiling effects, we piloted examples of each emotional 
expression morphed relative to the neutral expression of the same identity using Psychomorph 
(Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001). This procedure is known to lead to changes in the perceived 
intensity (and hence recognisability) of emotion (Calder, Young, Rowland, & Perrett, 1997). 
Here it was used to create five intensities (25%, 50%, 75%, 100%, and 125%) of each prototype 
(100%) expression (total n=250 images). In a pilot experiment comprising undergraduate and 
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postgraduate students at the University of York (n=12 participants: 4 males), we tested 
recognition accuracy for each of these stimuli in a five-alternative forced choice paradigm with 
a 1000ms exposure time. This step is of considerable importance as the limited scope of 
individual differences research on emotion recognition ability has meant that suitable stimuli 
(i.e., free of ceiling effects and with adequate variance for individual differences research) have 
usually been unavailable. We then selected sets of 10 stimuli for each emotion (i.e., total N=50) 
that showed adequate means and variances based on these pilot data (i.e., that were not showing 
clear floor or ceiling effects). In the cases where a surplus of stimuli was available, we chose 
10 that varied in gender and age as much as possible. This selection approach was also applied 
to the remaining stimulus sets.  
Body Stimuli (dynamic): To capture emotion recognition ability from body expressions 
we used dynamic point-light walker stimuli previously described by Atkinson, Dittrich, 
Gemmell, and Young (2004). In short, 10 actors were recorded performing each of five 
emotions at three levels of intensity (typical, exaggerated, very exaggerated). Actors wore suits 
with 13 reflective patches on key joints of their body. Subsequent rendering removed all 
information other than the patches from each video, resulting in a short clip of 13 light points 
whose combined movement simulated the natural, dynamic expression of a human emotion. 
Video clips lasted between 4.2 and 8 seconds. As with the face stimuli, we chose 10 stimuli for 
each emotion (i.e., total N=50) that showed adequate means and variances following a pilot 
experiment (n=12 participants: 6 males). 
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Figure 1: Examples of each of the stimuli used: (A) static facial expressions, (B) frames from 
the dynamic body point-light displays, (C) a frame from the dynamic facial expressions, and 
(D) static body expressions. Note: Stimulus sets A and B were used in Studies 1, 2 and 3; 
Stimulus sets C and D were only presented in Study 2.  
 
Procedure 
Stimuli were blocked according to expressive domain. Face and body blocks were each 
presented twice to the participants in a fixed order (face-body-face-body). In a five-alternative 
forced choice paradigm, participants had to select the emotion they thought was displayed by 
each stimulus using radio buttons on screen. Each face stimulus was presented for 1000ms. 
This limited exposure time was chosen in order to increase difficulty of the recognition task, 
and to ensure suitability of the data for individual differences research (i.e., by increasing error 
rates and variation in recognition accuracy). Body stimuli were presented for the duration of 
each video clip. Participants could provide their response at any point following the onset of 
the stimulus presentation. The within-block presentation order was fully randomised. 
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Participants were given the opportunity to rest following completion of each block. The mean 
recognition performance across blocks for each emotion was used in our analyses. 
 
Analysis 
In order to assess possible sex differences in emotion recognition from face and body, 
we used the data from Study 1 to conduct a three-way repeated measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) (2×2×5) with sex (male, female) as a between-subjects factor, and expressive 
domain (face, body) and emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) as repeated within-
subjects measures. For significant interactions, we conducted post-hoc tests to further analyse 
the results. As noted earlier, the prior literature did not provide strong bases for hypothesis 
testing and so these analyses were exploratory in nature. 
 
6.2.2 Results 
The data were submitted to a three-way ANOVA exploring the effects of sex, domain 
and emotion. There was a significant main effect of domain (F(1, 1020) = 46.37, p<.001, partial 
η2=.04 [CI95%: .02-.07]) with emotional expressions from faces being more accurately 
recognised (M=.61, SD=.17) than expressions from bodies (M=.59, SD=.18). For the factor of 
emotion, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 (9)= 
81.91, p<.05). Therefore, we corrected degrees of freedom using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates 
of sphericity (ε=.96). The main effect of emotion was significant (F(3.84, 3916.41) = 600.08, 
p<.001, partial η2=.37 [CI95%: .35-.39]) indicating differential performance across the five 
emotions. Recognition accuracy was greatest for happiness (M=.69, SD=.16), followed by fear 
(M=.66, SD=.17), anger (M=.61, SD=.17), sadness (M=.59, SD=.18), and disgust (M=.45, 
SD=.19). The main effect of sex was non-significant (F(1,1020) = 2.96, p=.086, partial η2=.003 
[CI95%: .00-.01]). 
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There was a significant interaction between expressive domain and sex (F(1, 1020) = 
33.32, p<.001, partial η2=.03 [CI95%: .01-.06]). Further significant interactions were also 
found between domain and emotion (F(3.78, 3859.82) = 1108.06, p<.001, partial η2=.52 
[CI95%: .50-.54]), and between sex and emotion (F(3.84, 3916.41) = 6.28, p<.001, partial 
η2=.006 [CI95%: .002-.011]). These interactions were also corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates (ε = .95). Of importance, these main effects and two-way interactions were 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction (also Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) between 
expressive domain, emotion, and sex (F(3.78, 3859.82) = 3.69, p=.006, partial η2=.004 
[CI95%: .003-.007]), which we now explore in greater depth. 
We examined the effects of emotion and sex for each domain separately, by running 
mixed ANOVAs with emotion as a within-subjects factor and sex as a between-subjects factor 
for face and body stimuli separately. In both domains, the emotion variable violated the 
assumption of sphericity, therefore Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used (εFaces=.95, 
εBodies =.91). For facial stimuli, there were significant main effects of emotion (F(3.82, 3891.79) 
= 762.72, p<.001, partial η2=.43 [CI95%: .41-.45]) and sex (F(1, 1020) = 25.03, p<.001, partial 
η2 =.02 [CI95%: .009-.045]). These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between 
emotion and sex (F(3.82, 3891.79) = 2.99, p=.020, partial η2=.003 [CI95%: .001-.006]). For 
body stimuli, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion (F(3.64, 3717.38) = 
902.14, p<.001, partial η2=.47 [CI95%: .45-.49]) and a significant interaction between emotion 
and sex (F(3.64, 3717.38) = 7.22, p<.001, partial η2=.007 [CI95%: .002-.013]) but no main 
effect of sex (F(1, 1020) = 1.91, p=.167, partial η2 =.002 [CI95%: .00-.011]).  
 To probe the nature of each of the emotion and sex interactions we ran ten post hoc 
(Bonferroni-corrected: adjusted α = .005) t-tests (i.e., one for each emotion across both 
expressive domains) comparing male and female performance (see Figure 2). These analyses 
revealed that females performed significantly better on recognition of facial expressions of 
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disgust (t(1020) = 4.19, p<.001, Cohen’s d = .28 [CI95%: .15-.41]) (female M=.58, SD=.19; 
male M=.53, SD=.19), and sadness (t(1020) = 3.90, p<.001, Cohen’s d = .26 [CI95%: .13-.40]) 
(female M=.49, SD=.18; male M=.44, SD=.18), and that males performed significantly better 
for bodily expressions of happiness (t(1020) = 3.74, p<.001, Cohen’s d = .25 [CI95%: .12-.38]) 
(female M=.51, SD=.18; male M=.56, SD=.17). The remaining t-tests were non-significant at 
our Bonferroni-corrected alpha level (all t ≤ 2.45, all p> .02).  
Figure 2: Mean emotion recognition accuracy in females and males in response to facial (A) 
and bodily (B) expressions for the five basic emotions in Study 1 (N = 1022 participants). Error 
bars represent standard error, and asterisks above the bars represent the results of the corrected 
t-tests, where ** indicates p<0.001.  
B 
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6.2.3 Discussion 
Study 1 examined the presence of sex differences in recognising emotion across face 
and body stimuli in a large sample. The results indicated that whilst sex had no overall effect, 
significant interactions between sex, expressive domain, and emotion did emerge. Upon further 
inspection of the nature of these interactions, we observed a significant female advantage for 
recognising facial disgust and facial sadness, and a significant male advantage for recognising 
bodily happiness. No other significant sex differences were noted.   
We next sought to confirm the key findings observed from Study 1 in a replication 
sample. In addition, we sought to assess whether these findings extended to reflect emotion 
processing more broadly. To this end we used data from a sample of participants who had 
completed an emotion recognition battery involving the same tests reported above and two 
novel stimulus sets: specifically, dynamic facial stimuli and static body stimuli.  
 
6.3 Study 2 
6.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
In Study 2 we analysed a set of archival data from an independent MTurk sample, also 
drawn from the same previous study (as reported in Lewis et al., 2016: Study 3, N=384). Again, 
we only included participants in our analyses who completed at least 90% (≥17 of 19: note, 
this study did not assess static bodily disgust – see below for further details) of the trial blocks 
for each emotion and expressive domain, and showed no evidence of false responding, leading 
to the omission of 81 participants and a final sample size of 303 (137 males). The gender ratio 
was near-identical across White and non-White participants. In order to test the specific effects 
observed in Study 1, this sample provided power of .69, .72, and .78 (for a Cohen’s d of .25, 
.26, & .28, respectively) for a one-tailed t-test with an alpha level of .05. Mean age was 34.8 
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years (SD = 11.3). A range of ethnicities were reported in the sample: White (n=232), Hispanic 
(n=16), Asian (n=16), Black (n=10), Native American (n=1), Other (n=15), and Undisclosed 
(n=13).   
Stimuli 
We used the same stimuli as described above, together with the additional sets of face 
and body stimuli detailed next. See Figure 1 for picture examples of each of our four types of 
stimuli, and the video in the Supplementary Materials for examples of the dynamic stimuli.    
Face stimuli (dynamic): We used a sub-set of dynamic facial stimuli previously used 
for emotion recognition work (Lau et al., 2009). In brief, these stimuli were created by 
morphing one male and one female image from a neutral expression to one of the five basic 
emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness) and then assembling the morphed 
images into a video clip. Stimuli dynamically changed from the neutral expression to one of 
four levels of intensity (25%, 50%, 75%, 100%), but for happiness, due to the ceiling effects 
often observed, intensity levels were lower (10%, 25%, 50%, and 75%). We only used stimuli 
where actors directly faced the camera, with either direct or averted gaze. This led to a total of 
80 stimuli that we piloted as before, in order to avoid floor/ceiling effects (n=47 participants: 
28 males, recruited through Amazon MTurk) before selecting sets of 10 stimuli for each 
emotion (i.e., total N=50) that showed adequate means and variances based on these pilot data. 
Each video clip was approximately 1.5 seconds in length. 
Body stimuli (static): To test emotion recognition from static bodies we employed the 
Bodily Expressive Action Stimuli Test (BEAST) stimuli set (de Gelder & Van den Stock, 
2011). In brief, these static stimuli comprised black and white whole body photographs of 
actors with faces obscured depicting one of four basic emotions (anger, fear, happiness, and 
sadness). Disgust is not included in this stimulus set due to it being difficult to represent in the 
static body alone (de Gelder & Van den Stock, 2011). The original image set contains 254 
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images. We again undertook undergraduate piloting at the University of York (n=14 
participants: 6 males) to identify 10 stimuli per emotion (i.e., total N=40) suitable for an 
individual differences task, for which we then validated means and variance in a second pilot 
study using MTurk participants (n=50). As with the static facial images, we presented each 
image for 1000ms.  
 
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that outlined for Study 1 with the exception that 
participants completed the following blocks in fixed order: static bodies, static faces, dynamic 
bodies, and dynamic faces. As such, each stimulus set was only seen once (as opposed to twice 
in Study 1). We describe Study 2 as a replication sample in the sense that we used the same 
stimulus sets in our second sample as we did in Study 1 (alongside two additional stimulus sets 
to test for the generalisability of the effects), as well as only examining the significant results 
that emerged in Study 1. 
 
Analysis 
Here we attempted to replicate only the significant effects observed in Study 1 to assess 
their robustness, as well as to examine whether these effects generalised to the additional 
stimulus sets. We chose to constrain our analyses to only the significant effects from Study 1, 
as any effects emerging in Study 2 that were not observed in Study 1 were unlikely to be of 
substantive interest given the much larger sample size of Study 1. 
 
6.3.2 Results 
We ran six t-tests based on the three significant findings from the discovery sample 
(i.e., facial disgust, facial sadness and bodily happiness) and tested each of these in both static 
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and dynamic forms. Therefore, our six t-tests comprised static facial disgust, dynamic facial 
disgust, static facial sadness, dynamic facial sadness, static bodily happiness, and dynamic 
bodily happiness.  
As in Study 1, females performed significantly better on recognition of static facial 
expressions of disgust (t(301) = 3.54, p<.001, Cohen’s d = .41 [CI95%: .18-.64]) (female 
M=.61, SD=.21; male M=.52, SD=.21). In addition, they also performed better than males on 
recognition of dynamic facial expressions of disgust (t(301) = 4.09, p<.001, Cohen’s d = .47 
[CI95%: .24-.70]) (female M=.79, SD=.18; male M=.70, SD=.18). 
In contrast to Study 1, females scored significantly higher on recognition of happiness 
from static bodies (t(301) = 2.09, p=.038, Cohen’s d = .24 [CI95%: .01-.47]) (female M=.48, 
SD=.23; male M=.42, SD=.22). However, we observed no differences between males and 
females for dynamic expressions of bodily happiness (t(301) = .49, p=.625, Cohen’s d = .06 
[CI95%: -.17, .28]) (female M=.54, SD=.18; male M=.53, SD=.20). Finally, in contrast to 
Study 1 we observed no difference between males and females for either static facial 
expressions of sadness (t(301) = 1.09, p=.275, Cohen’s d = .13 [CI95%: -.10, .35]) (female 
M=.48, SD=.23; male M=.46, SD=.21) or for dynamic facial expressions of sadness (t(301) = 
.21, p=.835, Cohen’s d = .02 [CI95%: -.20, .25]) (female M=.43, SD=.27; male M=.42, 
SD=.25). These results are also detailed in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Mean emotion recognition accuracy in females and males in response to dynamic and 
static facial and bodily expressions for the three basic emotions that reached significance in 
Study 2 (N = 303 participants). Error bars represent standard error, and asterisks above the bars 
represent the results of the t-tests, where * indicates p<0.05 and ** indicates p<0.001.  
 
6.3.3 Discussion 
The results from Study 2 confirm the significant female advantage for facial disgust 
that was observed in Study 1. Of importance, this sex difference in disgust recognition was also 
observed in an additional stimulus set comprising dynamic facial stimuli. In addition, females 
scored significantly higher on recognition of static bodily happiness, although this should be 
interpreted in the context of a significant male advantage in Study 1. No other sex differences 
emerged.  
Although these results confirm the finding of Study 1 with regards to sex differences in 
disgust recognition ability, our statistical power was lower than conventional levels (i.e. below 
80%). This will have limited our ability to detect sex differences in facial sadness and bodily 
happiness, as well as raised the potential for a false positive in our disgust recognition 
observation. With this in mind we conducted a third study with a sample size adequately 
powered to reliably detect effects of the magnitude we observed in Study 1.  
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6.4 Study 3 
6.4.1 Methods 
Participants 
In order to assess the robustness of the effects observed in Studies 1 and 2, we collected 
a third independent sample of MTurk participants. We sought to recruit a sample that would 
provide power of .80 to detect a Cohen’s d of .20 in a one-tailed test with alpha at .05. This 
level of power was chosen with the concern that the previously observed effect sizes – 
particularly of Study 1 with its larger sample – might be overestimates of the population effect 
size. To this end we continued recruiting until we had usable data that satisfied this power 
requirement (note, because the required sample size for a given level of power is sensitive to 
the gender ratio, and because we of course could not precisely know this ratio ahead of time 
for our final sample, we assessed the power of our sample – with our data exclusion protocol 
in place – periodically throughout recruitment). As before, we only included participants in our 
analyses if they completed 90% (≥9 of 10) of the trial blocks for each emotion and expressive 
domain, and showed no evidence of false responding. In total 730 participants completed our 
survey. 96 participants were omitted following our data exclusion protocol. Our final sample 
size was thus N=634 (275 males) and this sample provided power of exactly .80 to detect a 
Cohen’s d of .20 in a one-tailed test with alpha at .05. The gender ratio was near-identical 
across White and non-White participants. The mean age was 36.8 years (SD=10.9), and 
ethnicity was reported as follows: White (n=490), Hispanic (n=34), Asian (n=38), Black 
(n=59), Native American (n=3), Other (n=8), and Undisclosed (n=2).  
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Stimuli 
 For this sample, we used the same stimuli as detailed in Study 1; specifically there were 
10 static faces and 10 dynamic bodies for each of the five basic emotions (i.e., N=50 for each 
expressive domain). 
 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Study 3 was the same as in Study 1, with the exception that each 
block was presented only once to the participants (as opposed to being presented twice). 
Participants completed the two blocks in the same fixed order: static faces, dynamic bodies. 
Within-block presentation order was fully randomised. The stimuli presentation and response 
procedure was the same as outlined in the previous two samples.  
Analysis 
Here we attempted to replicate only the significant effects observed in Study 1 to assess 
their robustness.  
 
6.4.2 Results 
We ran three t-tests based on the three significant findings that emerged in Study 1 (i.e., 
facial disgust, facial sadness, and bodily happiness). The tests confirmed a significant female 
advantage for static facial disgust (t(630) = 2.21, p=.027, Cohen’s d = .18 [CI95%: .02-.33]) 
(female M=.60, SD=.20; male M=.56, SD=.21). There was no significant sex difference in 
recognition of facial sadness (t(630) = 1.22, p=.223, Cohen’s d = .10 [CI95%: -.06, .26]) 
(female M=.46, SD=.20; male M=.44, SD=.20), or bodily happiness (t(630) = 1.19, p=.234, 
Cohen’s d = .10 [CI95%: -.06, .25]) (female M=.48, SD=.18; male M=.50, SD=.18) (see Figure 
4).  
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Figure 4: Mean emotion recognition accuracy in females and males in response to facial and 
bodily expressions for the three basic emotions that reached significance in Study 3 (N = 634 
participants). Error bars represent standard error, and asterisks above the bars represent the 
results of the t-tests, where * indicates p<0.05.  
 
6.4.3 Discussion 
 The results of Study 3 confirm the female advantage for recognising facial disgust 
observed in both Studies 1 and 2. We did not see evidence for a sex difference in facial sadness 
and bodily happiness. 
 
6.5 General Discussion 
The current study sought to determine the role of sex in emotion recognition ability 
across three large samples of adults. In Study 1 (our discovery sample), while no overall main 
effect of sex was observed, significant interactions across sex, expressive domain, and emotion 
were noted. Following decomposition of these interactions, we observed that females 
performed significantly better than males on recognition of facial disgust and facial sadness, 
and that males performed significantly better than females in recognising bodily happiness. 
Results from Study 2 (our first replication sample) confirmed the female advantage for facial 
 CHAPTER 6: SEX DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION RECOGNITION 
168 
 
disgust. Importantly, this significant difference was present both for static disgust stimuli (as 
used in Studies 1 and 2) and for dynamic facial disgust stimuli (used only in Study 2). Results 
from Study 3 (our second replication sample) also confirmed the female advantage for static 
facial disgust. This pattern of findings shows that across three independent samples, with 
different presentation formats (static or dynamic), females consistently outperformed males 
with regard to recognising facial disgust stimuli. 
In contrast to this consistent female advantage for recognising facially expressed 
disgust, the findings in Study 1 of a female advantage for sad faces and of a male advantage 
for happy bodies were not replicated. In fact, in Study 2 we observed the opposite effect: 
females were significantly better at recognising happiness from static bodies (with no sex 
differences observed for dynamic happy bodies), and in Study 3, neither facial sadness nor 
bodily happiness showed significant sex differences. These results indicate that the findings in 
Study 1 probably reflect random sampling variability and so we do not discuss these failures 
to replicate any further.  
In sum, then, these findings support the existence of a robust sex difference for facial 
disgust but not for any of the other basic emotions. It should be noted, however, that the effect 
sizes observed are not large, and thus the distributions of scores for male and female 
participants are largely overlapping. As such, the sex difference should not be overstated; the 
two sexes appear to be more similar on this ability than they are different. 
Why do our findings diverge from what might be thought of as conventional wisdom, 
i.e., that there is an overall sex difference in emotion recognition? One possible explanation is 
that of publication bias in this field. This account is supported by a recent meta-analysis of sex 
differences in emotion recognition ability that reported evidence for an excess of significant 
findings in the literature (Thompson & Voyer, 2014). For the field to move towards a consensus 
 CHAPTER 6: SEX DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION RECOGNITION 
169 
 
state, this suggests a need for strongly powered confirmatory studies with pre-registered 
experimental protocols. 
What might account for this modest female advantage for recognising facial disgust? 
An interesting, if at present speculative, perspective posited to account for this more general 
sex difference concerns the unique selection pressures faced by females, including 
immunosuppression during pregnancy and over the menstrual cycle, higher risk of contracting 
sexually-transmitted diseases and transferring them to their offspring, and higher parental 
investment in infant protection (Fleischman, 2014). Given the greater vulnerability of females 
and their altricial offspring to contamination and infection, an evolutionary functionalist 
account theorises that females need to be more sensitive to cues of disgust (Curtis, Aunger, & 
Rabie, 2004), which may include facial expressions. 
In addition, Fleischman (2014) also hypothesised that males may show less disgust 
sensitivity than females due to a selection pressure to emphasise their robust immunity by 
displaying a relative indifference towards signals of disgust. Given that males consistently 
show greater risk-taking behaviour than females, Fessler, Pillsworth and Flamson (2004) 
suggested that this propensity may also extend to a higher willingness to approach sources of 
contamination in comparison to their female counterparts. By employing the minimum possible 
level of disease avoidance, it is suggested that males are highlighting their successful immune 
system and high genetic quality to potential reproductive mates.  
It is conceivable, then, that such fitness imperatives shape the ability to recognise 
disgust in conspecifics in different ways across the sexes. The evolutionary adaptationist theory 
that disgust sensitivity may be functionally related to successful mating and reproduction is 
supported by the finding that sex differences are observed from puberty and young adulthood 
onwards, but no sex differences in disgust sensitivity emerge in child participants (Stevenson, 
Oaten, Case, Repacholi, & Wagland, 2010), as well as the finding that disgust sensitivity 
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decreases across the lifespan as reproductive potential declines (Curtis et al., 2004). That said, 
we must reiterate that our study found largely overlapping distributions of ability to recognise 
disgust across women and men, so any evolutionary influences do not create major differences 
in this respect. Moreover, it is easy to think of ways in which cultural socialisation might tend 
to make women more sensitive than men to the importance of hygiene and risk of disease. 
 Some limitations of our studies require mention. Firstly, while MTurk samples are more 
diverse than student samples (Paolacci et al., 2010), they clearly do not form a representative 
sample of the population; for example, there was a greater proportion of female than male 
respondents in all three of our studies. And although our samples were ethnically diverse, they 
were mainly White and comprised solely of US residents; as such, all participants have been 
strongly exposed to Western culture. Further studies involving non-Western populations will 
therefore also be valuable in order to assess the robustness of the sex differences reported here. 
Secondly, here we focused on five basic emotions; however, emotional expressions are of 
course not restricted to these categories. Accordingly, work that explores a broader selection 
of emotions may reveal additional sex differences. Thirdly, while our stimuli are among the 
most carefully developed and validated for laboratory-oriented research, they clearly have 
limits with regards to ecological validity. As such, work that can take advantage of more 
naturalistic stimuli will be of value in future studies. Finally, we note that our bodily disgust 
recognition rate was low (in fact close to chance level) for both sexes, and this high level of 
noise may have led to a false negative result. Future work is recommended to address this issue. 
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Conclusions 
In summary, across three independent samples we observed that females are superior 
to males in facial disgust recognition. This result is of particular note as this sex difference was 
observed across two very different sets of facial stimuli (static and dynamic). However, these 
group differences were modest in magnitude, and the overlap in ability between the two 
populations is substantial. No consistent evidence for further sex differences in emotion 
recognition ability was observed. 
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Chapter 7: Emotion Recognition across Adult Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Face perception across the adult lifespan: 
Evidence for age-related changes independent of general intelligence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Andrew Young, and 
Gary Lewis (supervisor) and is under review at Cognition and Emotion.  
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Abstract 
 
It is well-documented that face perception – including expression and identity 
recognition ability – declines with age. To date, however, it is not yet well understood whether 
this age-related decline reflects face-specific effects, or instead can be accounted for by well-
known declines in general intelligence. We examined this issue using a relatively large, 
healthy, age-diverse (18-88 years) sample (N=595) who were assessed on well-established 
measures of face perception and general intelligence. Replicating previous work, we observed 
that facial expression recognition, facial identity recognition, and general intelligence all 
showed declines with age. Of importance, the age-related decline of expression and identity 
recognition was present even when the effects of general intelligence were statistically 
controlled. Moreover, facial expression and identity ability each showed significant unique 
associations with age. These results indicate that face perception ability becomes poorer as we 
age, and that this decline is to some extent relatively focal in nature. Results are in line with a 
hierarchical structure of face perception ability, and suggest that age appears to have 
independent effects on the general and specific face processing levels within this structure.  
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7.1 Introduction 
Face perception encompasses a range of abilities that are necessary for successful 
everyday interactions (Bruce & Young, 2012). Among these abilities, the perception of 
expression and identity are of critical importance. Accurate perception of facial expressions is 
essential for appropriate responses to the subtle and rapid changes in a person’s demeanour and 
emotional state, whilst accurate identification of others via their face enables social interactions 
to be appropriately adjusted based on prior knowledge of and previous encounters with that 
individual (Young, 2018).  
Of note, then, a substantial body of research has consistently reported a decline in face 
perception abilities with age. In the context of facial expression recognition, a meta-analysis of 
28 datasets (total N=1667) reported age-related decline in face emotion recognition that was 
evident across categories of emotions (Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Philips, 2008). In a 
sample of 607 participants (18-84 years) who were tested on facial and vocal expression 
recognition, older participants were shown to be less accurate across emotions (Mill, Allik, 
Realo, & Valk, 2009). In a sample of 482 participants (20-89 years), participants in their 30’s, 
40’s and 50’s showed equivalent accuracy in expression recognition, but a linear decline was 
seen to emerge from 60 years of age onwards, and further declines were particularly noticeable 
for participants in their 70’s and 80’s (West et al., 2012). In a large study (N=7230, 18-75 
years), Sasson and colleagues observed a deficit for older adults’ expression recognition across 
all tested emotions (Sasson et al, 2010). Another sample (N=9546, 10-85 years) observed age-
related deficits in emotion sensitivity (i.e. discriminating between the intensity of two 
expressions) (Rutter et al., 2019). Finally, a very large community sample (N=100,257) 
reported age-related deficits on an emotion recognition task involving composite expressions 
in a sample of individuals who ranged from younger than 15 years of age to older than 60 years, 
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with the older groups performing worse than their younger counterparts (Olderbak, Wilhelm, 
Hildebrandt, & Quoidbach, 2018).  
In the context of facial identity recognition, age-related changes have also been noted. 
In a sample of 448 participants (18-88 years), Hildebrandt and colleagues (2010) observed 
considerable age-related performance decrements across three aspects of identity recognition: 
face memory (e.g. immediate and delayed recognition of learned faces), face perception (e.g. 
part-whole matching tasks), and speed of face identity matching (e.g. matching of faces from 
different viewpoints). Decrements were strongest for the speed of face identity matching 
(showing a linear decrease beginning in the early 30’s) but were also apparent for memory (the 
late 40’s) and perception (the 60’s). Age-related decrements have also been reported for 
another unfamiliar face matching task (Benton, Eslinger, & Damasio, 1981), and in holistic 
perception (Boutet & Faubert, 2006). In eyewitness identification paradigms, older adults show 
lower accuracy on line up tasks, and a higher rate of false recognition of new faces (Searcy, 
Bartlett, & Memon, 1999).  
This body of work provides strong evidence for an age-related decline in face-related 
abilities. However, it is not yet known if this decline reflects changes in face perception per se, 
or instead is simply a reflection of well-known age-related declines in general intelligence 
(Deary, 2001; Salthouse, 2010). A huge amount of empirical research demonstrates the 
significant age-related declines observed in the domains of reasoning, spatial visualisation, 
verbal memory and perceptual speed, with vocabulary in contrast showing an increase or 
preservation until approximately age 60 (Salthouse, 2013). The possibility that this general 
cognitive decline underpins age-related decline in face perception abilities is bolstered by 
evidence from recent research demonstrating robust links from general intelligence to both 
expression recognition (Hildebrandt, Sommer, Schacht, & Wilhelm, 2015; Lewis, Lefevre, & 
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Young, 2016; Schlegel & Scherer, 2016) and identity recognition (Wilhelm et al., 2010; 
Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015; Connolly, Young, & Lewis, 2019).  
A handful of studies have already attempted to address this issue, although typically 
without a direct measure of general intelligence. In the context of expression recognition, Mill 
and colleagues (2009) observed that age remained a significant predictor when adjusting for 
education, a proxy for general intelligence (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007). West 
and colleagues (2012) reported the age/expression recognition association even when adjusting 
for processing speed, which is moderately associated with general intelligence (Neisser et al., 
1996; Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). Horning, Cornwell, and Davis (2012) used the Raven’s 
matrices reasoning test as a proxy for fluid intelligence (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 
1999), and found that whilst this was a significant predictor of recognition of some of the basic 
emotions, age also remained a significant predictor. Finally, in terms of identity recognition, 
Hildebrandt and colleagues (2011) reported that age-related differences in memory for faces 
were still evident after adjusting for age-related differences in general cognition, as measured 
by Raven’s advanced progressive matrices, and two working memory tasks: a rotation span 
task and a memory updating task.  
However, as alluded to above, a crucial caveat to these studies is the measure of 
intelligence. In most of the larger studies only a proxy for general intelligence has been used, 
such as years or level of education (Mill et al., 2009; Sasson et al., 2010; Kessels et al., 2014), 
matrix reasoning (Horning et al., 2012), or processing speed (West et al., 2012). Whilst these 
variables undoubtedly correlate with general intelligence (e.g. Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001), it is 
important to note that they fail to fully capture the broad variance of this ability. It is plausible, 
then, that if a more comprehensive measure was included, it might completely attenuate the 
association between age and face perception.   
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The Current Study 
The current study sought to offer clarity regarding this important issue by leveraging 
data from a relatively large age-diverse sample who had been assessed on well-acknowledged 
measures of face perception and general intelligence. The Cattell Culture-Fair Intelligence Test 
comprises four nonverbal subtests of matrix reasoning, and whilst the constructs of fluid and 
general intelligence have been debated in the field, factor analytic research has shown very 
strong correlations (r = .77-96) between the Cattell test and other more broadly constructed 
cognitive batteries, e.g. the General Aptitude Test Battery (Johnson, te Nijenhuis, & Bouchard, 
2008), indicating a high level of common measurement across these various cognitive batteries. 
In comparison to single measures of matrix reasoning or processing speed, then, the Cattell test 
battery better captures the breadth of general intelligence, and is well suited for our specific 
research question regarding age-related decline.  
The face perception measures included a test of emotion recognition involving morphed 
images to create differing levels of task difficulty (Young et al., 1997; 2002), thus making it 
sensitive enough to generate a range of scores and thus suitable for individual differences 
research in our sample of healthy adults. The measures also included the Benton Test of Facial 
Recognition (Levin, Hamsher, & Benton, 1975). Whilst the Benton test is based entirely on 
unfamiliar face recognition (Young & Burton, 2018) and there has been debate about the 
circumstances in which it is useful (Duchaine & Weidenfeld, 2003; Rossion, 2018) it has the 
advantages of being a widely-used and purely perceptual measure that generates a range of 
individual differences in performance. Importantly, in light of the fact that we had access to 
measures of facial expression and identity recognition in the same sample, the current study 
was able to examine whether these age-related declines showed unique associations with age; 
that is, whether face perception abilities showed a general decline with age, or whether this 
decline was specific to expression or identity recognition ability.  
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7.2 Methods 
Participants 
The data analysed in this study were collected by the Cambridge Centre for Ageing and 
Neuroscience (Cam-CAN) (Shafto et al., 2014). The Cam-CAN sample is cross-sectional and 
age-diverse (aged 18-88 years). Participants completed demographic questionnaires and 
general cognitive and memory assessments in a home interview. Following an initial 
assessment, 700 eligible individuals (50 men and 50 women for every age decile) who were 
MRI-suitable were invited to complete a range of neuroimaging sessions and cognitive-
behavioural tasks, including the cognitive measures examined in the current study. Exclusion 
criteria for non-eligible participants included: low cognitive health (Mini Mental State Exam 
score of 24 or lower); poor hearing (failing to hear 35dB at 1000 Hz in either ear); poor vision 
(below 20/50 on Snellen test); low English language ability (non-native or non-bilingual 
English speakers); self-reported substance abuse; and serious health conditions that would 
affect participation (for example, major neurological or psychiatric conditions, current 
chemo/radiotherapy, or a history of stroke. A total of 656 (291 men) participants were thus 
recruited and these data form the basis for the analyses reported here. 
Participants were next excluded if they showed chance levels of performance on two or 
more of the cognitive-behavioural tasks, or had not completed all of the cognitive-behavioural 
tests (see Measures). Participants were also excluded if they were missing age information. 
This necessitated the exclusion of 61 participants, resulting in a final sample size of 595 (291 
men). The mean age of participants was 54.0 years (SD=18.2, range=18-88), and ethnicity was 
as follows: White (N=573), Asian (N=7), Black (N=1), Mixed Race (N=8) and undisclosed 
(N=6).  
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Measures 
Facial expression recognition ability was assessed using the Emotion Hexagon test 
(Young et al., 1997, 2002). This test was created by using a model from the Ekman and Friesen 
(1976) ‘Pictures of facial affect’ series displaying each of the six basic emotions (anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise). These images were then morphed with another 
basic emotion to form emotional expressions with graded levels of difficulty (expression pairs 
morphed together consist of happiness-surprise, surprise-fear, fear-sadness, sadness-disgust, 
disgust-anger, and anger-happiness). Participants were shown faces with either 70% or 90% of 
the target emotion, and had to make a six-alternative forced-choice response to indicate 
whether the expression was most like anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, or surprise. There 
were 20 trials for each of the six emotions, and stimuli were shown for 3 seconds each. A 
percentage accuracy score for each of the six emotions was generated for use in subsequent 
analyses. The six Emotion Expression Recognition sub-scores were significantly associated: r 
ranged from .12 to .46, and all p < .003. 
Facial recognition ability was assessed using the short-form of the Benton Test of 
Facial Recognition (Levin et al., 1975), which measures the ability to match pictures of 
unfamiliar faces. The test consists of 27 trials in which the participant is shown one target face 
and an array of six faces. The participant has to identify one or more examples of the target 
face in the array. There may be changes in head orientation or lighting between the target and 
array faces. Each correct response receives a score of 1, and a total percentage accuracy score 
was generated for use in subsequent analyses.  
General intelligence was assessed using the Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence test (Scale 
2 Form A: Cattell, 1973), which contains four nonverbal subtests: Series Completion, 
Classification, Matrices, and Conditions. Participants are given 3, 4, 3, and 2.5 minutes, 
respectively to complete each subtest. The test uses a pen-and-paper approach: the participant 
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is asked to choose a response for each item from multiple response options and to record their 
response on a corresponding answer sheet. Correct responses are given a score of 1 and the 
percentage correct for each sub-test was calculated for use in subsequent analyses. The four 
Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence subtests were significantly associated: r ranged from .52 to .63 
(all p < .001). 
Procedure 
 Eligible participants attended testing sessions at the Medical Research Council 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit in Cambridge UK. Approximate duration for each of the 
tasks was as follows: Emotional expression recognition: 20 minutes; Unfamiliar facial 
recognition: 10 minutes; and General intelligence: 20 minutes. The emotional expression 
recognition test was presented on a laptop, and the unfamiliar facial recognition and 
intelligence tests were administered using pen and paper. The majority of participants were 
comfortable using the laptop for the emotional expression task, but if a participant struggled, 
the researcher pressed the buttons for them in response to their spoken answer. This ensured 
that the accuracy of a participant’s answer would not be confounded by their computer 
competency.  
 
Analysis 
Measurement Invariance 
As a sensitivity check, we tested for measurement invariance separately for the two 
variables with sufficient number of manifest variables to stably identify a latent factor (General 
Intelligence: four Cattell subtests; Face Expression recognition: six emotion categories).  
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General Intelligence 
Firstly, we tested for configural invariance by examining whether the same pattern of 
freed and fixed parameters held across three defined age groups (Younger Adults: 18-39 
(N=153); Middle-aged Adults: 40-64 (N=243); Older Adults: 65+ (N=199). Model results 
demonstrated that configural invariance was evident across the three age groups, (Χ2 (6) = 
5.36, p=.499; CFI=1.00; RMSEA=.00). Secondly, metric invariance (i.e., weak factorial 
invariance) was tested by examining if the factor loadings were equivalent across groups. 
Model results in aggregate demonstrated evidence for complete metric invariance (Χ2 (12) = 
21.64, p=.042; CFI=.98; RMSEA=.06). However, the chi square difference between this model 
and the configural model was significant, Χ2 difference (6) = 16.28, p=.012, suggesting that 
the metric model had a significantly worse fit. 
We thus explored whether metric model fit could be improved by adjusting some model 
parameters. For this, we inspected the modification indices and in turn allowed the loading of 
the second Cattell subtest (Classification) to vary across age groups, with the other three subtest 
loadings remaining constrained to equality across the age groups. We re-ran the metric 
invariance test with this modification and found this model had excellent fit (Χ2 (10) = 10.84, 
p=.370; CFI=.99; RMSEA=.02). Moreover, the chi square difference between this partial 
metric model and the configural model was non-significant, Χ2 difference (4) = 5.48, p=.241.  
 The results of this invariance testing suggest that the factor structure of general 
intelligence is equivalent across age groups. However, complete metric invariance was not able 
to be established, suggesting that at least some of the age group differences in general 
intelligence reflect variance beyond the general factor level of analysis.  
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Face Expression Recognition 
Secondly, we assessed whether face expression recognition ability was invariant across 
age. Firstly, configural invariance was established across the three age groups, Χ2 (21) = 29.44, 
p=.104; CFI=.98; RMSEA=.05).  
Complete Metric (weak factorial) Invariance Testing: Face Expression Recognition 
Model results in aggregate demonstrated evidence for complete metric invariance (Χ2 
(31) = 51.95, p=.011; CFI=.945; RMSEA=.058). However, the chi square difference between 
this model and the configural model was significant, Χ2 difference (10) = 22.51, p=.013, 
suggesting that the metric model had a significantly worse fit.  
Partial Metric (weak factorial) Invariance Testing: Face Expression Recognition 
As before, we explored whether the metric model fit could be improved by adjusting 
some model parameters. For this, we inspected the modification indices and allowed the 
loading of the Happiness manifest variable to vary, with the other five emotion category 
loadings remaining equivalent across the age groups. We re-ran the metric invariance test with 
this partial constraint, and found this model did not have an acceptable fit according to the chi 
square statistic, Χ2 (29) = 44.78, p=.031, but had acceptable alternative fit indices (CFI=.958; 
RMSEA=.052). Moreover, the chi square difference between this partial metric model and the 
configural model was non-significant, Χ2 difference (8) = 15.33, p=.053, although interpreting 
p values close to the nominal threshold should be done with caution.   
The results of this invariance testing suggest some relatively modest evidence of metric 
variance of expression recognition across age groups. Complete weak invariance was not able 
to be established, suggesting that at least some of the age group difference in expression 
recognition factor loadings is attributable to measurement bias. However, scale invariance was 
established for both general intelligence and face expression recognition, so we elected to 
continue using these measures to assess age differences as per our analysis plan. 
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7.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics are detailed in Table 1. Inter-correlations between study variables 
are detailed in Table 2. Facial expression recognition showed strong positive correlations with 
general intelligence and facial identity recognition. Age was negatively associated with 
expression and identity recognition, and with general intelligence. These age relationships are 
also illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of facial expression recognition ability (Face Exp), facial 
identity recognition ability (Face ID), age, and general intelligence. 
 
Table 2. Zero-order correlations between measures of facial expression recognition ability 
(Face Exp), facial identity recognition ability (Face ID), age, and general intelligence. Values 
in parentheses reflect correlations when adjusting for general intelligence.  
Note. All p <.001.  
 
Regression Analysis 
The regression analyses then enabled us to test our research question of whether the 
age-related decline in expression recognition or identity recognition was independent from the 
decline observed in general intelligence.  
 Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Age 54.01 18.16 18 88 -.04 -1.12 
Face Exp 87.43 9.83 26.09 95.65 -1.36 1.75 
Face ID 85.07 8.50 49.17 100.00 -.36 -.50 
General Intelligence 69.58 14.48 62.96 100.00 -.56 -.14 
 Face ID General Intelligence Age 
Face Exp .39 (.22) .52 -.44 (-.15) 
Face ID  .42 -.46 (-.27) 
General Intelligence   -.66 
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In the first regression model, expression recognition was entered as the dependent 
variable, and general intelligence, age, sex, and identity recognition were all entered as 
predictors in the same step. The coefficients indicated that each of these variables was a 
significant and unique predictor of expression recognition. The full results of this regression 
analysis are shown in Table 3. Note that the coefficient for sex reflects face expression 
recognition scores being significantly higher for women. This finding is further analysed and 
discussed below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationships with age (by decile) for general intelligence (g), facial expression recognition 
ability (Face Exp), and facial identity recognition ability (Face ID).  
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Table 3: Multiple regressions predicting facial expression recognition ability from age, sex, 
facial identity recognition ability (Face ID), and general intelligence.  
 
In the second regression model, identity recognition was the dependent variable, and 
general intelligence, age, sex, and expression recognition were all entered as predictors. In this 
case, the coefficients for general intelligence, age, and expression recognition all suggested 
unique influence of these variables on identity recognition, but sex was not a significant 
predictor. The full results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Multiple regressions predicting facial identity recognition ability from age, sex, 
facial expression recognition ability (Face Exp), and general intelligence.  
 
 The age declines in face perception abilities when adjusting for general intelligence are 
further illustrated through plotting of the residuals, and are shown in Figures 2 (expression 
recognition) and 3 (identity recognition).  
 
Independent Variables β Sig 
Age -.10 .04 
Sex .14 <.001 
Face ID .18 <.001 
General Intelligence .39 <.001 
Independent Variables β Sig 
Age -.29 <.001 
Sex .02 .63 
Face Exp .20 <.001 
General Intelligence .13 .01 
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Figure 2: Relationships of age with face expression (Face Exp) recognition residuals, 
showing the age decline of Face Exp when adjusting for general intelligence.  
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Figure 3: Relationships of age with face identity (Face ID) recognition residuals, showing the 
age decline of Face ID when adjusting for general intelligence.
 
 
Mediation Analyses 
We note from the linear regressions presented above that both age and general 
intelligence are significant unique predictors of facial expression recognition and facial identity 
recognition ability. We formally tested for mediation effects using a path analysis approach 
implemented in the R package ‘lavaan’ (Rosseel, 2012). We tested one plausible model, 
whereby age was the independent variable, general intelligence the mediating variable, and 
facial expression or facial identity recognition as the respective dependent variable. While this 
arguably reflects the most theoretically plausible causal model, other possible pathway models 
exist, and as such we advise caution when interpreting these paths. The mediated relationships 
are presented in Figures 4 and 5.  
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Figure 4: Mediation model of age, general intelligence, and facial expression recognition 
ability.  
Note: All standardised coefficients are significant at p<.001. The value in parentheses is the 
relationship between age and facial expression recognition before general intelligence was 
taken into account. 
 
Figure 5: Mediation model of age, general intelligence, and facial identity recognition ability.  
Note: All standardised coefficients are significant at p<.001. The value in parentheses is the 
relationship between age and facial identity recognition before general intelligence was taken 
into account. 
 
Across the two models, age significantly predicted facial expression (β=-.09, CI=[-.14, 
-.04], p<.001), and facial identity recognition (β=-.15, CI=[-.19, -.11], p<.001), even when 
general intelligence was included in the model. The indirect effect of age through general 
intelligence was a significant predictor of facial expression (β=-.15, CI=[-.18, -.11], p<.001), 
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and facial identity recognition (β=-.06, CI=[-.09, -.03], p<.001), indicating that general 
intelligence was a partial mediator of the effect between age and facial expression, and between 
age and facial identity recognition. 
 
Subsidiary Analyses 
Firstly, we ran some exploratory tests to examine whether age-related decline in 
emotion expression recognition ability instead reflected worse performance on one or more 
particular emotion categories. We observed moderate-to-large negative correlations of age with 
fear (r=-.48, p<.001), anger (r=-.31, p<.001), sadness (r=-.36, p<.001), and surprise (r=-.30, 
p<.001). We observed non-significant correlations of age with happiness (r=-.08, p=.042) and 
disgust (r=-.04, p=.326). These results suggest that the age-related decline of emotion 
recognition is not being driven by performance on a limited sub-set of emotions, with medium-
to-large decrements observed across the majority of negative emotion categories. The non-
significant correlation of age with happiness recognition is also not altogether surprising given 
the pervasive ceiling effects observed here (and in many other studies) that may obscure any 
true effects. Finally, the absence of a significant decline in disgust recognition ability across 
age supports the relative preservation noted in earlier work (e.g. Calder et al., 2003). 
Secondly, whilst not of primary importance to the present study, the observation of a 
significant sex difference in favour of women for emotion recognition ability was deemed 
sufficiently important for us to present here for issues of replication, and thus was further 
explored in a subsidiary analysis. We tested whether this effect was evident across all of the 
emotions, or if it reflected specific emotional categories, in light of recent work noting a 
selective female advantage for recognising facial disgust (Connolly, Lefevre, Young, & Lewis, 
2019). We subjected the data to six t-tests, correcting for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni-
corrected: adjusted α=.0083). There was a significant difference in favour of women on 
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recognition of disgust (t(593)=-3.22, p=.001, Cohen’s d=.26, [CI95%:.10-.43]) (female 
M=88.59, SD=15.98; male M=83.83, SD=19.94) and in recognition of happiness (t(593)=-
3.39, p=.001, Cohen’s d=.28, [CI95%: .12-.44]) (female M=98.17, SD=4.17; male M=96.68, 
SD=6.37).  
 
7.4 Discussion 
A number of studies have reported age-related declines in facial expression and identity 
recognition abilities. However, to date, it has not been well understood if these declines reflect 
independent expression and identity effects, a more general face-specific effect, or simply the 
manifestation of the well-acknowledged decline in general intelligence observed across the 
lifespan (Deary, 2001). Moreover, as we have noted in the Introduction, studies to date have 
not used sufficiently broad measures of intelligence to fully answer this question. To address 
both the theoretical question and this methodological issue here, we used a relatively large 
cross-sectional sample of individuals ranging from 18 to 88 years of age who were assessed on 
widely used tests of face perception ability, and most importantly for current purposes, a 
comprehensive measure of general intelligence. 
Expression recognition ability, identity recognition ability, and general intelligence 
were all negatively related to age, such that older individuals scored more poorly. Of 
importance, age was a significant predictor of both expression and identity recognition ability, 
even when general intelligence was statistically controlled, indicating that these age-related 
declines are not fully accounted for by the known decline in general intelligence. Indeed, the 
mediation analyses indicated that general intelligence was a partial mediator of the effect of 
age on facial expression/identity recognition. These findings are consistent with previous work 
that found age remained a significant predictor after adjusting for proxies of general 
intelligence (Horning et al., 2012; West et al, 2012). However, given that the current study used 
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a comprehensive measure of general intelligence as opposed to a proxy measure, our results 
here support this finding in stronger and more concrete terms.  
Whilst it is clear that different measures of face perception will often correlate with 
each other, such correlations are typically able to account for a maximum of around 25% of 
the variance across face tasks (Connolly et al., 2019; McCaffery et al., 2018; Verhallen et al., 
2017). Consistent with this, the intercorrelation between the face perception variables tested 
here (0.39) accounted for some 15% of variance and each measure showed significant unique 
associations with age. This suggests that whilst the face variables themselves covary in a way 
that is consistent with the idea of a general factor underlying different aspects of face perception 
(Verhallen et al., 2017), their respective declines are to some extent independent of one another, 
and not solely attributable to a general overall decline in face processing ability.  
This finding of independent associations of expression recognition and identity 
recognition to age is consistent with previous related work suggesting multiple levels of 
individual differences underlying face perception ability, including general intelligence, 
general face-specific processing, and expression- and identity-specific processes (Lewis et al., 
2016; Connolly et al., 2019). This suggests then, that the effect of age may operate differently 
at these various levels of processing, and that at least some of the age-related decline acts upon 
the expression- and identity-specific level, resulting in the independent age associations that 
we have observed in the current study.  
Our findings are also consistent with the age-related decline often observed in broader 
domains such as social cognition. For example, Maylor and colleagues (2002) reported a 
significant negative association between theory of mind (ToM) and age, when adjusting for 
vocabulary, processing speed, and executive functioning. More recently, Baksh and colleagues 
(2018) developed a test of social cognition that assessed both cognitive and affective ToM and 
inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms, and found that whilst scores on this test 
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declined with increasing age, they were not correlated with either verbal or reasoning ability. 
These results suggest, then, that in line with our current face perception results, social cognition 
may also show a somewhat independent age-related decline from general intelligence. Further 
studies will be able to offer further insight into the extent of this putative independence.  
In our subsidiary analysis, we noted a significant female advantage for recognising 
facial disgust and happiness, suggesting that the overall emotion recognition difference was 
being primarily driven by women’s more accurate recognition of these two discrete emotions. 
The sex difference in disgust recognition is consistent with a recent study involving three 
independent samples (Connolly et al., 2019). In contrast, in that set of studies, we did not 
observe a female advantage for happiness recognition. This discrepancy may be the result of 
the more age-diverse sample reported here. It appears plausible that the sex difference in 
happiness recognition is stronger in older individuals and thus why it emerged in the current 
sample, and not in the younger adult samples tested in Connolly et al. (2019). 
Some limitations of the current study are worth noting. Firstly, the design is cross-
sectional, with participants being tested at only one time point, and therefore cohort effects 
between different generations may be a source of bias. The environments in which our younger 
and older participants developed are likely to vary greatly, with large differences in cultural 
norms and quality and quantity of healthcare, nutrition, and education, amongst other variables. 
Indeed, in intelligence research, the phenomenon of cognitive test scores increasing across 
generations has been widely established (Flynn, 1987). However, it has also been noted that 
within-cohort variation can be almost as large as that between different cohorts (Salthouse, 
2014a), suggesting that age-related differences in cognition cannot be wholly accounted for by 
cohort differences.  Additionally, whilst longitudinal designs have often reported positive test 
effects whereby participants show benefits of having had prior test experience, quasi-
longitudinal designs have reported almost identical age trends to cross-sectional studies 
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(Salthouse, 2014b). This suggests, then, that longitudinal designs may underestimate the 
negative age-related change in cognition, and that cross-sectional results may be closer to 
estimating the true magnitude of age-related decline. Given this, then, future studies may 
benefit from employing longitudinal designs to corroborate the findings of cross-sectional 
studies.    
Secondly, we must consider the likely bias induced by self-selection. The individuals 
comprising the current sample were recruited as part of a larger study in which participants had 
to attend multiple testing sessions involving MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) and MEG 
(magnetoencephalography) measures. Being willing and physically able to attend these 
sessions and complete a variety of cognitive and neural tasks suggests a certain level of 
motivation. In addition, in order to be eligible to take part in the neuroimaging stage of the 
study, the individuals had to be healthy with no serious cognitive impairment, psychiatric 
disorders, difficulties with vision or hearing, or evidence of substance abuse. Given the 
extensive cognitive and physical screening of our participants before testing (Shafto et al., 
2014), the observed age-related declines in face perception are unlikely to be due to 
comprehension or sensory difficulties. Therefore, selected participants are likely to represent 
the higher end of the typical continuum in the general population, and this may be especially 
true for the older participants. It should be noted, though, that this source of bias would likely 
have led to an underestimate of the age effects observed here. 
Finally, we established configural invariance of general intelligence and expression 
recognition, but only established partial metric invariance for these two variables. This suggests 
only partially equivalent factor loadings across the age groups, and that at least some of the age 
effect observed for intelligence and expression recognition may be accounted for by 
measurement bias. We suggest that future studies of expression recognition and general 
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intelligence should seek to establish complete metric invariance of their chosen measures to 
ensure accurate interpretation of any age effects observed. 
 
Conclusions 
 In summary, the current study observed age-related declines in facial expression and 
facial identity recognition abilities in a relatively large, healthy, age-diverse sample. 
Importantly, these declines were not fully explained by adjusting for the known age-related 
decline in general intelligence, even when this was thoroughly measured. Furthermore, the 
declines in expression and identity recognition were to some extent domain-specific, and not 
merely a function of broader face processing age-related difficulties.  
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Chapter 8: General Discussion 
 
8.1 Thesis Overview 
The research reported in this thesis investigated individual differences in a cluster of 
person perception abilities. Specifically, I have outlined the underlying structure of emotion 
expression recognition ability, and how this is associated with a range of broader cognitive and 
socio-affective traits. These included general intelligence, social cognition, facial identity 
recognition, autism-like characteristics, and alexithymia, as well as demographic variables of 
age and sex. A large body of research exists on the links of emotion expression recognition to 
broader life outcomes, including better social functioning and mental well-being. Equally, a 
difficulty in recognising emotional expressions has been shown to relate to the development 
and maintenance of psychiatric difficulties in a number of disorders. In this thesis, I examined 
expression recognition and identity recognition using an individual differences approach as a 
novel route to extend knowledge about these person perception abilities.  
The introductory chapter first reviewed whether there is thought to be a general factor 
underlying the ability to recognise expression across emotional categories and sensory 
modalities. I also examined the current thinking on individual differences in expression and 
identity recognition, and the psychological and demographic factors that may contribute to 
these differences. There is little work addressing this question, and even less work using the 
powerful approach of structural equation modeling (SEM), and this chapter reviewed the 
research done thus far.  
The empirical work presented in this thesis sought to address five main research aims. 
Firstly, I investigated the individual differences structure of emotion expression recognition 
ability. Secondly, I examined if this ability is related to broader abilities of face identity 
recognition and general intelligence. Thirdly, I assessed if general intelligence was related to 
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the construct of alexithymia, after accounting for (facial and supramodal) emotion recognition 
ability. The fourth aim examined the long-held view of female superiority for emotion 
expression recognition. Finally, the fifth aim explored how face abilities change over adult age, 
and whether any change is independent of the known age decline in general intelligence.  
The aim of this final chapter is to review in turn the findings of each paper, and consider 
how they relate to previous research in the field. Moreover, the wider implications are 
discussed, and future directions and conclusions are considered.  
8.2 Chapter Summaries: Main Research Questions and Findings 
8.2.1 Chapter 3:  Emotion expression recognition ability: evidence for a 
supramodal factor and its links to social cognition 
The first key research question addressed in this thesis was that of the underlying 
individual differences structure of emotion recognition ability. Much of the work concerning 
emotion expression recognition has focused only on facial expressions, despite expressive cues 
being conveyed through a variety of other modalities in everyday life. Theoretical perspectives 
posit that the ability to rapidly integrate cues across different modalities is adaptive for social 
interactions, and therefore it is plausible that individual differences across modalities reflect a 
higher-order general ability factor structure (Young, 2018).  
To examine this, in Study 1 of Chapter 3, participants (N=284) completed a battery of 
previously piloted face, body, and voice expression tests, as well as measures of autism-like 
traits, social anxiety disorder and alexithymia. Using SEM, I tested a number of specified 
models, and found that the best fitting structure was a higher-order model with a superordinate 
general factor and three modality-specific factors (one for each of face, body and voice). In 
terms of the affective traits, there was a significant negative association between the 
supramodal emotion factor and alexithymia, but no relation to either social anxiety or autism-
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like traits. The lack of relation to autism traits is not wholly surprising given recent work that 
suggests co-occurring alexithymia is the reason for the reported emotional difficulties in many 
autistic individuals (Cook et al., 2013). Many studies have observed a link between social 
phobia and difficulty with recognising emotions, but this is not confirmed in Study 1 here. This 
may be in part due to the very brief three-item measures used, although it has reportedly good 
psychometric properties and high sensitivity for identifying socially anxious individuals (de 
Lima Osório, Crippa, & Loureiro, 2007). It should also be considered that the online sample 
tested here was healthier and more heterogeneous in nature than the clinical groups often tested. 
An association may exist but only at the more severe, clinical end of the social anxiety 
continuum.  
In Study 2 (N=218), I extended the scope of the general emotion factor to include 
performance on a more ecologically valid test: the Reading the Mind in Films (RMFT) task. 
Given that this test comprises more realistic everyday social interaction scenarios, and also 
involves rapidly integrating expressive cues from characters’ faces, bodies, and voices, this test 
is a pertinent measure to include as a test of the ‘generality’ of the general emotion factor. The 
RMFT performance significantly loaded onto the general factor, thus supporting the factor as 
accurately reflecting performance across a range of emotion tasks and modalities.  
Additionally, participants completed a number of face processing tests, including 
unfamiliar face identity recognition. Results suggest the existence of a latent ‘face perception’ 
factor that is distinct from, yet highly related to, the general emotion recognition factor. These 
results are in line with recent theoretical perspectives of face processing, whereby facial 
identity and facial expression recognition share a common early perceptual stage. I modelled 
the relation between the general emotion and general face factors as a latent factor reflecting 
‘social cognition’. Future work examining a greater number and variety of tests will help to 
corroborate and extend the scope of this social cognition factor. It will be especially important 
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to explore this ability factor by developing suitable batteries of non-face stimuli, given the 
relative reliance on facial stimuli in this study.  
In Study 3 (N=249), a comprehensive measure of general intelligence was included in 
order to test its association to social cognition, and I also explored direct links to the general 
emotion and face latent factors. General intelligence was strongly and significantly predictive 
of the emotion factor, but not the face perception factor. This result is consistent with the 
perspective that face identity recognition is a specific cognitive ability, distinct from general 
cognitive ability. It also supports the proposed existence of a face perception ‘f’ factor 
(Verhallen et al., 2017) that is separate from general cognitive ability.  
Across three independent samples, then, I observed strong support for a general 
emotion recognition factor that extends beyond facial stimuli to include bodily expressions, 
auditory stimuli from the voice, and emotionally complex video stimuli. Given that this is also 
in line with, and in fact extends, the model structures reported in previous factor analytic and 
SEM studies, it seems a replicable and robust finding.  
Some further findings of this section are important to note: I observed that the general 
emotion factor was highly associated with face perception, but the two abilities remained 
functionally distinct. Moreover, they showed differing relations to general intelligence. While 
emotion recognition was strongly and positively associated with general intelligence, face 
perception exhibited no association, in line with much research positing face perception as a 
distinct skill from general cognition. In contrast, accurate emotion recognition appears to 
reflect broader cognitive processes, and may be due to recruitment of problem-solving or 
working memory strategies.  
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8.2.2 Chapter 4: Recognition of facial expression and facial identity in part reflects 
a common ability, independent of general intelligence and visual short-term memory 
Face perception literature has long debated over the degree of separation between 
identity recognition and expression recognition, and this paper sought to further address this 
question using an individual differences approach. Classic cognitive models have posited 
functionally distinct processing routes for facial cues that can rapidly change (i.e. emotional 
expression, eye gaze direction) and for cues that are relatively invariant (identity) (Bruce & 
Young, 1985; Haxby et al., 2000). Much of the support for this perspective arose from studies 
of neuro-damaged individuals who reported double dissociations between recognition of facial 
identity and facial expression (e.g. Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993).  
However, more recent empirical work has contested the notion of complete functional 
segregation, and instead has posited some overlap between these processes. To address the 
question of degree of overlap, in Chapter 4, I analysed a large, healthy, age-diverse dataset 
(N=605) whom had been tested on well-used measures of unfamiliar facial identity recognition 
(Benton test of facial recognition) and facial expression recognition (Emotion Hexagon tests 
comprising morphed basic emotions on Ekman faces). I used a SEM approach, and observed a 
significant strong association between the two face abilities. In a second model, I examined 
this association whilst adjusting for the latent variable of general intelligence (Cattell culture-
fair intelligence test) and a measure of visual short-term memory (a colour-wheel memory 
paradigm). Importantly, the expression-identity association, whilst reduced to moderate in 
magnitude, was still highly significant when accounting for performance on these two 
cognitive-perceptual measures. This suggests that the two face abilities share a common stage 
specific to face processing, and that cannot be fully accounted for by cognitive or perceptual 
abilities.  
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The findings are in line with Chapter 3 and previous work which indicated that 
individual differences in face perception are reflected at multiple levels, including general 
cognitive ability, broader face processing ability, and specific expression or identity 
recognition ability. Furthermore, results are in line with findings from Chapter 3 in that 
expression and identity recognition are related abilities but remain distinct in their own right. 
Finally, results appear to support the notion of the aforementioned f’ factor, posited by 
Verhallen and colleagues (2017), that is distinct from other cognitive abilities.  
In this study, a significant association between general intelligence and face identity 
recognition was observed, whereas no such association was observed between intelligence and 
the general face perception factor in Chapter 3. The discrepancy may be in part due to the 
choice of face perception task and the level of perceptual or cognitive demands each requires. 
In Chapter 4, the face test was the Benton test of facial recognition: a measure of unfamiliar 
face matching that can arguably be somewhat successfully completed by relying on low-level 
perceptual abilities. In contrast, the face tests used in Studies 2 and 3 of Chapter 3 comprised 
the Glasgow Face Matching Test and the Cambridge Face Memory Test, the latter of which (as 
its name suggests) has a large memory component. It thus requires higher-level face processing 
faculties to succeed, rather than lower-level feature matching abilities to problem-solve, as can 
be used to complete the Benton test.  
8.2.3 Chapter 5: Alexithymia and General Intelligence: Independent association 
over and above emotion recognition ability  
The sub-clinical construct of alexithymia has long been associated with emotional 
impairments. Individuals scoring highly on this construct report difficulties with describing 
and identifying their emotions, as well as a paucity of imagination and an externally-oriented 
style of thinking. The construct has been associated with a range of psychological and 
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psychosomatic disorders, as well as with interoceptive ability, frontal lobe functioning, and 
verbal abilities, but it has not been well established whether the construct is related to general 
intelligence. This research question was robustly examined in Chapter 5. Across three 
independent, large, healthy samples, I observed a significant negative association between 
alexithymia and intelligence. Importantly, in two of the studies, this association remained 
significant when adjusting for emotion expression recognition ability. This suggests that the 
difficulties associated with alexithymia are broader than has typically been considered in the 
literature. It also suggests that the cognitive and emotional deficits observed in alexithymia are 
relatively independent of each other.  
This finding has practical implications for the measure of alexithymia in clinical 
populations in which difficulties with cognition are already known, for example, depression 
(Marazziti et al., 2010). It is suggested in Chapter 5 that when assessing alexithymia and 
emotion recognition in these populations, a well-established measure of general intelligence 
should also be included to adjust for this potentially confounding variable.  
One interesting outcome in this section was the finding that in two samples (Study 1a 
and Study 2), alexithymia was associated with both verbal and nonverbal components of the 
general intelligence measure, and the magnitudes of these associations did not significantly 
differ from each other. From the alexithymia-language hypothesis (Hobson et al., 2019) and 
from other studies implicating verbal ability in the alexithymia construct (Hsing et al., 2013), 
this result seems surprising. However, from the present results, it appears that alexithymia 
reflects broader, nonverbal aspects of cognition in addition to the verbal association that has 
been more consistently observed. This has theoretical implications for the alexithymia 
construct, and offers possible aetiological routes to its development. This is discussed in more 
depth below.  
 CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
202 
 
8.2.4 Chapter 6: Sex Differences in Emotion Recognition: Evidence for a Small 
Overall Female Superiority on Facial Disgust 
This paper aimed to strongly test the widely held assumption of female superiority on 
emotion expression recognition. Early work in the field proposed the robust finding of a general 
female advantage across emotions, and more recent meta-analytic studies have supported the 
idea of females performing more accurately overall relative to males. However, other findings 
have reported a more mixed picture, especially with regards to individual emotion categories 
as opposed to a global score. Moreover, the vast majority of research had focused on facial 
expressions only, whereas a more extensive test of emotion recognition ability should 
incorporate expressions from other modalities. Further limitations of studies in the field consist 
of small underpowered samples, and prototypical expressions that often result in easy 
recognition and ceiling effects: these effects then obscure any potential sex differences that 
may exist.    
In order to address these limitations, participants in Chapter 6: Study 1 were tested on 
the five basic emotions in static facial and dynamic bodily expressions in a large non-student 
adult sample (N=1022). The expressions had been carefully piloted prior to the study to 
eliminate items with floor or ceiling effects, thus making them suitable for individual 
differences work. Results indicated a significant female advantage for recognising facial 
disgust and facial sadness, and a significant male advantage for recognising bodily happiness.  
With issues of reproducibility in mind, the results of the first study were tested in two 
further independent samples (Study 2: N=303, Study 3: N=634). In Study 2, participants 
completed the same battery of static faces and dynamic bodies as in Study 1, but with the 
additional batteries of dynamic faces and static bodies. Results confirmed the significant female 
advantage for static facial disgust that had been observed in Study 1. This finding was bolstered 
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by a significant female advantage for dynamic facial disgust in the additional stimulus set, 
supporting the idea of a general ability across expressive modalities. A female advantage for 
static bodily happiness was also observed, but should be interpreted with caution given the 
male advantage noted in Study 1, and is most likely the result of random variability.  
In Study 3, participants completed the static facial and dynamic bodily expression 
batteries as used in Study 1. Only the three significant findings that had been observed in Study 
1 were tested, in order to increase power and validate only the robust findings. The significant 
female advantage for recognition of static facial disgust expressions was confirmed. The other 
two findings did not replicate.  
Across three large independent samples then, I observed that females were consistently 
more accurate in recognition of facial disgust, and this ability extended beyond static 
expressions to incorporate dynamic stimuli as well. In contrast, a female advantage for facial 
sadness and a male advantage for bodily happiness did not replicate in either of the latter 
samples, and thus appear not to be robust findings. Overall, results of these three studies 
support the idea of a sex difference but it is important to emphasise that this difference is limited 
to facial disgust, and not any of the other basic emotions. Moreover, the effect, though 
significant, was small, and indicates that the two sexes are largely overlapping in their emotion 
recognition ability. This contrasts with previous work (e.g. Hall, 1978; McClure, 2000; 
Thompson & Voyer, 2014) and popular belief in the female advantage for emotion recognition 
that is often posited to be large and present across emotions, and instead suggests that for the 
most part, males and females are similarly accurate in recognising emotions.  
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8.2.5 Chapter 7: Face perception across the adult lifespan: Evidence for age-
related changes independent of general intelligence 
In the final empirical section, Chapter 7 addressed the question of how emotion 
recognition ability changes across the adult lifespan. Given the consistent finding of general 
intelligence declining with increasing age, and given also the strong positive associations 
between intelligence and emotion recognition that I have reported in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, 
it is plausible that any age-related decline observed in emotion recognition may be reflective 
of the known decline in general intelligence.  
To test this, a relatively large, healthy, age-diverse sample (N=595) completed widely 
used measures of facial emotional expression recognition, unfamiliar facial identity 
recognition, and general intelligence. Results indicated that both expression and identity 
recognition abilities declined significantly with age, independent of the decline in intelligence. 
Furthermore, the presence of both aspects of face perception meant that the specificity of the 
decline was explored. Of particular note, I observed that the decline in expression recognition 
was distinct from that of identity recognition, and vice versa. These findings are in line with 
the aforementioned perspective of face perception ability reflecting a hierarchical structure 
with multiple levels of individual differences (Chapter 3), and that at least part of the age effect 
appears to operate at the specific expression and identity levels. The age-related declines are 
considered relatively focal, and not purely due to declines in broader face processing or general 
cognitive ability.  
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8.3 Main Implications for Theory  
8.3.1 The individual differences structure of emotion recognition ability 
In Chapter 3, I outlined three independent studies that examined the functional 
architecture of emotion recognition. Results strongly suggested a general factor underlying 
recognition of emotions from across visual (face and body) and auditory (voice) modalities. As 
noted in the introductory and discussion sections of this chapter, this structure of emotion 
recognition may reflect the response to the demands of everyday social interactions. It is clear 
that individuals do not only communicate their emotional state through facial expressions, but 
also through other expressive cues, such as hand gestures, body posture, and vocal tone. It has 
been theorised in the literature that being able to rapidly attend to any or all of these cues may 
be the most adaptive strategy in accurately perceiving others’ affective states. Indeed, a 
consistent finding is that of an advantage for bimodal (face and voice) stimuli: these are 
recognised more quickly and accurately than unimodal displays (Klasen, Chen, & Mathiek, 
2012).  
In the three studies in Chapter 3, the cues from sensory channels were not presented 
simultaneously (i.e. cross-modal). Instead, they were tested consecutively in separate batteries, 
and the common variance between each was extracted using a SEM approach. In this way, the 
individual differences structure of the general ability underlying performance across the three 
modalities was estimated free from measurement error.  
Across the three studies in Chapter 3, the higher-order model exhibited the best fit to 
the data, and this is in line with recent work suggesting there exists multiple levels of individual 
differences within the architecture of emotion recognition ability, including modality-specific 
(i.e. face, body, or voice) and modality-general. It has been argued that there may be a good 
reason for the architecture to be arranged in this way. A general emotion factor that ranges 
across expressive modality may be particularly useful when the individual needs to integrate 
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cues from multiple modalities at once, or when the expressive channels are changing rapidly. 
This is often the case for social interactions, where a person has to listen to what someone is 
saying, attend to their tone of voice, and perceive their facial expressions and/or body signals. 
All of these may change very quickly and subtly, and need to be perceived in parallel. A general 
factor in common cases such as this may be the most optimal solution for fast and accurate 
emotion recognition. Equally, modality-specific factors may be optimal when expertise for one 
expressive channel is especially required. Thus, the hierarchical structure outlined in Chapter 
3 appears to reflect the full range of everyday social demands.   
This study used structural modeling to look at face, body, and voice recognition in a 
single sample, and results support previous neuroimaging (Calder & Young, 2005) and 
structural equation modeling work (Schlegel et al., 2012) suggesting a general ability for 
perceiving emotional information from different sensory modalities. Importantly, results also 
support the previous SEM structures that posit a general recognition ability across emotions 
and across one (Suzuki et al., 2010) or two (Lewis et al., 2016) modalities, but extend this 
structure to three domains of face, body and voice. Given that this outcome was observed across 
three independent samples in Chapter 3, it appears a robust and replicable pattern.  
 
8.3.2 Classic models of face perception 
 Classic cognitive models of face perception have posited functionally distinct 
theoretical and neural pathways for processing of facial expression and facial identity (Bruce 
& Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000) that diverge after a common stage in face perception. 
However, more recent work has indicated that variant (expression, gaze) and invariant 
(identity, sex) facial signals may interact to a greater degree than was previously assumed. 
Becker and colleagues (2007) observed an interaction between sexually dimorphic 
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characteristics and expressions of anger or happiness, such that males were more likely to be 
labelled as displaying an angry expression and females as displaying a happy expression. 
Responses were also shown to be quicker when these two types of facial signal were congruent 
(i.e. anger/male and happiness/female) as opposed to incongruent (anger/female and 
happiness/male). In a similar vein, Sacco and Hugenberg (2009) found an interaction between 
the invariant signal of face shape and the variant signal of fear and anger expressions. They 
observed an interaction effect such that a more youthful and submissive-looking face (rounder 
face, higher brow, larger eyes) was perceived to be showing a fearful expression, whilst a more 
mature, dominant-looking face (narrower face, lower brow, smaller eyes) was perceived as 
expressing anger.  
Given some evidence for an overlap between expression and identity, then, an 
interesting question concerns the extent of this common stage of shared processing. In Chapter 
4, a strong positive association between facial expression and facial identity was observed 
(.52), indicating a substantial degree of overlap between the two face perception abilities. This 
suggests that the two measures included here are tapping abilities at the early perceptual stage 
of face processing, rather than a later cognitive stage. In Studies 2 and 3 of Chapter 3, the 
relationship between facial expression recognition and the two tests of unfamiliar face 
recognition (GFMT, CFMT) was weaker (between .19 and .30), indicating a lower degree of 
overlap. This makes sense, given that the CFMT in particular places fewer demands on earlier 
perceptual processes and more emphasis on later cognitive processes. From these studies, it is 
clear that the degree of overlap between expression and identity recognition is more nuanced 
than traditional models posited, and depends largely on the specific demands of the tasks used.  
 An important observation from this section is that the expression-identity association 
was reduced in magnitude but remained significant when adjusting for measures of general 
intelligence and visual short-term memory. This implies that at least some of the shared 
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variance arises from the level of specific face processing, and that it is not fully explained by a 
commonality at the level of broader cognitive processing. These findings are consistent with 
previous work (Lewis et al., 2016) and with results from Chapter 3 of the current thesis that 
face processing involves contributions from individual differences at multiple levels within the 
ability, including general cognition, general face processing, and emotion- or identity-specific 
processing.  
Results can be interpreted in line with both Bruce and Young’s and Haxby et al.’s 
models, given that some of the overlap appeared to be at the cognitive level, and some appeared 
to be at a face-specific level. Determining the structure of multiple levels involved in face 
processing helps us to understand the discrepancies in the literature regarding the extent of the 
overlap between facial expression and identity recognition.  
8.3.3 The f factor in face perception  
Across many broad batteries of general intelligence, a commonly reported finding is 
that of positive correlations being observed between individual sub-tests, otherwise known as 
the ‘positive manifold’, and the term g was coined to describe the general factor that emerges 
through factor analysis of the batteries (Spearman, 1927). In the same vein, Verhallen and 
colleagues (2017) observed significant correlations across a variety of face perception tests, 
and thus termed the underlying common factor f that accounted for the positive manifold 
performance across these tasks. Other studies have observed similar results for significant inter-
relations between diverse tests of face processing (Bowles et al., 2009; Wilhelm et al., 2010; 
McCaffery, Robertson, Young, & Burton, 2018). In both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, results were 
in line with these studies and appeared to support the existence of this general face perception 
factor f that was related to but functionally distinct from other cognitive and socio-emotional 
abilities.  
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This proposal of f was particularly supported by results of Chapter 3, given that the 
same three face perception tests (Glasgow Face Matching Test, Cambridge Face Memory Test, 
Mooney test) were included as in Verhallen et al.’s f factor paper. Moreover, this chapter 
contributed to extending the scope of f by showing that it relates to, but remains distinct from, 
other higher-level cognitive abilities including facial expression recognition. Its scope was also 
extended by observing support for the f factor in a broader, more diverse and more generalisable 
sample than the undergraduates tested by Verhallen et al., and across two independent studies.  
 Verhallen and colleagues reported no significant association between performance on 
the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) and participants’ scores on the UK secondary 
school qualification: GCSE (their proxy for intelligence). In contrast, I observed a significant 
positive correlation between the Benton Test of Facial Recognition and the Cattell Culture-Fair 
intelligence test in Chapter 4. This overlap may be as a result of similar cognitive strategies 
that are used in the multiple choice general intelligence test and can also be employed to ‘solve’ 
the Benton test. Studies have shown that typical scores on this test can be achieved even by 
prosopagnosic individuals, by means of matching the facial features in a non-holistic style 
(Bowles et al., 2009). In this way, participants can achieve ‘normal’ scores on then test even in 
the absence of ‘normal’ face recognition ability. In contrast, the CFMT does not show the target 
and test faces simultaneously and so the participant is required to encode the target identity in 
memory in order to succeed on the test, and this memory component for encoding faces may 
show less commonality with the intelligence test in Chapter 3.  
Alternatively, the lack of correlation between GCSE scores and CFMT performance 
may have been as a result of the undergraduate sample drawn from the same university. 
Verhallen himself notes that this may have restricted the possibility of observing a correlation 
given that many of the students may have achieved similar GCSE grades, thus limiting the 
range extensively. One strength of the methods used is Chapter 4 is the inclusion of a battery 
 CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
210 
 
of general intelligence that tested participants at the same time point as performance on the 
face perception tasks. This is in contrast to the inclusion of GSCE scores which may have been 
sat a few years prior to the face battery tests, and which required participants to remember and 
report their scores accurately and truthfully.  
The strong correlation between facial expression and facial identity recognition 
observed in Chapter 4 lends support to the notion of a general face factor. However, it is also 
possible that the association between these two particular measures may have been somewhat 
bolstered by the overlap in perceptual demands of the two face tests. Both expression labelling 
and unfamiliar face matching tasks demand contribution from early perceptual processes, and 
as highlighted previously, it is likely that a weaker correlation would have been observed in 
this study had a test like the CFMT been used, in which later cognitive processes are more 
pertinent to task success. This is supported by the findings from Chapter 3 in which a weaker 
association between the CFMT and facial expression recognition ability was observed.  
Nonetheless, the association between the expression and identity measures in Chapter 
4 remained significant and moderate in magnitude when adjusting for cognitive and perceptual 
ability, thus giving support to the face-specific f factor that is distinct from wider cognitive 
functioning. The moderate association between the abilities, then, appears to better capture the 
face-specific variance of the general f factor.  
8.3.4 Theories of alexithymia  
Verbal difficulties have frequently been reported in alexithymic individuals, and a 
recent proposal has extended this perspective in greater depth. In their alexithymia-language 
hypothesis, Hobson and colleagues (2019) suggested that early language difficulties may be 
one plausible route for development of alexithymia, given that both nativist and constructionist 
theories of emotion posit language abilities as critical for emotional development. According 
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to this model, then, any dysfunction of these language abilities could have a disruptive effect 
on subsequent emotional abilities (Hobson et al., 2019).  
However, Hobson and colleagues acknowledge that verbal impairment is not the only 
possible route to alexithymia. Other potential mechanisms include interoceptive difficulties 
(Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016), cortical damage, as posited by the neurobiological accounts 
(Larsen, Brand, Bermond, & Hijman, 2003) or difficulties focusing on or evaluating an 
emotional response, as posited by the attention-appraisal model (Preece et al., 2017). In the 
samples tested in Chapter 5, alexithymia was negatively associated with both verbal and 
nonverbal components of the general intelligence test, suggesting that more general cognitive 
deficits appear to exist. Cortical lesions to frontal or right cerebral regions may contribute to 
these broader impairments, given the cognitive processes that are associated with frontal lobe 
functioning, such as working memory, decision-making, and task-switching. According to 
neurobiological perspectives (e.g. Larsen et al., 2003), deficits to these areas would result in 
neither experience of emotion (affective component) nor subsequent conscious reasoning of 
emotion (cognitive component). Rather, a relative blunting of emotionality is thought to occur.  
In contrast, alexithymia arising through interoceptive impairment is likely reflecting a 
type of alexithymia in which emotions are experienced but unable to be explicitly verbalised. 
Because of this, these individuals may report more psychosomatic problems, arguably due to a 
misinterpretation of the somatic symptoms that come from emotional arousal (Larsen et al., 
2003). This is consistent with interoceptive alexithymia, in which physiological signals are 
unable to be interpreted appropriately and often misconstrued for other internal cues. Finally, 
Preece et al.’s (2017) attention-appraisal model posits that an individual experiences an 
emotional response but because of their under-developed emotion schemas, they either do not 
focus on the most pertinent aspect of the response or they misinterpret the emotional 
information, resulting in emotional difficulties and maladaptive emotion regulation.  
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These possible routes for development of alexithymia (frontal damage, interoceptive 
failure, or underdeveloped emotion processing) may also account for the heterogeneity 
observed in the many psychosomatic and psychological disorders associated with the construct. 
If an individual has developed alexithymia through the frontal lobe/right hemisphere pathway, 
then they have an absence of both the emotional and cognitive aspects of affect, and as such, 
will not suffer problems with emotionalising or psychosomatic distress. In contrast, individuals 
with impaired interoception continue to experience emotional arousal but with no conscious 
cognition, and therefore, the physiological signals can be misinterpreted. As a result, 
individuals have problems regulating their internal bodily signals and emotions, leading to a 
variety of psychosomatic or emotion dysregulation conditions, such as anorexia nervosa 
(Bourke, Taylor, Parker, & Bagby, 1992; Brewer et al., 2015), chronic pain (Lumley, Asselin, 
& Norman, 1997), alcohol abuse (Lyvers et al., 2012), and medically unexplained symptoms 
(Deary, Scott, & Wilson, 1997), amongst many others. In a similar vein, if an individual’s 
alexithymia is as a result of poorly developed emotion schemas, then they experience an 
emotional response but do not attend to or evaluate it appropriately, resulting in poor regulation 
of uncomfortable feelings and negative emotional reactivity (Preece et al., 2017).  
In terms of the alexithymia-language hypothesis, Hobson et al. (2019) noted that it is 
difficult to distinguish between alexithymia caused by damage to language processing areas 
such as the inferior frontal gyrus, or damage to interoception-related areas such as the anterior 
insula, given how close in proximity these areas are to each other and their location being close 
to or within the frontal lobes themselves. It may be that the pathways outlined in the different 
manifestations of alexithymia are not mutually exclusive, and further behavioural and 
structural imaging research could help to disentangle their respective aetiologies.  
As mentioned, one key finding from the studies in Chapter 5 is that alexithymia is not 
solely related to verbal difficulties but shows associations with broader cognition too. In Preece 
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et al.’s (2017) attention-appraisal model, the authors outline a route to alexithymia whereby an 
individual’s emotion schemas are underdeveloped and not well organised or integrated. As first 
posited by Lane and Schwartz (1987), emotion schemas are cognitive structures that guide the 
processing of emotions. If these have not developed normally, it results in the individual 
reaching only the lower-level basic stages of emotional awareness, with less complex and 
nuanced processing of emotions. The underdevelopment of these key cognitive structures may 
imply some broader cognitive development difficulties in the individual as well.  
Izard defined emotion schemas as “emotion feelings interacting with cognition in 
motivating the decision making and actions of everyday life” (Izard, 2011, p371). He argued 
that emotion schemas depend on sufficient cognitive development in order to implement the 
higher-order mental processes involved in emotional experience. Given that Izard suggested 
that the basic emotions require minimal cognitive processing relative to more complex 
secondary emotions, and that alexithymia was associated with inferior recognition of the basic 
emotions in the studies in Chapter 5, it would be interesting in future studies to examine 
whether people higher in alexithymia would show even worse recognition of these more 
complex and blended emotions.  
In sum, a possible route to alexithymia is through inadequate development of language 
and/or emotion schemas that lead to inappropriate emotion appraisal. These schemas are 
dependent on adequate cognitive development, especially higher-order processes including 
reasoning, planning, and evaluation of complex information. The manifestation of emotion 
recognition difficulties as seen in the three samples in Chapter 5 may reflect insufficient 
cognitive development, and may be one plausible explanation for the observed difficulties in 
general intelligence in people high in alexithymia observed here.  
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8.3.5 Sex differences in emotion recognition ability 
It has been widely reported in emotion literature to date that females consistently show 
a general advantage over males for accurate recognition of emotional stimuli. Many individual 
empirical studies and four meta-analyses (Hall, 1978, 1984; McClure, 2000, Thompson & 
Voyer, 2014) have supported this finding, and report small-to-medium effect sizes. Hall’s first 
review indicated a Cohen’s d of 0.40, and her second indicated a range between 0.18 and 0.52. 
McClure’s review (which it should be noted comprised children and adolescent studies) 
reported a d of 0.13, and Thompson and Voyer reported an overall d of 0.19. However, closer 
inspection of the available studies reveals a more nuanced picture with a greater mixture of 
outcomes. Whilst many studies report more accurate performance in females, a number of 
studies have observed no significant sex differences or report a male advantage.  
The findings from Chapter 6 sought to offer some clarity with regards to this mixed 
literature. Across three relatively large, independent samples, a small but significant advantage 
for females on recognising facial disgust was observed (Cohen’s d ranged from 0.18 to 0.47). 
Interestingly, this finding extended from static facial stimuli to a novel set of dynamic faces. 
Despite some sex differences observed in other emotional categories (for example, male 
advantage for bodily happiness, and female advantage for facial sadness), none of these 
replicated in the other two studies, and thus are most likely the result of random sampling. 
These results emphasise the importance of replication studies and validating results in well-
powered samples.  
The fact that the female advantage for facial disgust recognition was observed across 
the three studies in Chapter 6, as well as the advantage extending to include dynamic morphed 
facial stimuli, suggests that this is a robust pattern. However, it should also be highlighted that 
the effect sizes were small-to-moderate, in line with the magnitudes reported in the previous 
meta-analyses. Given the results from Chapter 6, then, it can be tentatively concluded that there 
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does appear to be a robust sex difference, but importantly, it is small in magnitude and limited 
to the domain of facial disgust. In terms of global emotion recognition scores, there appears to 
be no sex difference, and overall, the distributions of the two sexes are largely overlapping.  
In the discussion of Chapter 6, a speculative account was proposed for the robust female 
advantage for facial disgust recognition, and which focused on the distinct evolutionary 
pressures faced by males and females. Females have been shown to score higher on measures 
of disgust sensitivity, and this is considered to serve as a guard against disease. They have a 
higher risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases and of passing infection on to any 
offspring. Their immunity changes over the first half of the luteal phase of the menstrual cycle 
when conception is most likely, and also during the first trimester of pregnancy when their 
maternal immune system is suppressed to prevent attack on the growing foetus (Fessler, Eng, 
& Navarrete, 2005). Food-borne illnesses are especially dangerous to the mother and unborn 
child during this initial pregnancy phase, which may in part account for the increased levels of 
nausea and vomiting, and may elevate reactions to subtle oral or vocal cues of food-related 
elicitors of disgust. Experiencing higher levels of disgust, then, may be a motivating factor in 
avoiding potential contaminants. From an evolutionary adaptationist framework, it is argued 
that this may drive the more sensitive and rapid recognition of disgust cues often reported in 
females.  
Whilst females’ reporting of higher disgust sensitivity may arise from hormonal 
influences, it has been argued that males’ consistently lower scores on this measure is as a 
result of highlighting their robust immune systems (Fleischman, 2014). The selection pressure 
faced by males trying to attract and secure a reproductive mate may mean that it is not adaptive 
for them to outwardly react to signals of disgust or contamination. In fact, they may be more 
successful in acquiring a mate by expressing a willingness to approach potential toxins, as with 
other risky behaviour (Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson, 2004). By not recognising or reacting 
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to subtle cues of disgust, males signal to potential female mates that their immune system is 
(and thus their genes) are strong and suitable for successful mating.  
It is interesting that the female advantage for recognising disgust was limited to the 
facial domain in the studies of Chapter 6, albeit in both static and dynamic formats. This may 
be because disgust is primarily an emotion to protect against oral ingestion of toxins. Given 
that reactions to contaminants are most often expressed via the nose and mouth, it seems most 
adaptive to focus on these facial cues when scrutinising for signs of contamination. As the 
traditional primary caregiver in most instances, it is often the female’s responsibility to 
carefully monitor their offspring for these signs and may result in their superior facial disgust 
recognition ability. Traditionally, males have a lower parental investment in raising offspring, 
and are not often the primary caregiver, and so sensitivity to their facial signals of disgust may 
not be salient or adaptive for males.  
Another reason why the sex difference was found only for facial stimuli is that disgust 
is relatively difficult to express via the body alone, evidenced by the low performance scores 
of both males and females on the dynamic bodily disgust point-light displays in Study 1. In 
fact, both sexes scored the lowest on this domain. In addition, items expressing disgust through 
a static body were not included in the stimulus set that was used in Study 2, due to it being 
highly difficult to accurately portray disgust in this format (de Gelder & Van den Stock, 2011). 
In terms of disgust recognition, then, it appears most adaptive to focus on facial cues, although 
distinct mating roles may drive this ability differently in males and females. In sum, it is 
suggested, with a certain degree of caution, that unique selection pressures are a potential 
explanation for the observed small female superiority on facial disgust.  
The sex difference in disgust recognition observed in Chapter 6 is in line with 
Darwinian and nativist theories of basic emotions outlined in the introductory chapter. It seems 
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plausible that sex-specific selective pressures can drive experience and expression of the basic 
emotions differently in males and females, and this may vary according to each of the emotions 
and their adaptive functions. For disgust specifically, differences in child-rearing roles may 
have driven higher sensitivity and more accurate recognition ability in females, as this is 
advantageous for optimal offspring survival, whereas males are afforded no evolutionary 
advantage for recognition of facial disgust. Rather, males may face a selective pressure to not 
react to signals of contamination or infection, as a means of highlighting their reproductive 
fitness to females. If this is the case, it is perhaps not surprising that there exists a sex difference 
in favour of females on facial disgust. For the other four basic emotions, however, mating roles 
may not be as salient in shaping the respective selection pressures and may be why no robust 
sex differences emerged for these categories.  
 
8.4 Critical Evaluation: Limitations and Future Directions 
Individual limitations of each study have been discussed in the corresponding 
chapters. In this section, some general limitations that are relevant across the range of studies 
are considered.  
8.4.1 Cross-modal versus supramodal emotion recognition 
 One clear limitation of the current work is that participants were not tested on emotional 
stimuli from different categories simultaneously. That is, cross-modal emotion recognition was 
not examined here. Rather, participants in Chapter 3 were shown emotional stimuli from the 
face, body, and voice separately and in succession, and the commonality between their 
performances was statistically extracted using SEM. This then resulted in a general emotion 
recognition factor that, along with my collaborators, we have termed ‘supramodal’. This factor 
reflects an individual’s ability to recognise emotions from a variety of visual and auditory 
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sources, and offers interesting insight into the question of whether our ability to recognise facial 
emotions is associated with our ability to recognise cues from other sensory channels.  
Of course, this approach does not assess an individual’s ability to integrate across these 
channels, and future work using cross-modal stimuli will be invaluable towards establishing 
the nature of sensory integration of emotional information. Currently, there exists few available 
stimulus sets to robustly examine this which are suitable for individual differences work, i.e., 
stimuli that show no floor or ceiling effects, and are sensitive enough to detect a wide range of 
individual variation within a healthy sample. Development and validation of such sets is an 
ongoing challenge for the field, and a key aim for future research. Given the interesting results 
reported in Chapter 3, such stimuli development would be valuable for exploring emotion 
recognition ability from a cross-modal perspective.  
Another reason why future testing of cross-modal emotional stimuli is particularly 
relevant is the higher ecological validity they can offer. It has been widely argued that in 
everyday life, we do not often encounter emotional stimuli in isolation. When interacting with 
other people, we can often see their facial expressions and hear their tone of voice 
simultaneously, as well as perceiving their hand gestures and body posture. Being able to 
quickly and accurately attend to all of these various sensory cues in parallel is fundamental for 
a nuanced understanding of the emotional state of the other person and for responding most 
appropriately. From an evolutionary perspective, congruent vocal, facial and bodily 
expressions may have facilitated the rapid recognition of a signal of threat in the environment 
or the state of mind of a conspecific.  
For the subsets of participants who show relative difficulties with emotion recognition, 
it may be useful to have access to other emotional cues as a compensatory strategy for decoding 
expressions. For example, if a person who is higher in alexithymia is unsure of a facial 
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expression being made, the accompanying body language or vocal tone may help them to work 
out the most likely emotion being expressed. Alternatively, bi- or trimodal stimuli may offer 
the additional insight of identifying which sensory channels certain subsets of participants more 
heavily rely on for recognition. For example, in their Reading the Mind in Films task (RMFT), 
Golan and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that autistic participants were less likely to integrate 
the verbal information with the available prosodic and facial cues, thus resulting in a higher 
proportion of labelling errors. The authors recommend the development and use of ecological, 
multisensory tasks to assess socioemotional understanding that may reveal more subtle and 
nuanced difficulties in some clinical populations. To date, the widespread use of static, posed 
facial expressions of emotion may be easy enough for autistic or alexithymic participants to 
pass, and therefore their emotional difficulties and recognition strategies are somewhat masked 
by the choice of stimuli.  
Older adults are also thought to be able to somewhat compensate for their declining 
emotion recognition by taking into account emotional signals from multiple sources. In a study 
of lexical, facial, and vocal expressions, older adults benefitted more from bimodal or trimodal 
stimulus presentation than did their younger counterparts. There was no group difference 
between the younger or older participants on the bi- or trimodal conditions, but the older adults 
showed significantly worse accuracy on unimodal expressions (Wieck & Kunzmann, 2017). 
Consistent with this notion, some studies have reported equal or even superior performance of 
older adults when the emotional stimuli consisted of videos rather than static images (e.g. 
Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2010). Isaacowitz and Stanley (2011) went on to argue that most 
emotion stimuli used to date have been impoverished and lacking in context. He argues that 
whilst facial emotion recognition does appear to decline in older adults, the reality of this 
decline may not be as severe as results would suggest. In everyday life, older adults may be 
able to effectively compensate for this decline by considering situational cues or signals from 
 CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
220 
 
other sensory channels. Appreciating this compensation may lead researchers to a more 
nuanced understanding of the mechanisms underpinning age-related decline in emotion 
recognition (Isaacowitz & Stanley, 2011).  
Whilst this ageing and emotion recognition literature remains somewhat mixed 
(Ruffman, 2011), it is plausible that older adults’ emotion recognition ability may be enhanced 
with the addition of congruent information, and therefore cross-modal stimuli may minimise 
the age effect that is widely reported in the literature. It is possible, then, that the age decline 
observed in Chapter 4 would have been weaker had the emotional stimuli comprised 
simultaneous bodily or vocal information alongside facial expressions. Future studies with 
similarly age-diverse samples and cross-modal stimuli will be able to offer a unique insight 
into this debate.  
8.4.2 Testing in general populations 
 Another limitation that is relevant across the studies presented in this thesis is the testing 
of clinically-relevant traits in healthy populations. Whilst the findings are informative for 
exploring the associations between emotion expression recognition and socio-affective 
disorders, it does not necessarily follow that these associations translate to a clinical population.  
 For example, in Chapter 3, I tested autism-like characteristics using a 28-item self-
reported questionnaire. Whilst this instrument provides a range of individual variation and is 
useful in establishing correlations with emotional tasks, it is obviously not as thorough as a 
clinical autism assessment and interview in identifying the severity of autistic traits. 
Furthermore, autism-like traits were tested in an online sample of healthy American adults. 
Online samples have been demonstrated to be more diverse and more representative of the 
general population at large than traditional college-based samples, but of course are not 
representative of clinically-diagnosed autistic populations. Confounds of higher general 
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intelligence and verbal ability in the healthy samples in Chapter 3 may have constrained or 
altered the associations reported. Future work examining the structure of emotion recognition 
ability in autistic individuals may corroborate the superordinate emotion factor reported here, 
or alternatively may reveal a different underlying structure in this population.   
 Also in Chapter 3, social anxiety was measured and no association with emotion 
recognition was observed. However, for purposes of overall survey brevity, the measure used 
was very short and may not have reliably captured the variance of the disorder. Moreover, as 
with autism-like traits above, the samples tested were healthy, and therefore it cannot be ruled 
out that an association with emotion recognition would have emerged if a clinically diagnosed 
sample of individuals with social anxiety disorder had been tested.  
 Finally, in both Chapters 3 and 5, the sub-clinical construct of alexithymia was assessed 
using the self-report Toronto Alexithymia Scale. Whilst this scale is very widely used in the 
field, it has faced criticisms regarding the self-report nature. Some researchers argue that being 
able to provide an accurate and reliable gauge of emotional capabilities requires a high degree 
of self-awareness that alexithymics typically do not have (Hobson et al., 2019). This lack of 
meta-awareness into one’s own emotional difficulties may confound the measurement of 
alexithymia, particularly in high-scoring individuals who may not be aware of their own 
impairments. Furthermore, verbal difficulties in alexithymic individuals may interfere with 
their self-assessment. By rating agreement to items like ‘It is difficult for me to find the right 
words for my feelings”, the researcher may be unsure as to whether the problems lie in 
identifying the emotional feeling, or in verbalising their emotional experience. However, at 
least in the healthy general populations tested, alexithymia scores correlate well with emotional 
task performance, suggesting that the scale does have predictive value and that most individuals 
do have reliable emotional insight. As with the two clinical traits discussed above, it would 
useful for the understanding of the alexithymia construct if the associations reported here were 
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corroborated in individuals who score above the clinically-significant threshold for 
alexithymia.  
8.4.3 Social Cognition variable – reliance on facial stimuli 
 The overriding majority of the current set of studies has relied on facial stimuli for 
measurement of social cognition, and this reliance may be limiting. In Chapter 3, a latent social 
cognition factor was proposed, but the subtests included in the overall model comprised mainly 
facial stimuli. It would have been interesting to see if the latent face perception factor (derived 
from face identity recognition tasks) would have extended to identity recognition from other 
modalities, for example, voice. However, body and voice identity recognition tasks that are 
suitable for individual differences research are not widely available. In pilot studies of voice 
identity tests carried out during this doctoral work, the psychometric properties observed were 
not satisfactory for the individual differences approach that was used with the other stimulus 
sets. That is, in two voice identity recognition tasks tested, participants showed chance level 
responses and little individual variation. The lack of stability of these two tests rendered them 
impossible to structurally and stably model, and therefore could not be used to answer the 
theoretically interesting question of whether the face perception factor extends to other sensory 
modalities, (e.g. voice, gait), and better reflects ‘person perception’, rather than faces per se. 
As highlighted, a pertinent task for future research in this area is the development and validation 
of suitable stimulus sets that will help to broaden the scope of the latent ability factors observed 
in this thesis.  
Regarding emotion expression recognition, the development of more ecologically valid 
stimuli will be of great use to the field. Stimuli that vary in race, age, and modality, as well as 
showing a wider variety of complex emotional expressions and social interactions, will be 
necessary for corroborating and extending the findings reported in this thesis. As outlined in 
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previous chapters, there has arguably been an over-reliance on greyscale posed expressions. 
Stimuli that present emotional expressions across modalities simultaneously may be especially 
helpful in detecting subtler individual differences in certain samples, for example, older 
individuals or individuals with autism. Within the general adult population, expressions that 
are not prototypical and posed, i.e. subtle, spontaneous micro-expressions, are required to avoid 
the widespread ceiling effects in the field, and enable the researcher to observe the more 
nuanced differences in expression recognition ability.  
8.5 Conclusions 
 In sum, this thesis has advanced knowledge of person perception abilities in several 
important ways. Firstly, I have outlined the individual differences structure of emotion 
recognition ability across face, body and voice domains, and suggest that this structure is a 
higher-order model comprising a general supramodal factor and domain-specific factors. 
Secondly, I have extended our understanding of this structure by exploring its links to important 
cognitive and affective traits; specifically, I observed moderate links with general intelligence 
and alexithymia.  
 Thirdly, I also modelled another core person perception ability, that of face identity 
recognition, and observed that this ability was related to, but functionally distinct from, that of 
emotion expression recognition. Fourth, I used an individual differences approach as a novel 
and more robust way to examine how demographic variables of sex and age are associated with 
person perception abilities. These sections highlight the importance of ensuring that emotion 
and identity stimuli are suitable for detecting subtle individual variation, given how varied the 
healthy adult population appears to be on these abilities.  
 I have outlined the architecture of person perception abilities, and have also placed 
these abilities in a wider cognitive and psychosocial context. To gain a fuller and more nuanced 
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understanding of emotion and identity recognition, it is important to understand how these 
abilities vary in a neurotypical population, as well as how they relate to broader everyday skills. 
The findings presented here emphasise how individual variation has been somewhat 
overlooked in earlier studies, and how it is crucial to consider when examining these abilities 
in future work.  
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